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ABSTRACT 
 
Situations that call for interorganizational coordination are often ones in which there is no higher 
authority to mandate how the cooperating organizations will work together.  Scholars and practitioners 
often see collaboration as a solution to the challenge of egalitarian interorganizational organizing.  In 
order to truly evaluate this premise, scholars must first define the communication behaviors that constitute 
collaboration.  Then they must address the misconception that collaborative approaches in and of 
themselves somehow prevent or eliminate conflicts.  Rather, as Poole (2013) reasons, whether or not 
collaborators confront one another to address differences may differentiate between effective 
collaborations and “pathological” collaborations.  The present project operationalizes collaborative 
interaction – a term proposed by Lewis (2006) – as well as Poole’s (2013) concept of confrontation to 
better understand how agents involved in interorganizational coordination may or may not engage in such 
behaviors, and what happens as a result. 
To study these phenomena, I designed a mixed-method study of interagency coordination in 
multi-agency disaster response exercises.  In Phase 1, I observed three such exercises involving a variety 
of city, county and state response agencies in different geographical areas of a Midwestern state.  In 
addition to the exercises themselves, I attended the exercise planning meetings for two of the exercises, 
and I interviewed fourteen members of the planning committee of the most complex exercise.  I analyzed 
these qualitative data to better understand what kinds of coordination conflicts arise in a multi-agency 
disaster response exercise and how participants communicate in response to those conflicts.   
I found that agency representatives were unlikely to address their concerns directly to the 
interfering party as soon as something prompted those concerns.  Instead, they directed concerns to a 
liaison – often, the exercise’s lead facilitator – who may not have been in position to influence the 
interfering party.  Other times, they held back concerns until the debrief discussion after the exercise; 
sometimes these debrief discussions prompted robust group problem-solving, but a few key stakeholders 
were almost always missing.  Those agency representatives who did raise their concerns directly to the 
interfering party sometimes encountered resistance or indifference, but other times, they were able to 
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engage in dialogue about each agency’s needs and to make provisional cooperative decisions about how 
to work together differently in the future.     
Next, I used the results of Phase 1 to design a questionnaire to better understand the relationship 
between collaborative communication behaviors, confrontive communication behaviors, what motivates 
such behaviors, and how they affect exercise outcomes.  In Phase 2 of the study, I distributed the online 
questionnaire to a sample of response professionals who had completed incident command courses at a 
local fire service institute.  I asked participants to think of a multi-agency disaster response exercise in 
which they had participated in the past three years, and to answer a series of questions about their 
perceptions of and activities associated with this focal exercise.  Participants (n = 245) were affiliated 
with a variety of types of response agencies, but the largest proportions came from fire, law enforcement, 
public health, and emergency management.  Approximately half (47%) reported on an exercise that they 
had helped to plan.   
My analysis evaluated a series of original scales and addressed four research questions related to 
the relationships between key variables.  I found that collaborative interaction behaviors and confrontive 
interaction behaviors appear to constitute distinct but related constructs, and both showed a strong 
positive association with exercise participants’ satisfaction with the exercise.  Motivations, such as the 
anticipated benefit for the participant’s home agency and the impression that other participating agencies 
appear motivated to learn, also showed strong positive associations with participants’ satisfaction.  The 
extent of the individual’s involvement with exercise activities did not appear to be a strong predictor of 
collaborative interaction or of exercise satisfaction; neither did the agency’s investment of resources in 
the exercise.      
The study as a whole provides a rationale for future study of how confrontation may help 
collaborators foster productive conflict while limiting unproductive conflict – and ultimately achieve 
effective interorganizational coordination.  
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am deeply grateful to my co-chairs, Dr. John C. Lammers and Dr. Marshall Scott Poole, for 
supporting me throughout my graduate studies.  They have consistently modeled scholarly generosity, not 
only sharing their ideas and reactions but also giving very generously of their time.  I want to thank John 
in particular for quite literally betting on my success; in 2007, he put a dollar in his desk as a wager that I 
would eventually pursue a Ph.D., and in 2009, I returned to the U of I do just that.  I want to thank Scott 
for making me a partner in his already flourishing field research in disaster response.  I am honored that 
he trusted me to develop additional field contacts, first on behalf of the Paradox Project and then for my 
dissertation study.  He accompanied me to many meetings and training observations to help me convince 
a series of gruff-looking governmental authority figures to allow me to observe, interview, and survey 
their personnel.  Also, on one trip, I nearly side-swiped a car on the highway and then actually did knock 
him down the stairs of a command vehicle, and he bore these endangerments with grace and good humor.   
I would also like to thank a number of other scholars for helping me on this journey.  Dr. John 
Caughlin and Dr. Sally Jackson, my remaining committee members, did me the honor of reading my 
work and discussing my ideas with genuine interest and analytical seriousness.  I appreciated both John 
and Sally for their wide knowledge of the field of communication, as well as their deep knowledge in 
particular subject areas.  Each committee meeting provided me with insightful and thought-provoking 
feedback, which is a credit to the time that they invested in engaging with the material.  Dr. Michelle 
Shumate served on my initial preliminary examination committee, and I appreciated how her knowledge 
of the field of organizational communication influenced the development of the questions that guided my 
preliminary examination process.  I also learned a great deal about research methodologies in courses 
with Dr. Carolyn Anderson, Dr. Donald Bullock, Dr. Jennifer Greene, Dr. Leanne Knobloch, and Dr. 
Ramona Oswald.  I will continue to revisit and appreciate their courses for many years to come.  I would 
also like to acknowledge the mentorship I’ve received from my academic brother and sister, two of Dr. 
Lammers’ advisees who preceded me: Dr. Joshua Barbour and Dr. Mattea Garcia.  Both set excellent 
examples for me and encouraged me directly and indirectly throughout my graduate studies.  Lastly, I 
 
 
v 
 
would like to thank my graduate colleagues in the Organizational Communication Lab Experience 
(OCLE), a fake lab group that we invented for no good reason other than to make each other feel 
important: Yannick Atouba, Kate Cooper, Melissa Dobosh, Natalie Lambert, Macarena Pena y Lillo 
Araya, and Andy Pilny.  I will be forever grateful for their friendship and support over the past five years.   
Without violating the confidentiality of my research participants, I would like to add a general 
note of thanks to the disaster response community, including local and state emergency response and 
emergency management professionals, the National Guard, and institutes of fire service education.  This 
project made me a more informed and appreciative citizen.  Our communities are truly fortunate to have 
dedicated safety professionals such as the ones I met during my research.  On a personal level, I was 
deeply touched by the welcome that I received from my field contacts when I expressed interest in their 
work. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family members, who never go off duty.  Thanks to my parents, 
Armand and Jane Aronson, for nurturing my love of learning, and many, many thanks to Ryan L. 
Carlson, my husband, who knows better than anyone what it took to make this document – and this doctor 
of philosophy – a reality.  I can never thank him enough for supporting me in my aspirations (not all of 
which are well-informed) and for encouraging me every single blessed day.  I can only hope to be the 
kind of support in his life that he has been in mine, and I’m honored to have the opportunity.      
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Context ............................................................................................................................... 7 
Chapter 3: Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 17 
Chapter 4: Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 5: Phase 1 Results ................................................................................................................. 73 
Chapter 6: Phase 2 Design Using Phase 1 Results ......................................................................... 119 
Chapter 7: Phase 2 Results ............................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter 8: Implications and Future Directions ............................................................................. 132 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 141 
Appendix A: Interview Protocol ...................................................................................................... 151 
Appendix B: Complete List of Survey Variables  .......................................................................... 155 
Appendix C: Survey Instrument  .................................................................................................... 156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Any catastrophic emergency has seven core threats: human, biological, radiological or 
nuclear, incendiary, chemical, explosive and – nowadays – cyber. There is no response 
organization in the world that can deal with all of those. […] There’s no single agency 
that’s competent to deal with all of the components of any one of those.  
- Fire Service Instructor 
 
Collaborative arrangements provide organizations with the necessary alliances and, 
hence, resources to address increasing development and production costs, decreasing 
research-to-market times, and escalating problem and product complexity. At the center 
of these collaborative efforts are work groups composed of employees from different 
organizations, often meeting face-to-face only sporadically, and who stay together only 
for the duration of the special project.   
- Stohl & Walker, 2002, p. 237 
 
 The two quotations in this epigram represent the central rationale for this project: To address 
complex problems – including threats to public safety – professionals with different domains of expertise 
must find ways to work together, often outside of the familiar structures of their home organizations.  The 
practitioner perspective in the first quotation simply describes the need: to deal with all of the components 
of a catastrophic emergency.  The academic perspective in the second quotation prescribes a method: 
“collaborative arrangements” involving temporary, project-based interorganizational work groups.  In one 
sense, promoting collaborative approaches is a normative stance; it implies that inclusive, consensus-
oriented decision-making – rather than super-imposed coordinative procedures – will produce better 
results for collaborators and for the collective.  In another sense, however, Stohl and Walker are 
suggesting collaborative approaches only because they recognize that traditional, hierarchically-imposed 
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coordinative approaches may not be possible for interorganizational work groups.  What entity would be 
in a position to impose and reinforce procedures for coordination?  How likely is it that every collaborator 
would accept the dictates of some outside authority?  If organizations are working together on a voluntary 
basis, how likely are their representatives to allow one organization’s standards and practices to 
dominate?  As these questions suggest, there are no simple solutions for interorganizational coordination, 
and collaborative approaches may be attractive if only due to the dearth of other viable options.  
 My dissertation project examines these challenges in the context of emergency management.  A 
single large or complex incident might invoke the responsibility, authority and expertise of dozens of 
agencies.  To manage the incident, an emergent work group must establish the infrastructure to administer 
personnel assignments, the movement of equipment and other assets, instrumental support for responders 
on the scene, safety measures, and plans for the next operational period, as well as keeping financial and 
personnel records.  Meanwhile, teams or task forces of response professionals work on mitigating the 
incident according to the standards and practices of their particular disciplines.  At times, however, these 
teams find that their tasks affect other teams or that other expertise is needed to proceed with the 
response.  In order to be ready for the challenges of a multi-agency response to large or complex incident, 
responders periodically join together to plan and participate in multi-agency disaster simulation exercises.  
The present study focuses on multi-agency disaster exercises as a site of interorganizational coordination 
and, perhaps, collaboration.  
Key Concepts 
 The key concepts I explore are coordination, collaboration, and conflict – three inter-related 
communication phenomena.  How agents coordinate their individual activities to act collectively is one of 
the cornerstone topics of organizational communication.  One approach to activity coordination is 
collaboration; although contested, this term typically refers to inclusive and consensus-driven ways of 
organizing.  The third concept, conflict, springs naturally from the scope conditions of collaborative 
arrangements: interdependency among parties and goals that may be interfering or even mutually 
exclusive.   As the mainstream popularity of the concept of collaboration has grown, so too has scholarly 
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interest in the topic, but theories of collaboration have often privileged breadth over depth when 
considering constitutive behaviors and environmental influences and, consequently, have not fully 
addressed how conflict can or should be handled to maximize the benefits of collaborative arrangements.  
More broadly, the vast literature on coordination would suggest that collaboration, one approach to 
coordination, is not the optimal solution for every coordination need.  It can also be executed so 
ineffectually that it hinders rather than helps coordination.  Consequently, I treat coordination as the 
master concept, but I study behaviors related to collaboration and conflict management in order to speak 
to it.  
 Surprisingly, contemporary models of interorganizational collaboration have not explicitly 
included conflict management (e.g., Stohl & Walker’s (2002) Bona Fide Group Collaboration Model; 
Keyton, Ford, & Smith’s (2008) Mesolevel Communicative Model of Interorganizational Collaboration; 
and Bedwell, Wildman, DiazGranados, & Associates’ (2012) Collaborative Performance Framework).  
Conflict management does appear prominently in Poole’s (2013) exposition on the pathologies of 
collaboration.  In that essay, Poole described a “good collaboration” as having five qualities; it is active, 
founded on social interaction and relationships, empowering, emergent, and confrontational.  The term 
confrontational suggests direct rather than indirect or avoidant approaches to conflict.  Poole depicted the 
following enactments of confrontation: collaborators “actively confront their differences and work them 
through,” “goad one another forward [...] without ever coming to a resolution,” “inject new ideas and 
possibilities into the collaboration that promote creativity,” and “[challenge other collaborators] to 
evaluate and sometimes question their activities” (p. 8).  Poole’s concept of confrontation looked at 
conflict management in the long view: Over time, are collaborators examining their differences in such a 
way that it does not diminish any party’s capacity to act but yet reveals previously unconsidered 
directions for action?  In the trajectory of this project, I explore how agents engage in the confrontational 
aspect of collaboration in their attempts to coordinate activity.  
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Clarification Regarding Terminology 
When addressing scholarly concepts, I use the adjective “interorganizational” to describe a 
particular kind of relationship between agents involved in coordinative efforts.  Organizations 
communicate primarily through individuals and groups who are formally affiliated with those 
organizations.  For this reason, Stohl and Walker (2002) referred to work groups in which members 
represent different organizations.  Similarly, Keyton, Ford and Smith (2008) defined interorganizational 
collaboration as “the set of communicative processes in which individuals representing multiple 
organizations or stakeholders engage when working interdependently to address problems outside the 
spheres of individuals or organizations working in isolation” (p. 318).  What difference does 
organizational affiliation make?  In my view, it is a proxy term; what it really means is that group 
members have different spheres of knowledge (i.e., expertise) and access to different material resources 
which they may offer to the collective cause (Faraj & Xiao, 2006).   
In the context of the present study, organizational affiliation is also, in most cases, a proxy for 
disciplinary affiliation.  Firefighters don’t just belong to a particular fire department, knowing its practices 
and resources; they also have disciplinary knowledge about fire prevention and mitigation.  They have 
internalized the standards of a particular profession (Lammers & Garcia, 2009).  Often, other entities want 
to coordinate or collaborate with them specifically because of this disciplinary expertise.  Among disaster 
response professionals, the goal is not only to coordinate among individual organizations (e.g., County A 
Fire Department and County B Fire Department) but also to coordinate across disciplinary groups (e.g., 
fire and police).  In emergency management, all such entities are referred to as agencies, and the term 
jurisdiction specifically addresses the separation of branches across geographical boundaries.  When 
referring to data or concepts in the context of disaster response, I use the term “interagency” rather than 
“interorganizational,” because it better captures the confluence of disciplinary and jurisdictional 
affiliations among agents.  
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Anticipated Contributions    
 At present, organizational communication scholarship seems to treat the concept of coordination 
as passé, the concept of collaboration as amorphous and often idealized, and the concept of conflict 
management as completely unrelated to collaborative interaction.  I want my work to demonstrate that 
coordination is still a fertile field for communication research, collaborative communication behaviors 
can be defined with precision, and conflict management is essential to collaborative interaction – and is 
perhaps its definitive challenge.  I also want to elucidate the relationship between actors in situations of 
interorganizational coordination, particularly when organizational and disciplinary affiliations may 
overlap.  Lastly, I hope that the particular context of the work – disaster response and preparation – 
invites both respect for the public good that response professionals’ work represents, as well as interest in 
the more universal qualities of the challenges they face (i.e., emergent, rapidly-changing, high-risk, 
complex problems) and the ways that they communicate to achieve interagency coordination.  
 More specifically, investigating the concept of confrontation promises to build on extant literature 
on conflict and communication in three ways.  Many communication scholars already promote the view 
that conflict trajectories consist of multiple episodes, over time, in which a variety of conflict 
management strategies may be enacted, and studying confrontation will complement and illustrate the 
idea of conflict as an ongoing cycle of initiation-response-counter-response (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 
2005).  Studying confrontation may also expand on the limited purview of conflict management styles 
(Blake & Mouton, 1964; Kilman & Thomas, 1975; Nicotera & Dorsey, 2006) and the ways that they have 
been traditionally measured (e.g., Putnam & Wilson, 1982; Kilman & Thomas, 1975).  Finally, studying 
confrontation promises to enhance our understanding of the communication behaviors that constitute 
productive conflict interaction (Cahn, 1990).  
 The study also promises a few specific contributions to the literature on collaboration.  It begins 
to address Lewis’ (2006) call for communication scholars to identify what is basic to the phenomenon of 
collaborative interaction.  Building on Keyton, Ford, & Smith’s (2008) rationale, it helps the field better 
understand the group communication process among organizational representatives in an 
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interorganizational collaborative arrangement.  Lastly, extrapolating from Poole’s (2013) presentation of 
the concept of confrontation, it begins to address whether confrontation is, in fact, associated with 
desirable outcomes for collaborators – including effective interorganizational coordination. 
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Chapter 2: Context 
 In this chapter, I will provide some background on emergency management, specifically disaster 
response and preparation, and I will explain the rationale for the specific context of the present study: 
multi-agency disaster response exercises as instantiations of interorganizational coordination.  
Defining Disaster 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, defines a disaster as “an occurrence of 
a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human-caused event that has resulted in severe property 
damage, deaths, and/or multiple injuries” (FEMA, 2014).  In scholarly literature, the terms disaster or 
crisis connote a larger or more complex incident than the relatively isolated cases that emergency 
responders are dispatched to address on a day-to-day basis.  For example, in the preface to their book on 
disaster management and community resilience, Comfort, Boin, and Demchak (2010) disclaim,  
“Terrorist attacks, water shortages, critical infrastructure failures, a looming energy crisis, a 
continuing flow of illegal immigrants, the effects of climate change, the threat of a pandemic: 
societies face an array of potentially devastating threats.  These are not ‘routine emergencies’ 
such as fires, traffic accidents, and hostage takings.  These are so-called low-chance, high-impact 
events: urgent threats to societal core values and life-sustaining systems that typically require 
governmental intervention under conditions of deep uncertainty.” (2010, pp. 2-3) 
The perspective captured in the quotation from Comfort et al. is common to many scholars in this area: a 
particular interest in the non-routine, urgent demands of responding to low probability, high impact 
events.  
From an organizing perspective, what differentiates a disaster from a routine call for emergency 
response service is the degree of demand on public resources.  Dynes, Haas, and Quarantelli (1967) 
encapsulated this concept in their demand-capability model.  This model defines a disaster as an event 
that creates demand – i.e., demand from citizens for services from public and private sector organizations 
– that exceed those organizations’ capabilities.  Tierney, Lindell, and Perry explain,  
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“[W]hen an extreme event impacts a vulnerable community it creates pressure on that community 
to prevent adverse impacts on public health, safety, and property (Lindell and Perry, 1992). […]  
[A] large-scale, rapid-onset disaster is likely to also require a timely and coordinated response by 
many public and private sector organizations to minimize damage and disruption and restore the 
community to routine functioning.  Such coordinated responses may be problematic both because 
of the magnitude and unexpected nature of the disaster demands and because the organizations 
that are required to respond lack sufficient training and practice.” (2001, pp. 9-10)  
As Tierney et al.’s excerpt indicates, one critique of the demand-capability model is that the demand of 
any particular disaster is difficult to anticipate, even when based upon past disasters with similar 
characteristics.  
On a national scale, disasters are surprisingly frequent.  In the U.S., events that are sufficiently 
large and complex to be designated as disasters occur, on average, sixty-five times per year; if distributed 
evenly throughout the year, that would be five to six disasters per month (FEMA, 2011).  Laypeople often 
make a common binary distinction when classifying disasters: Was the disaster manmade or an ‘act of 
God’?  In the ‘act of God’ category, physical scientists classify natural hazards into eight types, based on 
climatological and physical characteristics: droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes, 
landslides, volcanoes, asteroids (Nott, 2006).  Manmade disasters include industrial accidents and terrorist 
attacks.  For example, in Tierney et al.’s (2001) list of the fourteen major world disasters that occurred 
between 1979 and 1999, five incidents are strictly manmade: the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident, 
1979; the Bhopal toxic gas explosion, 1984; the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 1986; the Exxon oil spill, 
1989; and the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995 (p. 2).  Within the United States, presidential disaster 
declarations have also helped shaped the nation’s conception of what counts as a disaster; declared 
disasters have ranged from winter storms to school shootings (Sylves, 2008).   
Societies often define disasters in terms of the degree to which the event disrupts societal 
expectations for normal daily activity.  Disasters may be compared to one another in terms of their cost – 
in monetary value, fatalities, injuries, or number of people rendered homeless (Tierney et al., 2001) – but 
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for survivors and journalists, the major story is often one of disruption (see, for example, Lambert & 
Fisher, 1993).  Similarly, a recent emergency management textbook defines disasters in terms of their 
impacts, namely, “extreme events that can injure or kill great numbers of people, do extensive property 
damage, and disrupt community life” (Sylves, 2008, p. 5).  The effects of disaster fall into three 
categories.  The first category is direct effects: deaths, injuries, physical damage and destruction “caused 
by the impact of the disaster agent itself” (6).  The second category is “disaster-induced” (i.e., secondary) 
effects, as when damage due to flood or earthquake causes fires, the release of hazardous materials, or 
environmental pollution.  The third category is indirect effects, which Tierney et al. define as “‘ripple 
effects’ resulting from disruptions of in the flow of goods and services, unemployment, business 
interruption, and declines in levels of economic activity and productivity” (6).  In fact, in economic terms, 
disaster-induced and indirect effects may be considered the most expensive repercussions of a disaster.  
Disasters that appear frequent or even repetitive on a national scale, however, remain very 
unlikely to occur in any particular locality at any particular time.  On a local scale, disasters are relatively 
infrequent.  Even regional phenomena that occur more or less annually – such as forest fires, tornados or 
flooding – affect different cities and counties with different degrees of severity each time they occur.  The 
constant threat of low frequency, high impact incidents – each type requiring different forms of expertise 
and standard operating procedures – poses a great challenge to the two pre-emptive goals of disaster 
management: prevention and preparedness. 
Prevention as Strategy 
Prevention, also known as mitigation, is intended to precede the occurrence of any particular 
disaster.  The goal of mitigation, according to Sylves (2008), is, “to reduce or eliminate risk to people and 
property from hazards and their effects” (p. 21).  Mitigation is often accomplished through means such as 
hazard identification and mapping, construction codes and other design regulations, zoning rules and 
land-use planning, structural controls (e.g., levees, dams, channels, etc.), and financial measures such as 
incentives or aid for relocation and insurance programs and requirements (Sylves, 2008, pp. 22-23).  As 
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these examples suggest, public administrators agree upon rules and codes, and domain-specific monitors 
(e.g., the State Fire Marshal) enforce them.  
It would be optimistic to say that mitigation is happening constantly through risk assessment, 
regulation, inspection, and general inquiry about causes and conditions of particular hazards.  In practice, 
mitigation is often retrospective: effectively, prevention for incidents similar to the one that just occurred 
happens during and after the recovery from that incident.  Mitigation efforts enjoy maximal momentum 
(i.e., political and popular support) in the aftermath of a disaster, when yet-unaddressed vulnerabilities are 
most visible and the desire to assess and limit future exposure to similar threats is greatest.  As such, 
mitigation is commonly executed as “activities undertaken after a disaster to lessen the likelihood of 
future disasters” (Sylves, 2008, p. 21).   
Over the past twenty years, the political sensitivity of mitigation efforts has been highlighted by 
the increasing power and prominence of FEMA (since 2003, subsumed under the Department of 
Homeland Security, or DHS).  Comfort et al. explain,  
“Mitigation was long considered a ‘bottom-up’ approach, engaging citizens, businesses, non-
profit organizations, and communities in the shared task of increasing their capacity to reduce risk 
and respond effectively to potential hazards.  This approach, recognized as fundamental in the 
1990s, was overshadowed by the concept of prevention following the terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 
2001.  The concept of prevention enhances the role of government in preventing disasters from 
happening.  In the United States, prevention traditionally justified a ‘top-down’ approach to 
disaster in which governments are expected to design proper prevention mechanisms for known 
risks.  These mechanisms typically include regulation and inspection regimes and detailed lists of 
tasks that are mandated for each level of government, building on lessons from previous disasters 
and emergencies.  In putting such mechanisms into place, governments must weigh the potential 
benefits of strong prevention policies against the cost that excessive regulation may exert on 
social habits, economic activities, and civil liberties.” (2010, p. 3) 
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Sylves provides a corroborating description of the conflict: “In effect, FEMA began to encourage or 
induce local officials and individuals to adopt mitigating policies.  Mitigation work opened up a 
perennial, highly political difference of opinion between FEMA and various local officials, developers, 
and citizens” (22).  As these assessments portray, mitigation (i.e., prevention) can be controversial and is 
often ill-timed, in the sense that it more easily follows a disaster than precedes it.  In many cases, it is 
difficult to demonstrate the extent of damages or losses that have been prevented, and practitioners and 
citizens alike recognize that complete prevention is impossible.   
Preparation as Strategy 
The limited influence of prevention makes preparation even more important.  While mitigation 
focuses on preventing disasters, preparation assumes that they will occur.  This phase includes all “actions 
undertaken before disaster impact that enable social units to respond actively when disaster does strike,” 
including making emergency response plans, training emergency response employees, acquiring 
equipment and supplies, and facilitating drills and exercises” (Tierney et al., 2001, p. 5).  The inherent 
difficulty, then, is preparing for the unknown.   
As Comfort et al. (2010) conclude, “not all incidents and breakdowns can be prevented,” so 
“preparation becomes essential” (p. 3).  Unfortunately, although it is indispensible, preparation cannot 
possibly be comprehensive.  Local responders are expected to be prepared for any kind of disaster, but the 
range of possible disasters is very broad, with each requiring different forms of expertise.  Comfort et al. 
explain, “Careful assessment of potential risks and informed calculation of the interdependencies among 
organizations that share those risks contribute significantly to effective investments in planning and 
preparedness actions.  Yet society should also prepare for unimaginable contingencies” (2010, p. 4).  
Comfort’s admonition to prepare for the unimaginable sounds almost paradoxical.  In practice, response 
agencies may not enjoy financial or political support for planning and practice for extreme disaster 
scenarios.  As Brandsen, Boogers, and Tops (2006) pointed out, one impediment to disaster preparation is 
the perception of disasters as “low risk, strong impact” occurrences. Stakeholders simultaneously 
acknowledge that: (a) a large, complex disaster is relatively unlikely to happen to our immediate 
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geographic region, (b) but we have to be ready just in case it does happen, (c) so we need to be ready for a 
variety of possible disasters, (d) even though there is no way we can be expected to be fully prepared for 
any possible severe disaster.  
The Lessons Learned Cycle 
One guide for preparation is the archive of lessons learned from prior disasters and exercises.  In 
fact, these lessons learned reports have a few common themes (Donahue and Tuohy, 2006).  Not only do 
professionals engaged in disaster response experience coordination-related problems, they also seem to 
experience the same problems over and over again. That is, the “After Action Reports” (AARs) produced 
by state or federal emergency management agencies and other agencies, such as the United States Fire 
Association, seem to suggest problems of a recurring nature. Donahue and Tuohy (2006) studied this 
phenomenon by analyzing the content of “lessons learned” included in AARs from a sample of major 
U.S. disasters (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, and 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, among others). They found so much redundancy in the so-called “lessons 
learned” that they concluded that the lessons were not, in fact, learned, and that the convention of 
publishing “lessons learned” may be ineffective. Donahue and Tuohy’s analysis generated five types of 
recurring problems that consistently appeared in lessons-learned reporting from disasters requiring multi-
disciplinary coordination: uncoordinated leadership, failed communications, weak planning, resource 
constraints, and poor public relations. The authors then conducted a focus group with responders who had 
worked on major U.S. disasters and asked them to elaborate on the problems that they experienced. Each 
of the five categories of persistent problems merits a brief summary here, as they foreshadow the kinds of 
conflicts that I observe and relate to communication scholarship in the chapters to come.  
 Uncoordinated leadership.  Uncoordinated leadership included “unclear, multiple, conflicting, 
uncooperative, and isolated command structures” (p. 45). Responders that participated in Donahue and 
Tuohy’s focus groups described several conditions that contributed to uncoordinated leadership during 
disaster response. The first was a lack of trust and understanding among the different agencies (police, 
fire, medical, government, and others). In their view, agencies did not seem committed to multi-agency 
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coordination. Responders also said that temporary leadership structures that form as part of the protocol 
for a large or complex disaster lacked true decision-making authority, weren’t respected by responders on 
the front lines, and sometimes engaged in petty political squabbles. Lastly, responders attributed the 
uncoordinated leadership to inconsistent and widely varying implementations of the federally-supported 
Incident Command System (ICS). They noted that responders are trained on the ICS within disciplines, 
not across disciplines, so they often aren’t aware of inconsistencies until they are in the throes of multi-
disciplinary coordination in the face of a real incident.  
 Failed communications.  Failed communications referred to two types of communication lapses 
between responders: those due to the destruction of communications equipment in the disaster, and those 
due to the absence, underuse, or misuse of channels for interagency communication. Acknowledging that 
“all else relies on communication” (p. 45), responders attributed subsequent problems to the 
communication failures. They also saw the failure of cross-disciplinary communication efforts as 
stemming from unwillingness or lack of commitment to establishing a shared, multi-disciplinary system. 
 Weak planning.  Weak planning produced plans with gaps, under-elaborated plans (i.e., not 
sufficiently detailed), unrealistic plans (i.e., assuming idealistic sequences of events or not accounting for 
possible contingencies), and plans that addressed the immediate response but failed to account for short- 
and long-term recovery. The category also encompassed “problems of protocol”, namely, weak 
knowledge about, adoption of, and ability to execute existing plans. For example, key stakeholders were 
sometimes unaware of roles assigned to them by an existing plan, or they were aware of their assigned 
roles but had never trained or practiced to perform them.  
 Resource constraints.  The fourth category, resource constraints, referred to resources such as 
“personnel, equipment, supplies, commodities, [and] specialized capabilities” (p. 47). Recurring problems 
in this category related to the staging, verification, and placement of resources.  
 Poor public relations.  The last category, poor public relations, addressed the persistent problem 
of gaining the public’s compliance with ad hoc directives to ensure public safety. The authors noted that 
pre-incident public education is minimal and tends to rely on mainstream media, rather than on new 
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media or channels likely to inspire ‘viral’ distribution or transmission via word-of-mouth. These 
strategies do not adequately address the likelihood that people may ignore messages or, if aware of them, 
be unwilling to comply.  
 Donahue and Tuohy (2006) ultimately argue that what are reported as lessons learned are, in fact, 
lessons not learned. From an organizational communication perspective, the reporting of lessons learned 
may operate as a rational myth: a symbolic exercise that appeases the multiple institutional commitments 
of the emergent disaster response ‘organization’ and enables a cyclical process in which the same 
problems are repeatedly experienced and acknowledged without being substantially addressed.   
Preparing to Respond to Disaster 
During disaster response, responders from different agencies mobilize by forming ad hoc, role-
based, and sometimes inter-professional teams, such as task forces and incident command teams.  In these 
teams, members must conform to standard operating procedures and use mutually agreed upon 
terminology, but they must also improvise together in response to emerging, ambiguous, or contradictory 
information about the situation.  Members must coordinate not only behavior but expertise (Majchrzak, 
Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007).  Because the danger to lives and property increases with each passing 
minute, communication challenges such as misunderstandings, protracted disagreements, and failures of 
coordination extract an opportunity cost that is painfully high and often, in retrospect, preventable.  The 
response to a large or complex incident, which is simulated in exercises and training plans, often employs 
NIMS, the National Incident Management System, or a state-specific variation thereof; in so doing, it 
mobilizes a team-based system of ad hoc or emergent teams in order to flexibly respond to dynamic, time-
pressured situations.   
Because of the constant threat of disaster, emergency response organizations engage in ongoing 
preparedness activities such as training, creating disaster plans, acquiring and maintaining specialized 
equipment, and conducting disaster simulation exercises.  For most responders in most places, however, 
the kinds of incidents that they train to confront never actually happen.  At the same time, however, their 
public charge is preparedness: a constant state of readiness.  Similarly, organizations across sectors value 
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preparedness and agility in addressing rapidly-evolving and high-impact threats as they arise (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).   
The organization of disaster preparedness activities often involves cooperation between 
jurisdictions (cities, counties), response agencies (fire, police, emergency medical services, etc.), and 
state-level services (e.g., the state emergency management agency).  The organization of disaster 
preparedness activities, then, provides a context for enhancing our understanding of collaborative 
interaction and the coordination of activity among representatives of different organizations, professions, 
and specializations.  The present study includes the planning, execution, and after-action review of multi-
agency disaster simulation exercises. 
Several different kinds of work groups are implicated in the collaborative arrangements that 
produce disaster response training exercises.  Task forces, strike teams, and incident command teams 
could be classified, according to Sundstrom, DeMeuse, and Futrell’s (1990) typology, as “action-
negotiation teams,” whose work cycles consist of “brief performance events, often repeated under new 
conditions, requiring extended training and/or preparation” (p. 125). Other aspects of disaster 
preparedness, such as the creation of plans and the allocation of physical resources, would more likely be 
handled by two other types of teams from Sundstrom et al.’s typology: advice-involvement teams (e.g., 
advisory councils) and project-development teams (e.g., planning teams).  All three types of teams engage 
cooperatively in a multi-agency exercise.  In practice, the advisory team (likely a state-level governmental 
or inter-governmental entity) would approve the grant application to fund the exercise, the planning team 
(typically consisting of representatives from participating agencies) would plan the exercise, a set of 
action teams (available members of the participating agencies) would participate in the exercise, and, 
lastly, the planning team would construct an after-action review and submit the resulting report to the 
advisory team as a condition of the grant. 
Three types of exercises are typical: full-scale, functional, and tabletop.  Tabletop exercises are 
discussion-based (i.e., sitting around a table), and the goal is to react to a scenario and make decisions 
about what actions would be performed and by whom.  Functional exercises are also table discussions, 
 16 
 
 
 
but they involve an element of surprise.  Instead of receiving the whole exercise scenario packet in 
advance, information about the scenario is provided incrementally.  Participants must respond to each 
prompt, or “inject” as it appears.  Full-scale exercises involve action in a field setting.  The response is 
planned and executed in response to field stimuli.  Elements may be “notional” – i.e., the chemical spill is 
not a real chemical spill – but are treated as demanding response.   
As this chapter has demonstrated, multiagency disaster response exercises provide an excellent 
context for studying interorganizational coordination, collaboration, and conflict.  The chapter that 
follows will examine how extant literature on these three subjects should inform an empirical study in this 
context. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 As an objective of organizational communication, the project of coordination is essentially, “How 
can we do this work together?”  Collaborative approaches to coordination ask the same question, but they 
also more or less explicitly imply a second question: “What work should we be doing together?”  
Collaborative approaches encourage the expression of different values and preferences, as well as the 
search for mutually-acceptable solutions.  Where value differences or concerns about goal interference are 
expressed, there is conflict (Putnam & Poole, 1987), and how actors respond to conflict is conflict 
management.  This literature review positions collaboration as an approach to coordination and identifies 
how the growing literature on interorganizational collaboration speaks in part to coordination but very 
little to conflict management.  I explore the relationship between collaborative interaction and conflict 
management, and I explicate a relatively new construct, confrontation.  My review of extant literature 
demonstrates the need for additional research on how parties engaged interorganizational coordination 
may or may not engage in collaborative interaction and confrontation – as well as what the consequences 
of collaborating with or without confrontation might be.  
Coordination as Concept 
 Thinking broadly about organization design, Mintzberg (1980) posited that, “Organizational 
structuring, of course, focuses on the division of labor of an organizational mission into a number of 
distinct tasks, and then the coordination of all of these tasks to accomplish that mission in an organized 
way” (324).  Mintzberg synthesized extant literature to produce a typology of five coordinating 
mechanisms.  The first was direct supervision: “one individual (typically a manager) gives specific orders 
to others and thereby coordinates their work” (324).  The second was the standardization of work 
processes: “the work is coordinated by the imposition (typically by analysts of the technostructure) of 
standards to guide the doing of the work itself, e.g., work orders, rules and regulations, etc.” (324). The 
third was the standardization of outputs: “the work is coordinated by the imposition (again, often by the 
analysts of the technostructure) of standard performance metrics or specifications concerning the outputs 
of the work” (324).  The fourth was standardization of skills: the work is coordinate by the internalization 
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by individuals of standard skills and knowledge, usually before they begin to do the work” (324).  The 
fifth and last was mutual adjustment: “individuals coordinate their own work, by communicating 
informally with each other” (324).  The literature on team coordination tends to focus on mutual 
adjustment, and thus it dovetails with the literature on collaboration, although the informal 
communication producing coordination may or may not constitute collaboration.  
 When it comes to team coordination, coordination is often integrated into scholars’ definitions of 
team itself.  For example, describing the premise of their classic book, Teamwork: What Must Go Right, 
What Can Go Wrong, Larson and Lafasto (1989) explain, “We adopted a very broad definition of team: A 
team has two or more people; it has a specific performance objective or recognizable goal to be attained; 
and coordination of activity among the members of the team is required for the attainment of the team 
goal or objective” (p. 19).  As Larson and Lafasto’s definition exemplifies, teams are generally considered 
a locus of explicit and implicit coordination of individual activity among members.   
 The term coordination has been conceptualized and operationalized in several different ways.  It 
may refer to intra-team coordination (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, 
& Gibson, 2008), as in the coordination of activities among individual team members, or it may refer to 
coordination between units in an organization (Sherman & Keller, 2011; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & 
Koenig, 1976; Victor & Blackburn, 1987).  Most empirical studies are descriptive, but some experimental 
treatments of the intra-team coordination (see, for example, Saavedra, Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993) and 
inter-team coordination (Reid & Ng, 2006) can be found.   
 Coordination has been conceptualized as a cognitive phenomenon and as a behavioral 
phenomenon.  Some authors study coordination as a cognitive phenomenon, presenting concepts such as 
implicit coordination (Rico et al., 2008), cross-understanding (Huber & Lewis, 2010), or overcoming 
representational gaps in problem orientation (Cronin & Weingart, 2007).  Also in this vein, some authors 
focus on the influence of collective goals or cooperative goal-setting in facilitating effective coordination 
(Hertel, Konradt, & Orlikowski, 2004; Kleingeld, van Mierlo, & Arends, 2011).  Others emphasize the 
cognitive by focusing on how information processing (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; De Dreu, 2007) or 
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information sharing (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009) contribute to coordination and, by extension, 
collective goal attainment.  In contrast, other work on coordination has eschewed the cognitive to focus 
on the behaviors or actions that constitute coordination (Lepine, Piccolo, Jackson, Mathieu, & Saul, 2008; 
Marks et al., 2001).  Coordination has also been conceptualized as both a form of organizational control 
(Gupta, Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1994) and a form of voluntary, team-based concertive control (Barker & 
Tompkins, 1994).   
From this brief review, it is clear that the term coordination denotes multiple processes.  It may 
refer to the integration of activities between different units of analysis (individuals or organizational 
units), and it may indicate cognitive accommodations or behavioral accommodations.  Conceptions of 
coordination that attempt to enumerate or sequence behaviors can tend toward the hyper-rational or 
mechanistic, and yet, there is clearly a need to specify the process(es) by which individuals or units 
integrate their activities.  
Coordination in Disaster Response and Related Contexts 
The coordination challenges of disaster management are not unique; increasingly, organizations 
in every sector see their most pressing problems as impossible to predict, rapidly evolving, only partially 
within their sphere of influence, and demanding the collective expertise of entities that normally operate 
in a fragmented way (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Concepts such as resilience (Comfort, Boin, & 
Demchak, 2010), high-reliability organizations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), fast response organizations 
(Faraj & Xiao, 2006), swift-starting action teams (McKinney, Barker, Davis, & Smith, 2005), and multi-
team systems (Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, & Alonso, 2005) overlap to form a composite 
illustration of the interests and aspirations of scholars related to coordination under high-intensity 
conditions.  
 Resilient, high-reliability organizations.  The first line of thinking suggests that organizations 
and communities, like individuals, can be resilient.  Comfort, Boin, and Demchak (2010) defined 
resilience as “the capacity of a social system (e.g., an organization, city, or society) to proactively adapt to 
and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and 
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expected disturbances” (Comfort et al., 2010, p. 9).  Writing specifically about disaster management, 
Comfort et al. promoted resilience as an answer to the inevitable shortcomings of response plans, namely: 
“One of the key findings in this field, however, helps us explain why resilience is crucial: crisis 
and disaster researchers have consistently shown that there is very little political leaders and 
public administrators can do during the immediate aftermath of a catastrophe (especially when 
they lack accurate knowledge of the unfolding event).  It turns out that disaster plans do not work, 
communication fails, and command-and-control doctrines backfire – only after some time can 
skilled or talented crisis managers impose some kind of order.  Ultimately, the quality of response 
critically depends on the capacity to enhance improvisation, coordination, flexibility, and 
endurance – qualities that we typically associate with resilience.” (p. 11)   
For Comfort et al., resilience suggested a different orientation toward disaster response; rather than 
promoting more elaborate, detailed response plans, they advocated for greater responder autonomy and 
adaptability.  One sees parallels, however, to the kind of resilience that would be appealing to any 
organization, and improvisation and flexibility are not the hallmarks of bureaucratic systems.  Along the 
same lines, Weick and Sutcliffe theorized about high reliability organizations (HROs), or organizations 
that “organize for high performance in settings where the potential for error and disaster is 
overwhelming” (2007, p. ix) – for which one of their five principles is a “commitment to resilience.”  
Weick and Sutcliffe explained, “HROs develop capabilities to detect, contain, and bounce back from 
those inevitable errors that are part of an indeterminate world” (p. 14).  The appeal of resilience resonates 
for organizations as well as communities.   
 Fast response organizations.  Faraj and Xiao (2006) drew a similar connection from medical 
trauma center teams to a type of organization they called the fast response organization.  They studied a 
medical trauma center as an example of an organization defined by “conditions of high uncertainty and 
fast decision-making” (1155).  Faraj and Xiao argued that extant models of coordination have 
overemphasized the role of organizational structure and routines in promoting effective information 
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processing, and distinctions between formal and informal processes of coordination obfuscate the fact that 
both are needed in most situations.  They explained,  
“Contrary to the tenets of coordination theories, in such settings the empirical record shows that 
formal modes of coordination do not melt away in favor of more improvised ways of 
coordinating. To the contrary, the dilemma of coordination in such settings is that, on the one 
hand, there is a need for tight structuring, formal coordination, and hierarchical decision making 
to ensure a clear division of responsibilities, prompt decision processes, and timely action; but, on 
the other hand, because of the need for rapid action and the uncertain environment, there is a 
competing need to rely on flexible structures, on-the-spot decision making, and informal 
coordination modes.” (pp. 1156-1157) 
Their particular interest was in how short-term teams in fast response organizations overcome the 
limitations of routines in practice.  They found that, for almost every incident, expertise coordination 
practices such as “plug-and-play” (i.e., role-based) teaming were adequate.  When something went wrong 
or became more complicated, however, someone other than the designated expert needed to act quickly 
on behalf of the team and perform an “urgent intervention.”  They labeled these responses as dialogic 
coordination practices, consisting of four kinds of practices: epistemic contestation (i.e., reconciling 
different perspectives), joint sensemaking, cross-boundary intervention (i.e., questioning a team member 
from a different discipline), and protocol breaking.  Faraj and Xiao noted that conflict often accompanied 
the application of dialogic coordination practices; they concluded: “Because of the epistemic distance 
between specialists organized in communities of practice, [fast-response cross-boundary] coordination 
practices magnify knowledge differences and are partly contentious” (p. 1156).  Faraj and Xiao’s primary 
research suggests, then, that scholars may want to further study how teams handle disruptions to routine 
plug-and-play teaming in fast response or high reliability organizations.  
 Swift-starting action teams.  In another study emphasizing ad hoc, role-based teaming, 
Mckinney, Barker, Davis, and Smith (2005) studied the communication practices of the crew of a 1989 
United Airlines flight that executed an emergency crash landing after a mechanical failure.  Their unit of 
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analysis was the crew, which they conceptualized as a swift starting action team.  They defined swift 
starting action teams by three characteristics: “(a) They are formed of well-trained strangers from one 
organization—professionals with no or limited prior knowledge of others on the team, (b) they must 
perform well immediately—performing as they warm up, and (c) they face high stakes from the 
beginning” (p. 201).  As Mckinney et al. pointed out, concepts such as ad hoc teams, high reliability 
teams (a la Weick & Sutcliffe’s high reliability organizations), and ephemeral teams are similar in the 
sense that they are short-term, short-task teams, but they vary in their emphasis on urgency and the 
severity of the consequences of failure.   
  Mckinney et al. (2005) proposed that training and practice in communication awareness facilitate 
effective adaptation in times of crisis.  They explained,  
“We argue that the individuals composing the crew of Flight 232, before the in-flight crisis 
occurred, had developed the potential to perform excellent communication processes that 
emerged from effective, practiced communication values and interactions. When the emergency 
happened, the crew was able to swiftly augment their communication interactions, enabling them 
to manage the crisis.” (p. 200)   
Rather than prescribing particular communication values, they argued that it is essential that actors have a 
shared basis of understanding of the communication values prescribed by their organization, and any 
necessary improvisation will deviate from the pre-existing model in recognizable ways.  
 Multi-team systems.  The Multi-team System (MTS) concept also addressed conditions identical 
to those connoted by terms such as high reliability organizations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), swift-starting 
action teams (Mckinney, Barker, Davis, & Smith, 2005), and fast response organizations (Faraj & Xiao, 
2006).  The distinction, however, is that the goal of the MTS framework was to “[address] in detail how 
interdependent teams operate as a larger work unit” (Marks et al., 2004, p. 283).  Mckinney et al.’s swift-
starting action teams emphasized a single ad hoc team, while the other authors did not conceive of the 
emergent, urgent organizing as being necessarily team-based.   
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 Marks et al. (2004) proposed four core characteristics of multi-team systems: interdependence 
between teams, goal hierarchies, dynamic environments, and temporal performance cycles.  
Interdependence between teams, they argued, consists of three dimensions, all of which must be present 
for two or more teams to constitute a multi-team system: (a) input interdependence, in which teams share 
‘input’ resources such as people, facilities, equipment, and information; (b) process interdependence, in 
which “teams work collaboratively to carry out processes such as boundary spanning, communication, 
and integration of actions, efforts, and timing” (p. 284); and (c) outcome interdependence, in which 
successful goal attainment affects everyone.  The goal hierarchy characteristic distinguishes between 
super-ordinate and sub-ordinate goals, recognizing that team-specific lower-order goals are likely to 
support the higher-order goals of the entire MTS.  The dynamic environment characteristic addresses the 
need for rapid response under uncertain conditions.  Lastly, the temporal performance cycle characteristic 
proposes episodic cycles of performance, in which component teams need varying degrees of 
synchronization in their efforts to achieve sub-goals as well as super-ordinate goals.  The fourth 
characteristic expands upon the authors’ earlier development of a taxonomy of team processes (Marks et 
al., 2001).  Due to the alignment of these characteristics with the demands of disaster response, the multi-
team system could be applied to disaster response organizing.  
Coordination in Postmodern Organizing  
 In all of the preceding examples, the authors proposed that hierarchical, bureaucratic forms of 
organizing were insufficient to explain what seemed to be needed to address the complex problems of the 
context – as well as, in the analysis of cases, what real teams and organizations seemed to be doing to 
produce collective and coordinated action.  To take a broader view, these intellectual moves exemplify a 
broader intellectual movement in the study of human organizations: the distinction between ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ organizing (Taylor, 2005).  While modern (i.e., industrial or Fordist) organizing emphasizes 
coordination through centralized authority, or hierarchy, and communication in the form of “command 
and control” language, postmodern organizing emphasizes decentralized authority, including lateral 
relationships between units and localized autonomy, and communication in the form of dynamic, 
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collaborative “team talk” (Taylor, 2005, p. 118).  As the preceding models demonstrate, recent efforts in 
theorizing about coordination strive to address both modern and postmodern forms of organizing – and to 
respond to organizational threats that are increasingly ‘postmodern’, or unpredictable, fragmented, and 
emergent.   
Collaboration as Concept 
While coordination research in the modern vein may tend toward the cognitive or mechanistic, 
collaboration research is more likely to suffer from a lack of conceptual precision.  Coordination is 
sometimes assumed to be an inevitable consequence of collaboration – that is, if decisions are made 
collaboratively, then team members will experience no misunderstanding, resistance, or other challenges 
during implementation.  In other cases, coordination is seen as a separate process, which exists 
independent of collaboration and can thrive in the absence of collaborative processes. 
 Collaboration is a practically important, popular, but contested concept in communication studies. 
Its practical importance stems from the versatility of levels to which it can be applied – from the dyad to 
the inter-organizational network – as well as from its widely acknowledged potential to help people 
understand conflicts and generate more robust, more participative, and more creative solutions to shared 
problems. Team collaboration has become a prevalent model of workplace organizing, and governmental 
or advisory organizations often assemble teams, from local school boards to the United Nations Security 
Council, to generate cooperative solutions to our world’s most intractable problems.  In the context of 
organizational communication, Stohl and Walker (2002) offer an especially comprehensive definition of 
collaboration: “the process of creating and sustaining a negotiated temporary system which spans 
organizational boundaries involving autonomous stakeholders with vary capabilities including resources, 
knowledge, and expertise and which is directed toward individual goals and mutually accountable and 
innovative ends” (p. 240).  
In recent decades, collaboration has become a popular buzzword among practitioners of all 
stripes.  The appeal for practitioners may relate to the way that collaborative communication both 
embraces the participative ideal of the U.S. political system and parallels the pro-informality ethos of 
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early 21st century U.S. mainstream culture.  In popular use, the term collaboration often functions as an 
ideal type, and as Laurie Lewis argued in a review of literature relating collaboration and communication, 
scholars have too often imitated this idealistic imprecision (2006).  She cautioned that defining 
collaboration as an ideal type “obfuscates readers’ abilities to distinguish what is merely desirable from 
what is basic to this phenomenon” (p. 223).  Lewis also advocated that a substantial portion of the burden 
and the opportunity of refining the concept should fall to communication scholars, because collaboration 
is widely conceived of as a form of interaction, constituted by communication behaviors, although it may 
reflect cognitive states such as attitudes and values. 
The potential benefits of communicating collaboratively are well established: more information, 
more creativity, better learning, and more satisfied group members – provided that group procedures 
invite participation (Beebe & Masterson, 2009, pp. 13-14). Well established, but less commonly 
discussed, are the disadvantages of the collaborative approach: pressure to conform, social loafing, the 
potential for one member to dominate, and the additional time spent discussing, reaching decisions, and 
coordinating individual activities (Beebe & Masterson, 2009, pp. 14-15).  Collaborative approaches may 
also reflect a misconception about conflict, namely that all conflicts can be resolved; stakeholders in 
conflict may be able to establish some common ground, but it is also possible that no truly mutually 
acceptable solutions exist (Beebe & Masterson, 2009, p. 175). 
From her review of more than 80 publications, mostly empirical studies, relating collaboration 
and communication, Lewis identified five ‘points of convergence,’ or commonalities, among prior 
definitions of collaboration.  These include: (a) regarding collaboration as an activity (rather than a state 
or object); (b) implying a particular relationship between self and other (e.g., “working jointly”); (c) 
equalizing participants; (d) emphasizing process; and (e) portraying collaboration as emergent, informal 
and volitional. In order to overcome diversity in individual definitions, and to emphasize the 
communicative aspects of collaboration-as-activity, Lewis advocated that scholars adopt the term 
“collaborative interaction” in lieu of “collaboration” in future work.  
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Lewis also acknowledged that many topics related to the conceptualization and study of 
collaborative interaction remain contested.  The points of divergence that Lewis noted include:  
(a) Regarding temporality: Is collaboration best understood as temporary, stable, or on a 
continuum therein?  
(b) Regarding pre-collaboration state: Should it be assumed that participants begin collaboration 
with differing, non-overlapping viewpoints?  
(c) Regarding goals and needs: Is there any distinction between collaboration that serves joint 
goals and collaboration that serves both joint and individual goals?  Are these concepts 
distinct from one another? 
In order to facilitate conceptual comparison, scholars’ attempts to define what is basic to the phenomenon 
of collaborative interaction should, at a minimum, address topics such as these. 
Teams as the Unit of Collaboration 
 What is not often explicitly stated is that collaborative interaction, as phenomenon, must happen 
between individuals (i.e., dyads) or in small groups.  Although interorganizational collaboration is a topic 
of great scholarly interest, scholars agree that the work of collaboration occurs in, as Stohl and Walker 
(2002) posited, work groups comprised of people representing different organizations.  
 Teams are generally considered to be a sub-category of groups.  Groups are comprised of more 
than two individuals – as a rule of thumb, a “small group” consists of three to twelve people – and are 
characterized by the fact that their members share common goals, feel a sense of belonging to the group, 
and exert influence on one another (Beebe & Masterson, 2009).  A team is a type of group characterized 
by more specific or well-developed goals and greater formality in procedures, rules, roles, and 
responsibilities (Beebe & Masterson).   
 Since the 1980s, organizations have increasingly embraced team-based structures.  Consequently, 
distinctions can be made among the various functions of work teams, or “interdependent collections of 
individuals who share responsibility for specific outcomes for their organization” (Sundstrom, DeMeuse, 
& Futrell, 1990, p. 120).  Sundstrom et al.’s widely cited typology of work teams classifies work teams 
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into four categories of functional responsibility.  For each category, Sundstrom et al. characterize the 
degree of differentiation among members, the degree of integration with entities outside of the team, the 
span or frequency of work cycles, and the team’s typical “outputs” or work products.  The four types that 
Sundstrom et al. propose are advice-involvement teams (e.g., advisory councils), production-service 
teams (e.g., manufacturing crews), project-development teams (e.g., planning teams), and action-
negotiation teams (e.g., sports teams).  The theoretical interests of this paper involve project-development 
teams and action-negotiation teams.  These two types are both typically comprised of a highly 
differentiated body of members – that is, members are “expert specialists” and team tasks may require 
specialized equipment or facilities, all of which differentiate the team from other parts of the organization.  
The two types differ in their external integration; project-development teams may be considered “low 
integration” to the extent that they have autonomy to set and pursue their own preliminary deadlines, 
while action-negotiation teams execute events that are “closely synchronized with counterparts and 
support units inside the organization” (p. 125).  
To draw a simple conclusion from the preceding definitions, teams are groups with more 
structure.  Team structures are the product of human communication and decision-making; their material 
consequences reflect those decisions and reinforce (i.e., transmit or ‘communicate’) shared values 
(Ashcraft, Kuhn, & Cooren, 2009; Leonardi & Barley, 2008).  Structures appear stable – or even 
permanent – due to the volume and persistence of individual’s ‘strategic choices’ to respond to existing 
rules and resources in an identical way (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994).  Entities external to the team, such as 
organizations and institutions, contribute to the availability of resources and the scope of rules 
(Orlikowski, 1992).   
Consequently, studying teams, as opposed to groups, may intensify one’s interest in how the team 
is influenced by or integrated with superordinate entities, such as organizations and institutions.  Intra-
team processes, however, also comprise a prominent subject of scholarly interest.  Teams are subject to 
all of the same internal phenomena as groups – group formation, conflict, decision making, climate, 
leadership, etc. – which have garnered significant study in social psychology, organizational behavior, 
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and small group communication.  The increasing popularity of team-based structures in contemporary 
organizations has made the internal processes of teams are especially interesting to management scholars 
who aspire to improve the overall productivity or performance of work teams.   
Persistent Challenges in Group Scholarship 
Within the field of communication, Poole has advocated that the small group could be the 
fundamental unit of communication research because the communication of small groups integrates a 
variety of micro- and macro-social forces (Poole, 1998).  Furthermore, the persistent challenges for group 
research that Poole presents in that article have special relevance for teams, given their sharper 
relationship to macro-social forces.  The first is the “problem of intersubjectivity,” or how to explain and 
predict properties of groups that “are not located in any individual, but are inter-subjective in that they are 
maintained by the interaction system of the group (or society)” (p. 360).  The second is a problem of 
defining groups when, as is often the case, their boundaries are permeable and members belong to and 
interact with a host of other groups in other contexts (p. 360).  Putnam and Stohl (1996) have suggested 
that scholars address these two problems by reframing the field’s definition of what a group is and does 
(p. 286).  They have proposed the construct “bona fide group” and defined it as a group with stable but 
permeable boundaries, in which members develop interdependence by co-constructing identities and 
interpretive frames (p. 286-287; see also Putnam & Stohl, 1990).  The concept applies equally well to 
contemporary teams; although membership and roles may be more structured in a team than a group, 
ambiguous or rapid changes to membership and roles are equally likely.   
Diverse Team Membership 
In general, teams with heterogeneous members have the potential to outperform teams with 
homogenous members because the former have the benefit of more perspectives, more unique 
information, and more ideas (Beebe & Masterson, 2009).  Also, when differences between members are 
readily apparent, this may alert team members to the need to question their assumptions and to use 
structured approaches to seek members’ input and make group decisions (Cronin, Bezrukova, Weingart, 
& Tinsley, 2011).   To capitalize on these benefits, however, team members have to avoid three common 
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pitfalls: (a) stereotyping, or making assumptions based on one’s limited knowledge about a certain social 
category (Lau & Murnighan, 1998, 2005); (b) interpreting members’ initial distrust or discomfort with 
one another as antagonistic, and using that as a justification for turning conflict about issues into personal 
conflict (Jehn, 1995; Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002); or (c) underestimating the influence of status 
differences on members’ communication behaviors and perceptions of the team (DiTomaso, Post, & 
Parks-Yancy, 2007). As this very brief summary of diversity in teams suggests, diverse team membership 
is both promising and perilous.   
 Much of the research in this area has focused on sources of diversity that are visible, such as 
ethnicity, age, or gender (see, for example, Oetzel, 2001).  A subset, however, has studied situations in 
which members are ‘diverse’ in terms of what they know.  Some scholars have focused on the diversity of 
task-related knowledge or information that team members have or share.  This vein of research 
distinguishes between shared information, which is known to multiple members, and unique information, 
which is known to only one member – a distinction which is a boon to experimental designs such as those 
of Stasser and Titus (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987), as well as the studies included in Mesmer Magnus and 
DeChurch’s (2009) meta-analysis, but more problematic for group communication scholars such as 
Bonito (2007) and Hewes (2009) interested in developing cognitive models.  This literature suggests that 
team members are generally more likely to talk about shared information than to introduce unique 
information (Stasser & Titus, 1987), and this self-filtering seems to be more severe when members are 
heterogeneous and when the structure of the task includes informational interdependence (Mesmer-
Magnus & DeChurch, 2009).   
Epistemic Diversity in Teams  
Other scholars have conceived of ‘what members know’ in terms of functional expertise.  Teams 
composed of members from different disciplines, professions, or functional areas may be called multi-
disciplinary, inter-professional, or cross-functional teams.  Along similar lines, Poole and Real (2003) 
conceptualized distinctions among multi-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary health care 
teams.   First, Poole and Real distinguished between three arenas of differentiation: function, discipline, 
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and specialty.  In their view, a function is associated with a particular division or department in the 
organization, a discipline is the aggregate of specific training and socialization, and specialties are areas 
within a discipline.  The term discipline may warrant clarification; in Poole and Real’s conceptualization, 
a doctor and a nurse would be regarded as representing different disciplines, while an intensive care nurse 
and a pediatric nurse would represent different specialties within the same discipline.   
Poole and Real acknowledged that, in the literature on health care teams, several terms have been 
used interchangeably to describe functionally different arrangements.  To clarify, they suggested the 
following three definitions.  A multi-disciplinary team is effectively a nominal team, in which members 
work in conjunction but function autonomously; team members’ work is likely to be sequential rather 
than simultaneous (e.g., specialists may see the same patient at different times and share information via 
the patient’s medical records).  An inter-disciplinary team consists of professionals from two or more 
disciplines who work interdependently in the same setting, as when surgical teams include nurses, 
surgeons, and anesthesiologists.  A team should be considered trans-disciplinary, they argue, when 
members are cross-trained in one another’s disciplines.  
 These distinctions provide clarity, but a few features of Poole and Real’s taxonomy limit its 
applicability to non-medical settings.  Despite the authors’ effort to assign the term multi-disciplinary to 
nominal teams, many scholars and practitioners continue to use multi-disciplinary as synonymous with 
inter-disciplinary.  The term discipline itself may generate confusion due to its broad colloquial use – i.e., 
the discipline in question might be “medicine,” which would subsume doctors, nurses, pharmacologists, 
and the like.  In organizational communication, Lammers and Garcia’s (2009) expansion on Abbott’s 
(1988) idea of professions as institutionalized occupations makes profession a less ambiguous term to 
describe an affiliation earned through training and socialization.  This suggests the usefulness of inter-
professional as an alternative.  By comparison, cross-functional is less precise, because an organization’s 
functions (divisions, departments, etc.) are likely to include members of multiple professions.   
 Extant literature suggests that teams that are diverse in what they know, in the inter-professional 
sense, will perform best after establishing collective goals (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), as well as 
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structures like rules and procedures (Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott, 1993).  Inter-professional teams will not be 
immune to tensions related to status and hierarchy (Apker, Propp, & Zabava Ford, 2005), but the 
aforementioned structures should help to minimize power struggles.   
 In addition, members of inter-professional teams are likely to see the same problems in different 
ways (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Holzer, 2012; Huber & Lewis, 2010), which can be attributed to the 
institutional logics associated with their professions.  The greatest advantage of the term inter-
professional team over similar or synonymous terms is that it invokes recognition of the institutional 
influences that differentiate a profession from an occupation.  Lammers and Garcia (2009) outlined ten 
characteristics of professions: emotional neutrality, a body of knowledge, formal standards of conduct, a 
service orientation, social status, training and education, self-control on the part of the professional, social 
control via others’ expectations of the professional, formal associations, and a professional identity (pp. 
359-362).  Lammers and Garcia argued that professions should be viewed as institutionalized occupations 
because professions exhibit the same extra-organizational influence attributed to institutional forces.  
They argue, “Inasmuch as professions are characterized (at a minimum) by established knowledge claims, 
rule-like standards, autonomous action, and participation in associations external to work organizations, 
they are indeed institutions manifested both within and across specific organizations” (p. 363).  As 
Chapter 1 discussed, the conditions of interagency in the context of the present study suggest a confluence 
of features of interorganizational and interprofessional communication.  
Extant Models of Collaboration 
 Scholars have proposed several models of collaboration.  Early models, such as Gray’s (1989), 
tended toward prescriptive, phased models.  Gray began from a premise very similar to the one that 
underlies most arguments for postmodern organizing: “Under turbulent conditions organizations become 
highly interdependent with others in indirect but consequential ways (Emery and Trist, 1965, 1972; Trist, 
1977). Under these circumstances it is difficult for organizations to act unilaterally to solve problems 
without creating unwanted consequences for other parties and without encountering constraints imposed 
by others” (1).  Gray advocated for multiparty collaboration – as an alternative to “competition, hierarchy, 
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or incremental planning” (10) – for resolving conflicts or advancing shared visions.  The collaborative 
process that Gray prescribed consisted of three phases, and mirrored Dewey’s classic reflective problem 
solving model.  The first phase included developing a common definition of the problem, committing to 
collaborate, and identifying stakeholders and resources.  The second phase included establishing ground 
rules and roles, searching for information, exploring options, and choosing (by consensus) a course of 
action.  The third phase was the implementation phase, which included monitoring the agreement and 
ensuring compliance.  Gray’s model continues to serve as a tool for action research and analysis (e.g., 
Prins, 2010), but it is not widely cited among communication scholars.  
 A more recent model in management literature builds on the attempt to enumerate a taxonomy of 
team processes (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2004) by proposing an intricate systems model of 
collaborative processes.  In this model, Bedwell, Wildman, DiazGranados, and Associates (2012) focus 
on six types of collaborative behaviors in the throughput portion of the system: adaptation, extra-role, 
information processing, leadership, sensemaking, and task execution.  The model (Figure 1) appears in 
the “Figures” section of this chapter.  
 Although communication behaviors are never explicitly mentioned, one can assume that the 
proposed collaborative behaviors would all be enacted through communication.  From a communication 
perspective, however, this model may not be sufficiently specific about how the implied behaviors would 
or should be integrated to produce collaborative performance and, ultimately, distal collaborative 
outcomes.  The nature of the collaborative performance remains somewhat opaque in this model as well.  
 In Organizational Communication, two key theoretical pieces have been published on 
collaborative processes: Stohl and Walker’s (2002) Bona Fide Group Collaboration Model (see Figure 2) 
and Keyton, Ford, and Smith’s (2008) Mesolevel Communicative Model of Interorganizational 
Collaboration (see Figure 3).  Both specifically address the phenomenon of interorganizational 
collaboration.  Stohl and Walker emphasize a bona fide groups perspective in order to address what they 
describe as changing organizational practices that change group structure and action, namely: “For some 
time, organizations have been situated neither in one place nor within one time; instead, they are 
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composed of employees located in several places, temporarily separated, moving in, through, and out of 
traditional organizational boundaries” (239).  Stohl and Walker’s model proposed that collaborative 
partners unite to form a negotiated temporary system in which they cooperatively facilitate decision-
making, commitment, trust, power, and knowledge management.  In so doing, they address both 
individual goals and organizational goals.  
 Keyton, Ford, and Smith’s (2008) model includes some similar elements, but it emphasizes the 
unique features of interorganizational collaboration.  They defined their scope as addressing problem-
centered teams in which individuals “represent multiple and competing organizational or constituency 
interests” (376).  One explicit aspiration of Keyton et al.’s work is to overcome the idealization bias in 
definitions and understandings of collaboration.  Accordingly, they offered the following definition of 
interorganizational collaboration:  
“Interorganizational collaboration is the set of communicative processes in which individuals 
representing multiple organizations or stakeholders engage when working interdependently to 
address problems outside the spheres of individuals or organizations working in isolation. The 
outcomes of these processes have the potential to benefit or harm the parties to the collaboration, 
as well as others.” (p. 381) 
Keyton et al. acknowledged that the model was complex, and they further explained that the process 
elements should be considered iterative rather than linear: “a set of iterative communicative practices 
across levels that are contextually bound in a public framework and embedded in the relationships among 
team members and stakeholders” (383).   
 Two concepts in the model merit clarification: the process inputs impact and investment.  Here, 
impact refers to anticipated impact, as in: “the degree to which individual parties to a collaboration 
believe the outcomes will influence them or their organizations” (394).  The term investment refers to 
what the individual or the individual’s organization invests in the collaborative effort, including money, 
supplies, people, time and status.  As the model depicts, a combination of these and other inputs, along 
with the iterative evolution of the collaborators’ shared vernacular constitutes collaborating.  Keyton et 
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al. explained that the model does not include outcomes because if the collaborative process is good, the 
outcome will also be good.  
 Models reviewed.  Similar to Bedwell et al.’s (2012) model, each model leaves something to be 
desired as one seeks to understand the communication behaviors that comprise collaborative interaction.  
The literatures on team structures, diverse team membership and coordination all suggest potential 
roadblocks or impediments for ad hoc, emergent, role-based teams, but the collaboration literature largely 
fails to acknowledge, much less address, these impediments.  Given the lack of overarching authority and 
the diversity in members’ perspectives, it seems likely that such groups would struggle to establish norms, 
and whatever norms they could develop through repetition or practice would be likely to apply only to 
routine situations, leaving the team at sea in the face of non-routine demands.  It is particularly surprising 
that none of the collaborative models explicitly mention conflict or conflict management.  Incorporating 
what the field already knows about group conflict may greatly enhance how we think about collaboration 
– and, in particular, how we can distinguish between more or less effective collaboration.  
Conflict as Concept 
 Communication scholars’ general warrant for studying conflict is that communication manifests 
conflict; communication indicates the presence of conflicting ideas, desires, or needs (Putnam, 2006).  In 
the Handbook of Conflict Communication, Putnam summarized, “[C]onflict centers on incompatibilities, 
an expressed struggle, and interdependence among two or more parties” (p. 5).  A widely cited definition 
of conflict is Putnam and Poole’s (1987) definition: “Conflict... is defined as the interaction of 
interdependent people who perceive opposition of goals, aims, and values, and who see the other party as 
potentially interfering with the realization of these goals” (p. 552).  In this definition, one also sees the 
scope conditions for collaboration: interdependence, the potential for goal interference due to the 
combination of shared and non-shared goals, and the likelihood of opposition due to the explicit inclusion 
of people designated to represent different perspectives and interests.  Additionally, the absence of a clear 
authority may increase collaborators’ fears that no one will arbitrate conflicts, and it will be ‘every man 
for himself.’ 
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 Conflict scholarship continues to strive to generate knowledge that serves yet transcends specific 
contexts (e.g., marital relationships, labor relations, hostage negotiation, etc.), and to answer the question, 
“How do communication patterns differ for diverse types of productive outcomes (e.g., facilitating 
diversity or promoting change)?” (Putnam, 2006, p. 22).  Regarding the sub-genre of conflict in work 
teams, Poole and Garner have argued that the three dominant perspectives – instrumental, developmental, 
and political – need to be better integrated, such that studies of conflict in work teams would not only 
address the effects of conflict on productive outcomes but would also interrogate the ongoing nature of 
conflict management and attend to the implications of conflict management for power and influence in 
work teams (2006). 
 As the prior paragraph suggests, conflict can be productive for groups.  Deutsch (1977) is 
credited with early theorizing about the distinction between destructive and productive conflict.  
Elaborating on Deutsch, textbook authors Folger, Poole, and Stutman (2005) explained:  
“In productive conflicts, parties believe that all sides can attain important goals (Deutsch, 1977). 
Productive conflict interaction exhibits a sustained effort to bridge the apparent incompatibility of 
positions.  This is in marked contrast to destructive conflicts, where the interaction is premised on 
participants’ belief that one side must win and the other must lose.  Productive conflict interaction results 
in a solution satisfactory to all and produces a general feeling that the parties have gained something (for 
example, a new idea, greater clarity of others’ positions, or a stronger sense of solidarity).” (10) 
 Folger, Poole and Stutman (2005) posited that conflict is best understood as series of cyclical 
episodes, and any one episode may include elements of both destructive and productive conflict.  In 
addition, they explained that productive conflict may not appear more charitable than destructive conflict: 
“Productive conflict interaction is sometimes competitive. Both parties must stand up for their own 
positions and strive for perceived understanding if a representative outcome is to be attained (Cahn, 
1990)” (10).   
The acknowledgement of differences in groups has the potential to facilitate cooperative problem 
solving, but it also has the potential to incite hostility and escalation or fear and avoidance.  Accordingly, 
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Folger et al. warned that the demands of differentiation – that is, of differentiating one position from 
another – are themselves anxiety-inducing (17).  Productive conflict, however, facilitates cooperative 
problem solving by managing cycles of differentiation – focusing and elaborating on differences – and 
integration – focusing and elaborating on common values, interests, and goals.  Folger et al. summarized 
the benefits of differentiation as follows: a clear understanding of differences, accepting other positions as 
legitimate (without necessarily agreeing), and motivation to work on the conflict.  What moves the group 
toward integration, the authors posited, is a full understanding or discussion of the issues, some kind of 
standoff, or the self-protective instinct, which may be prompted by discomfort or insult.  In the face of 
differentiation, groups have the option to cooperate or compete; reasons for cooperating hearken back to 
master social theories like Social Exchange Theory (Emerson, 1976) and invite consideration of 
economic, cultural, network-based, and even altruistic rationales. 
 Sources of conflict in team and organizational settings.  Extant scholarship has identified a 
number of generic sources of conflict in team and organizational settings.  These conflict types emerge 
from the conditions of interdependency inherent in team or organizational affiliations.  Common types 
include power differences (Bradley, 1978), the distribution of finite resources, role uncertainty (Galbraith, 
1973), procedural uncertainty (Dosi & Egidi, 1991; Simon, 1957), disparities in member effort or 
investment, mixed motives (i.e., potential interference of individual goals with group goals, or vice versa), 
and task-related interdependency.     
 Responses to Conflict.  As Nicotera and Dorsey (2006) pointed out, conflict scholarship related 
to organizational communication has largely focused on developing typologies of conflict management 
styles.  These typologies have produced a variety of survey instruments, which have been used to 
diagnose managers and create the impetus for training programs on situational approaches to conflict 
management (Nicotera & Dorsey).  The classic model of conflict management styles, generally attributed 
to Kilman and Thomas (1975), consists of five styles – avoidance, competition, compromise, 
accommodation, and collaboration – that map onto low-medium-high levels on two dimensions: concern 
for self and concern for others.  For example, the conflict management style associated with low concern 
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for others and high concern for self is competition, and the conflict management style associated with 
high concern for others and low concern for self is accommodation. 
The Kilman-Thomas instrument asks participants to report on what is typical for them in 
“situations in which you find your wishes differing from those of another person.”  The Putnam and 
Wilson OCCI instrument asks participants how they would respond to a hypothetical scenario.  One 
critique of all such style models is that they miss the greater trajectory of the series of conflict episodes, 
which over time have a “definite direction – toward escalation, toward avoidance and suppression, or 
toward productive work on the conflict” (Folger et al., 2005, p. 12).  
Conflict outcomes.  Thinking of productive conflict, one might view conflict outcomes as 
distributive (win-lose) or integrative (win-win) (Putnam, 1990).  It is difficult to make attributions, 
however, because, as Folger et al., disclaimed, “At best, people have extremely limited knowledge of the 
implications their actions hold for others, and their ability to manage conflicts is therefore severely 
curtailed.  Not only are parties’ behaviors inherently interwoven in conflicts, but their thinking and 
anticipations are as well” (13). 
Confrontation as Concept 
 Most conflict scholarship refers to collaboration only in the nominal sense in which 
“collaboration” is one of the five classic conflict management styles.  (Although, interestingly, Putnam’s 
(1984) extensive measurement of conflict styles found no distinguishable differences between 
compromise and collaboration, so she united the two under the label solution orientation.)  As previously 
discussed, most collaboration scholarship makes little or no mention of conflict.   
 One notable exception is Poole’s 2012 National Communication Association Carroll C. Arnold 
Lecture, “Paradoxes of Collaboration,” in which he acknowledged the importance of confrontation and 
the management of conflict in collaborative endeavors.  He argued that “a good collaboration” has five 
qualities: not only is it active, founded on social interaction and relationships, empowering, and emergent; 
it is also confrontational (Poole, 2013, p. 7).  Poole explained: 
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“Collaborations are not always as cooperative and supportive as today’s interpretations of the 
term may suggest. The nature of confrontation differs. In some cases, collaborators actively 
confront their differences and work them through, as with Pound and Eliot [from an earlier 
illustration related to the poem, The Waste Land]. In others, collaborators goad one another 
forward, as Picasso and Matisse did, without ever coming to a resolution.  Handled properly, 
differences inject new ideas and possibilities into the collaboration that promote creativity.  
Confrontation also challenges collaborators to evaluate and sometimes to question their activities, 
enhancing the quality of collaborative outcomes” (p. 8). 
Poole also argued that collaborations devoid of confrontation were likely to exemplify one of several 
“pathologies of collaboration,” such as the cooptation of collective work products by a single participant, 
over-reliance on a leader in lieu of empowered participation, or “uninspired pseudo-collaboration, in 
which participants go through the motions of what they think should be a collaboration but in reality is 
nothing more than coordinated work, at the root of much ‘teamwork’ in all walks of life” (p. 14).  Poole’s 
synthesis suggests that the presence of confrontation differentiates a perfunctory or counter-productive 
collaboration from a good one.   
From a practitioner perspective, however, confrontation may not seem like a desirable 
characteristic of collaboration, and participants may not know how to respond to such confrontations.  For 
example, Lewis, Isbell and Koschmann’s (2010) study of tensions in collaborative inter-organizational 
relationships found that, in response to tensions, collaborators were likely to enact strategies of conflict 
avoidance, such as stifling dissent in order to expedite the decision-making process or withdrawing from 
the collaborative effort when dissatisfied, rather than advocating for their positions.  Lewis et al. also 
noted that stakeholders who were initially excluded from the collaboration, intentionally or not, were 
unlikely to have their interests considered at any point in the process.  Although practitioners 
acknowledged the importance of “having the right people at the table” (p. 469), it appears that the lack of 
confrontation made it challenging to get the right people to the table, to keep them coming to meetings, 
and to encourage them to voice their opinions and concerns. 
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Confrontation Operationalized 
 In order to detect the presence or absence of confrontation in human interactions, one must first 
operationalize the construct.  Poole (2013) described the following enactments of confrontation: 
Collaborators “actively confront their differences and work them through”, “goad one another forward 
[...] without ever coming to a resolution”, “inject new ideas and possibilities into the collaboration that 
promote creativity”, and “[challenge other collaborators] to evaluate and sometimes question their 
activities” (p. 8).   
Poole also posited that confrontation is a characteristic of the collaboration; in other words, the 
behaviors that constitute confrontation would fall within the set of behaviors that constitute collaborative 
interaction.  Following Bedwell et al.’s (2012) model (p. 18), collaborative behaviors might include: 
adaptive behaviors, extra-role behaviors, information processing behaviors, leadership behaviors, 
sensemaking behaviors, and task execution behaviors.  Keyton et al.’s (2008) model (p. 20) additionally 
suggests that collaborative behaviors might include facilitating others’ goal pursuits and co-creating a 
“vernacular” as part of the emerging identity of the new collective entity.  In my view – and in layman’s 
terms – collaborative behaviors are likely to include: (a) asking for or giving feedback, preferences, 
perspectives, or opinions; (b) asking for or giving information; (c) explicitly talking about how best to 
work together; (d) seeking or giving information about task status in order to keep activities aligned to a 
shared timeline or plan; and (e) adapting behaviors or individual plans to help facilitate collective goals 
and other parties’ goals.  
Confrontation, then, would be the style in which one performs some or all of the collaborative 
interaction behaviors proposed above.  I propose that confrontation would include: (a) initiating contact 
with collaborators to seek or share feedback, preferences, perspectives, opinions, task information or 
status information; (b) in situations of conflict, asserting one’s preferences or opinions rather than 
withholding them; (c) in situations of conflict, asking the other party/ies to assert their preferences or 
opinions; (d) in situations of conflict, first encouraging differentiation, or the expression of differences, 
and second encouraging integration, or the pursuit of common interests.  Regarding scope conditions, I 
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would expect confrontation to occur between dyads or within groups; the present study places 
confrontation in the context of joint work arrangements.  A situation of conflict refers to an expressed 
struggle between “interdependent people who perceive opposition of goals, aims, and values, and who see 
the other party as potentially interfering with the realization of these goals” (Putnam & Poole, 1987, p. 
552). 
To say that confrontation is a style of performing collaborative interaction behaviors raises the 
question, “How is this different from the existing conflict style models?”  I will speak to this with respect 
to the Kilman Thomas instrument (KTI, Kilman & Thomas, 1975), because it is the most established and 
widely-used.  In the KTI, the items that describe a collaborative conflict management style include 
phrases like: “I attempt to deal with all of [the other party’s] concerns and my concerns,” “I consistently 
seek the other’s help in working out a solution,” “I attempt to get all concerns and issues out immediately 
in the open,” “I attempt to immediately work through our differences,” “I always lean toward a direct 
discussion of the problem,” and “I am often very concerned with satisfying all of our wishes.”  Although 
these items connote advocacy for one’s own wishes, they do not do so as strongly as the competition style 
items, such as, “I am usually firm in pursuing my goals,” “I try to win my position,” and “I make some 
effort to get my way.”  The competition items don’t preclude coming to a cooperative solution, but they 
more strongly suggest self-advocacy rather than avoidance.  I believe that confrontation would combine 
elements of the collaborative style and the competitive style.  It would not include elements of avoidance, 
accommodation or compromise.  I exclude compromise in particular because it can be reached without a 
robust consideration of each party’s wants and needs.  The heuristic of fairness suggests, “You get 
something you want, I get something I want, we both leave somewhat unhappy, but at least it’s fair.”  To 
me, this style is likely to skim the surface of differentiation and circumvent integration all together.  
Research Questions 
 In order to investigate the relationships between coordination, collaboration, conflict, and 
confrontation in disaster preparation, I developed four broad research questions and seven hypotheses to 
guide my research in two phases.  Phase 1 of the research project (the methods of which are described in 
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Chapter 4, with results described in Chapter 5) included three research questions.  Phase 2 of the study, 
using findings from Phase 1, posed seven hypotheses and one additional research question.  First, in 
Phase 1, in order to analyze conflict interactions in context, I asked the following two questions:  
RQ1: What kinds of conflicts arise in a multi-agency disaster response exercise? 
RQ2: What communication practices do exercise planners or participants use to navigate these 
conflicts?   
Next, I adopted “confrontation” as a sensitizing concept, and I re-analyzed the results of Research 
Questions 1 and 2 to answer this question: 
RQ3: How and when do confrontation behaviors emerge? 
In addressing Research Questions 2 and 3 – which relate to responses to conflicts – I also considered the 
outcomes of the conflict episodes for the agencies involved.   
 Consistent with the mixed methods design, the results of Phase 1 of the study strongly informed 
the design of items and scales used to measure the variables in Phase 2 of the study.  (For more on 
questionnaire design, see Chapter 6, p. 102.)  Regarding the identification of key variables, my initial 
conclusions came from my review of extant literature.  Following Keyton, Ford, and Smith (2008), as 
well as Lewis, Isbell, and Koschmann (2008), I concluded that anticipated impact, involvement, and 
agency resource investment were likely to be key input variables.  Keyton et al. proposed “impact” and 
“investment” as input variables; I expanded upon these concepts based on Lewis et al.’s applied study and 
my own analysis in Phase 1 of this project.  Anticipated impact refers to the organization’s expectation 
that it will benefit from participating in the interorganizational collaborative project.  Involvement 
addresses the authors’ concept of engagement; some organizational representatives are likely to be more 
involved (i.e., apply more discretionary effort, take on more responsibilities, complete more tasks, etc.) 
than others.  Agency resource investment refers to the idea that some organizations are likely to invest 
more material resources in the collaborative project than other organizations.  As Lewis, Isbell, and 
Koschmann found, the organizational representatives of organizations that invested greater resources in 
the collaborative project often assumed leadership roles and strongly influenced group processes and 
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outcomes.  To begin building a conceptual model, I posited that these three variables (each comprised of 
original, context-specific scales) would serve as formative, observed variables to a latent variable, 
motivation to achieve coordination. 
 I also posited that collaborative interaction, a latent variable, would be comprised of three 
dimensions: expertise recognition, informational support, and timeliness.  I drew these variables in part 
from Stohl and Walker’s (2002) model, which included “decision-making” and “knowledge 
management” as process variables; I also drew from Bedwell, Wildman, DiazGranados, and Associates 
(2012), who included “adaptive behaviors,” “information processing behaviors,” “sensemaking 
behaviors,” and “task execution behaviors” among their process variables.  I considered, in light of my 
Phase 1 data, what kinds of decision-making, knowledge management, adaptive behaviors, information 
processing behaviors, sensemaking behaviors, and task execution behaviors seemed most important in 
this particular context.  I concluded that three categories of behaviors were particularly important to 
interagency coordination: expertise recognition, informational support, and timeliness.  Expertise 
recognition refers to participating organizations’ mutual interest in understanding one another’s unique 
expertise, as well as how they might draw on one another’s expertise to make better collective decisions.  
Informational support refers to seeking and giving both process- and task-related information.  Timeliness 
refers to conforming to a shared or mutually-agreed-upon timeline so as to synchronize or sequence 
efforts in some mutually-beneficial way.  Upon further reflection, all three dimensions seemed to be 
forms of collaborative communication behaviors – per Lewis’ (2006) term, collaborative interaction.  To 
further develop the conceptual model, I posited that these three variables (each comprised of original, 
context-specific scales) would serve as formative, observed variables to the latent variable, collaborative 
interaction. 
 The literature review seemed to suggest effectiveness of coordination as one outcome of interest.  
Individual goal attainment and collective goal attainment also appear to be relevant outcomes.  In 
addition, the use of a collaborative approach – as opposed to top-down coordinative approaches – might 
result in participants feeling more satisfied with the process of working together.  I decided to propose 
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two outcome variables in this vein: satisfaction with exercise process and satisfaction with exercise 
results.   
 Lastly, I proposed that the degree of confrontation in the agency representative’s approach to 
conflict management would moderate the relationship between collaborative interaction and the exercise 
satisfaction outcome variables.  A moderating relationship would mean that higher degrees of 
collaborative interaction paired with a more confrontive conflict management style would result in higher 
degrees of satisfaction with the exercise process and with the exercise outcomes, while higher degrees of 
collaborative interaction paired with a less confrontive conflict management style would result in lower 
degrees of satisfaction with the exercise process and with the exercise outcomes.  I labeled this proposed 
moderator confrontive conflict management style.  
 A full conceptual model that summarizes all of the aforementioned variables and relationships is 
shown in Figure 4.  The proposed relationships can also be summarized in the following hypotheses:  
 H1: Motivation to achieve coordination will be positively associated with collaborative 
interaction.  
 H2a: Collaborative interaction will mediate the relationship between motivation to achieve 
coordination and satisfaction with exercise process. 
 H2b: Collaborative interaction will mediate the relationship between motivation to achieve 
coordination and satisfaction with exercise results.  
 H3a: Collaborative interaction will be positively associated with satisfaction with exercise 
process.  
 H3b: Collaborative interaction will be positively associated with satisfaction with exercise 
results. 
 H4a: Confrontive conflict management style will moderate the relationship between collaborative 
interaction and satisfaction with exercise process. 
 H4b: Confrontive conflict management style will moderate the relationship between collaborative 
interaction and satisfaction with exercise results. 
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As Chapter 4 will describe, the results of the qualitative analysis also strongly informed the design of the 
items and scales used to measure the variables identified in Hypotheses 1 through 4.   
 Lastly, as Chapter 5 will describe, the Phase 1 analysis also produced a set of eight tensions that 
seemed specific to the disaster exercise context.  In order to further evaluate the validity and usefulness of 
these tensions, I asked on additional research question in Phase 2:  
RQ4: What is the relationship between the proposed eight common exercise tensions and 
participants’ overall satisfaction with the exercise?   
The progression of research questions and hypotheses proposed here reflects the complexity of mixing 
methods, even in a sequential, development-oriented research design.   
Conclusion 
The master rationale for studying collaboration as a phenomenon of human organizing is the 
promise that it may facilitate breakthroughs in how humans work together to address complex problems.  
The argument seems to be that human collectives continue to face intractable and boundary-spanning 
challenges, and collaborative approaches may help them better marshal their best collective knowledge, 
decision-making, and capacity for action.  In the sub-discipline of organizational communication, this 
rationale has motivated the study of collaborative processes, with a particular emphasis on 
interorganizational collaboration.  Across social scientific disciplines, scholars have used this rationale to 
pursue the study of what Taylor (2005) called postmodern forms of organizing.  In popular and scholarly 
usage, the term collaboration is used more diffusely, but the study of collaborative processes has the 
potential to advance knowledge about how to communicate effectively in postmodern organizational 
structures.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Collaborative Performance Framework (Bedwell, Wildman, DiazGranados, and Associates, 
2012, pp. 137). 
 
 
Figure 2. Bona Fide Group Collaboration Model (Stohl & Walker, 2002, p. 243). 
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Figure 3. Mesolevel Communicative Model of Interorganizational Collaboration (Keyton, Ford, & Smith, 
2008, pp. 387-389). 
 
 
Figure 4. Proposed Conceptual Model. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 In order to explore the research questions and hypotheses discussed above (pp. 40-43), I designed 
a mixed-method study comprised of sequential qualitative and quantitative methods.  The purpose of 
mixing methods was development, namely, to analyze data collected by one method in order to develop 
an instrument to collect related data using a different method (Greene, 2007).  In Phase 1 of the study, I 
observed three cases of disaster response exercises, and I conducted individual interviews with exercise 
planners.  My analysis of these data informed the development of a survey instrument, which I 
administered to a large sample of disaster response professionals in Phase 2 of the study.  In this chapter, I 
will review the methods I employed in both stages of the study.  Results follow in chapters 5 (Phase 1 
results) and 6 (Phase 2 results).   
Overall Design 
 To mix methods is to interpret the data collected using different methods – either sequentially or 
concurrently – as part of the study design.  What differentiates mixed-method studies from multiple-
method (or multi-method) studies is that, in a mixed-method study, the researcher invites discoveries that 
could only come from employing a combination of methods that inform each other.  Multiple typologies 
of mixed-method research designs have been proposed (see, for example, Greene, 2007; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell & Clark, 2007); rather than selecting one, I will describe the distinguishing 
features of the design of the present study.  The data were collected and analyzed within a single 
paradigm (interpretive, then post-positivist) in sequence, not simultaneously.  Paradigms were not mixed 
– for example, I did not transform any qualitative data into quantitative data using content analysis or 
other quantitatively-oriented coding systems.  I did collect multiple forms of qualitative data 
simultaneously, and I analyzed observation and interview data together as one corpus, as is common 
practice in qualitative data analysis when the goal is to verify interpretations by checking them against 
multiple data sources (Huberman & Miles, 1998).  Thus, while the purpose for mixing methods in the 
overall research design was development, the purpose for mixing methods within the interpretive 
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paradigm was triangulation, not in the Campbell and Fiske (1959) sense, but in the sense that Huberman 
and Miles described as follows:  
“[T]riangulation is less a tactic than a mode of inquiry.  By self-consciously setting out to collect 
and double-check findings, using multiple sources and modes of evidence, the researcher will 
build the triangulation process into ongoing data collection.  It will be the way he or she got to the 
finding in the first place – by seeing or hearing instances of it from different sources, using 
different methods, and by squaring the finding with others with which it should coincide.” (pp. 
199-200) 
As Greene (2007) advises, mixing methods should be a matter of design, not of after-thought; regardless 
of the field of study, when authors explicitly describe their purposes for mixing, they reinforce the 
intentionality of their work (Carlson, Cooper, Pilny, 2012).   
 Evaluating the quality of mixed-method research remains a matter of some scrutiny. The central 
question, it seems, is whether each method employed should be judged by its own standard criteria, or 
whether there should be different standards for mixed method approaches?  There is no simple answer to 
this question (Greene, 2007), but mixed methodologists have proposed some considerations for readers, 
reviewers, and designers of mixed method studies.  The least challenging studies to evaluate are those that 
mix methods within a single paradigm.  For example, the intensive interviewing and observation method 
typically employs each method in a way consistent with the values and assumptions of the interpretive 
paradigm.  In such cases, “there is only one set of guidelines, criteria, and processes for warranting 
method and knowledge claim” (Greene, 2007, p. 165).   
It is more challenging to evaluate the quality of a design that mixes across paradigms as well as 
methodological traditions.  In such cases, Greene suggested evaluating the research in two respects: 
quality of method and quality of inferences.  Quality of method, Greene argued, reflects adherence to “the 
quality criteria and procedures of the tradition in which the method is being implemented.  In survey 
methodology, for example, such quality criteria include minimization of response bias, maximization of 
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the number of respondents, and measurement considerations of reliability and validity” (pp. 166-167).  
Quality of inferences, Greene explained, may require more of the writer and of the reviewer:  
“For warranting the quality of the inferences, conclusions, and interpretations made, adopt a 
multiplistic stance that (a) focuses on the available data support for the inferences, using data of 
multiple and diverse kinds; (b) could include criteria or stances from different methodological 
traditions; (c) considers warrants for inquiry inferences a matter of persuasive argument, in 
addition to the matter of fulfilling established criteria; and (d) attends to the nature and extent of 
the better understanding that is reached with this mixed methods design, as that is the overall aim 
of mixed methods inquiry.” (p. 167)  
With respect to evaluating the quality of inferences, Greene suggests that the burden is on the writer to 
persuasively demonstrate that not only did multiple data sources inform the researcher’s interpretations, 
but the mixture of the methods generated a superior understanding than could otherwise have been 
achieved.  At the same time, however, the burden is on the reviewer and the reader to accept the use of 
criteria and stances from different traditions and to treat as legitimate findings that originate from the 
mixture itself.  Although there is no simple answer to the question of how to evaluate the quality of mixed 
method study, the not-so-simple answers correspond well to trans-paradigmatic concerns for design 
quality and inference quality.  
 The following sections describe the methods used in Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively.  Each 
section also describes the research sample, the steps I took to ensure the integrity of my application of the 
methods, and the analytical techniques that I employed.  Results follow in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.   
Phase 1 
 Data collection and sample.  I conducted observations in the form of three cases.  Case studies 
may be exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive (Yin, 2003); in my project, they were exploratory in the 
sense that I was seeking to understand the range of manifestations of collaborative and confrontational 
communication behaviors in the context of disaster response exercises.  Each case consisted of a single 
exercise.  The first case, the “Central State Escalation” exercise (CSE, pseudonym), was a full-scale 
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exercise that took place over a three-day period in early 2013.  It involved over 300 participants, and it 
practiced the escalation of the response to a bioterrorist threat from the local response to civilian state-
level assets to the state National Guard.  The second case, the “Neighboring County Disaster” exercise 
(NCD, pseudonym), was a one-day full-scale exercise designed to exercise coordination among resources 
from two adjacent counties.  It involved over 150 people, and participating agencies included fire 
departments, city and county police departments, hazardous materials and technical rescue specialists, 
SWAT specialists, the staff and students of a local high school, 9-1-1 dispatchers, the emergency 
management agencies of both participating counties, and a variety of public administrators from each 
county as well.  The third and last case, “College Town Tornado” exercise (CTT, pseudonym), was a 
half-day functional exercise (i.e., tabletop format, but participants do not get any information in advance) 
designed to exercise how local response agencies and two higher educational institutions would work 
together if weather conditions required students to be evacuated from both campuses at the same time.  It 
involved over 50 people, and participating agencies included campus police departments, campus 
officials, county police departments, county fire departments, county public works, county EMA, county 
public health, and city and county officials (e.g., city manager).  What was common across all three cases 
was the presence of multiple civilian response agencies and the use of Homeland Security Exercise 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) principles in the structure of the exercise process and its supporting 
materials.  The cases differed in terms of format (full-scale versus functional), number of participants, 
types of agencies participating, as well as exercise objectives and scenarios being exercised.   
Regarding geographical diversity, CSE and CTT occurred in neighboring counties in the central 
part of Midwestern state; although the CSE exercise was much bigger, approximately 25% of the CTT 
participants also participated in the CSE exercise, albeit in different roles.  The NCD exercise took place 
in the northern part of the same Midwestern state; one of the lead evaluators from the CSE exercise was 
also a lead evaluator for the NCD exercise (by virtue of his state-level position), the lead facilitator of the 
NCD exercise was a controller for part of the CSE exercise, and the lead facilitator of the CSE exercise 
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served as a controller for the NCD exercise.  Apart from these participants, the population of participants 
in the NCD exercise was completely different.  
A ‘case’ traditionally has a beginning, middle and end defined by the researcher (Yin, 2003).  The 
CSE and CTT cases began with the first planning meeting for the exercise and ended with the after-action 
review meeting that followed the completion of the exercise.  The middle consisted of multiple planning 
meetings, the exercise itself, and informal on-site “hot wash” discussions (i.e., debrief discussions) at the 
end of work periods.  The NCD case was limited to the exercise itself.  It began with my arrival at the 
orientation before the start of the exercise, and it ended with the on-site hot wash at the end of the 
exercise day.   
One principle of case study design is that using multiple forms of evidence bolsters the study’s 
construct validity; Yin (2003) instructed the researcher to seek convergence among the data generated by 
multiple methods.  In other words, case study design typically benefits from the use of multiple methods 
of data collection for the purpose of triangulation.  Similarly, Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland 
(2006) pointed out that participant observation and intensive interviewing are not separate techniques; 
rather, observational data often serves to generate, refine, and better interpret interview data (p. 18).  The 
authors used the term intensive interviewing to include casual conversation as well as semi-structured 
interviews.  In my project, I conducted brief, informal interviews with a convenience sample of 
participants throughout my observations, but I also conducted more formal, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with members of the planning committee for the CSE exercise, the most complex of the three 
cases.  
It would not be appropriate to label my methodology as ethnography.  Readers may associate the 
combination of intensive interviewing and participant observation with ethnography or ethnographic 
methods, but the concepts are not synonymous.  Interviewing and observation are the more general terms, 
and ethnographic studies apply them in a specific way.  Miller, Hengst, and Wang (2003) describe three 
characteristics that render ethnographic methods distinct: (a) “sustained” (i.e., long-term) engagement 
with particular individuals at a research site; (b) a particular interest in relating “the details of particular 
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participants and practices” (p.224) to taken-for-granted cultural values; and (c) the flexibility to “revise or 
discard initial research questions and adjust data collection procedures as [ethnographers] position 
themselves physically and socially in the research site” (p. 225).  Traditional ethnographies are more 
sustained and open-ended than my study was.  In the next two sections, I provide more detail about each 
method.  
 Observations.  I observed four general types of phenomena.  The first was direct experience, that 
is, what happened to me, the researcher, while I was on the scene.  The second was observed social 
action, which consisted of what I saw other people doing, including their verbal interactions.  The third 
type was talk itself, or what people said, particularly, “talk in action,” which the Lofland et al. defined as 
“accounts or patterns of talk formulated for a particular end in a naturally occurring situation that is part 
of some ongoing system of action” (p. 87).  I also collected and observed supplementary sources such as 
print materials (e.g., exercise plans and other handouts) and photographic data while in the research 
setting, but the analysis of these items is not specifically included in the present study.   
Both full-scale exercises (CSE and NCD) had multiple sites with simultaneous activity, so I 
circulated among the sites.  At CSE, the only site from which I was formally restricted was the venue 
where the policymakers participated in a condensed tabletop version of the exercise.    The CTT exercise 
had effectively three sites; I had access to the two sites used by operational personnel but not the one in 
which the policymakers worked on their portion of the exercise.  For CSE, I had 8 undergraduate and 
graduate students assist in my observations; we posted ourselves in different locations in shifts so as to 
observe simultaneous portions of the exercise.  I asked these observers to provide detailed notes on an 
observation guide that I created.  For CTT, I observed one of the operational locations, and a fellow 
graduate student observed the simultaneous activities in the second room.  To accommodate participants’ 
privacy concerns, observers did not audio- or video-record.  We did take detailed notes – either by hand 
or on a laptop – and we occasionally took photographs.  As the observers and I engaged in informal 
conversations with exercise participants – for example, about what they were doing, what we were 
researching, or their perceptions of the exercise in general – we took notes, and these notes constitute the 
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records of these informal interviews.  Over the course of the three cases, I personally conducted 68 hours 
of observation over the course of eight months.  
 Interviews.  I also conducted more formal, semi-structured in-depth interviews with members of 
the planning committee for the CSE case, the largest and most complex exercise.  The purpose of these 
interviews was to better understand the ways that agencies wanted to and did work together in the 
planning and execution of the exercise.  I knew that their observations and reactions would be different 
from my own, and I wanted to better understand which aspects of the planning process, the exercise itself, 
and the results of the exercise were meaningful to them.  (The complete interview guide can be found in 
Appendix A.)  I recruited interviewees by sending individual requests to the agency representatives on the 
planning committee e-mail list; although not all elected to participate, I conducted a total of fourteen 
interviews, some in person, some over the phone.  All interviews were audio-recorded; participants 
granted permission to be interviewed and audio-recorded by signing an informed consent statement.  The 
recruitment procedures and informed consent statement were approved by the university’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).  The average duration of an interview was 49 minutes, and the recordings yielded 
263 transcribed pages. 
 Analysis.  My research questions (see p. 39) provided me with broad sensitizing concepts for the 
analysis, namely: conflict, response to conflict, and confrontation.  I was also seeking illustrations of 
collaborative behaviors and other phenomena from extant models of collaboration, such as anticipated 
benefits of participating in the collaborative arrangement (Keyton, Ford, & Smith, 2008) and the kinds of 
activities in which adaptive behaviors or task-related behaviors might occur (Bedwell, Wildman, 
DiazGranados, & Associates, 2012).   
 There is no single definitive procedure for the analysis and interpretation of qualitative data 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  My analysis consisted of question-oriented memo-writing for constant 
comparison, in the style described in Corbin and Strauss (p. 69-77) and attributed to Blumer (1969).  
From this analysis, I moved to a more abstracted consideration of conditions, inter/actions and emotions, 
and consequences – Corbin and Strauss’ (pp. 89-96) version of Glaser and Strauss’s 6 “C”s of axial 
 54 
 
 
 
coding (1967).  These analytical techniques led me to a long list of observations about conflicts from 
across the three cases.  As I considered how best to collate, collapse or otherwise organize these thematic 
observations, I realized that the next level of abstraction under which they could easily and appropriately 
be sorted was under the headings of types of conflict that one might expect based on extant literature 
(e.g., power differences, role uncertainty, procedural uncertainty, etc.).  To me, this organizing structure 
seemed to be an elegant way to both contextualize my conclusions back in the “natural social world” 
(Denzin, 2002) and to contextualize them back in the terms of extant literature – simultaneously 
acknowledging what was both unique and potentially transferable about the conflict-related themes that I 
generated.  In addition, I generated a set of tensions that seemed specific to the disaster exercise context.  
These tensions captured many of the exemplar conflicts and also spoke to the philosophical, social, and 
organizational challenges of conducting a disaster response exercise.  
 The assessment of validity in accounts of qualitative data remains a difficult and inevitably 
political topic (Altheide & Johnson, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008).  My guiding model was Altheide 
and Johnson’s concept of validity-as-reflexive-accounting (p. 291), which basically expresses the idea that 
the researcher should account for his or her approach as transparently as possible, recognizing that it can 
never be value-neutral, and let the research community judge for itself.  
Phase 2 
Phase 2 involved the design and distribution of an online questionnaire, as well as quantitative 
analyses of the data collected.  The text that follows describes the design of the instrument, sampling and 
recruitment procedures, an overview of analytical procedures, response and completion rates, sample 
characteristics, and survey variables and measures.  The full instrument can be found in Appendix C.  
 Instrument design.  Phase 2 of the study consisted of the design and distribution of an online 
questionnaire.  The purpose of the questionnaire was to get a broader perspective on how agencies work 
together in multi-agency disaster response exercises across the state.  There was one inclusion criterion: 
In order to participate, participants had to have participated in at least one multi-agency disaster exercise 
in the past three years.  The questionnaire asked participants to think of one such exercise and answer 
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questions about their perceptions and behaviors related to this focal exercise.  The complete list of 
variables included in the questionnaire appears in Appendix B.  
 Sampling and recruitment.  A local fire service education provider allowed me to draw my 
sample from their student database.  They provided me with contact information for over 5,000 
individuals who had completed any of their six incident management courses between 2005 and 2012.  
From this population, I randomly selected a sample of 2,100 individuals.  I chose this particular sample 
because I wanted participants with exposure to a wide variety of disaster response exercises across the 
state.  Many mid-level professionals from a variety of response disciplines take one or more of the 
incident command courses so as to familiarize themselves with the NIMS-based common procedures that 
all agency representatives would use to manage a large or complex incident.  If public administrators 
want to be eligible for federal disaster relief, then FEMA expects that the professionals managing the 
incident will keep records and account for costs using the Incident Command System (ICS).  Each of the 
six courses is a stand-alone course that addresses a different aspect of how to operate using ICS.   
I recruited participants by email.  The data collection procedures, including recruitment and 
informed consent materials, were reviewed and approved by my university’s Institutional Review Board.  
Participants read an informed consent statement embedded in the second screen of the questionnaire 
itself, and they were asked to express their agreement to participate by clicking “next” to proceed to the 
next page of the questionnaire.  They were invited to copy and paste the text of the informed consent 
statement into a word processing document if they wished to save the information for their records.  
Participation was completely anonymous; no one was asked to identify their municipality, the name of 
their particular agency, or the real name of the exercise on which they reported.  Participants were not 
compensated for their participation.   
 Overview of analytical procedures.  With the exception of the confrontive style score variable, 
which was based on an abbreviated version of the Kilman Thomas instrument, all variables were based on 
original scales.  Consequently, the first stage of the data analysis involved assessing scale characteristics 
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and refining scales using confirmatory factor analysis.  In the next stage of data analysis, I used linear 
regression models and path analysis models to address the research questions.  
Response Rate 
 On March 19, 2014, I sent the recruitment e-mail message with a link to the online questionnaire 
to 2,100 individuals randomly selected from the student database of a local fire education institute (see 
Chapter 4 for details).  Of that group, 21% of the messages were undeliverable, meaning the email 
address from the database was no longer current.  This reduced the recruitment pool to 1,650 individuals.  
Between March 19 and May 2, a total of 388 individuals accessed the online questionnaire; a total of 245 
completed the questionnaire.  The response and completion rates break down as shown in Table 1 in the 
“Tables and Figures” section at the end of this chapter.  The response rate is somewhat lower than what 
industry standards might predict, but one reason may be that participants were not remunerated for their 
participation.  The completion rate is very similar to that of previous study with a disaster response 
professional sample (18%; Carlson, Poole, Lambert, & Lammers, 2013).   
Sample Characteristics: Participants   
 Participants were 83% male, 17% female.  The number of years they had worked in their current 
field ranged from 2 to 44, with an average of 22 years.  Their ages ranged from 26 to 71, with an average 
age of 50.  They reported that they participated in an average of 7 single agency exercises in the past three 
years (range: 0 to 100) and 4 multi-agency exercises (range: 0 to 30).  This translates to roughly two 
single agency exercises a year and one multi-agency exercise per year.  These exercise participation 
statistics match those reported by CSE exercise participants who completed the exercise evaluation 
survey.  
 Regarding participants’ agency affiliations, the largest proportion of the sample were firefighters 
(34%), followed by police (11%), public health (9%), and city or county emergency management agency 
employees (8%). Agency affiliations representing 1 to 5% of participants appear in Table 2, as well as 
those representing less than 1% of participants (i.e., 1 to 2 persons per category).  
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Regarding special affiliations, 16% reported that they were now or had at one time been enlisted 
in the U.S. military.  A full 70% had at least one FEMA credential: a national certification in a particular 
functional area (“section”) of incident management, corresponding to NIMS.  Additionally, 
approximately half (49%) reported that they were trained in some kind of special operations role in their 
field, such as hazardous materials mitigation, technical rescue, EOD/ bomb squad, WMD, etc.  As these 
figures suggest, the group was relatively experienced in their work and tended to be highly trained in 
optional areas of disaster response specialization.  Those with special operations roles were statistically 
more likely to have participated in more single- and multi-agency training exercises in the past three years 
(p < 0.05), but those with FEMA credentials were not.  
Sample Characteristics: Focal Exercises 
 Recall that each participant reported on one self-selected focal exercise; the only requirement was 
that it be a multi-agency exercise in which s/he participated in the last three years.  Of the exercises 
reported on, 23% were tabletop exercises, 24% were functional exercises, and 52% were full-scale 
exercises.  Additionally, one participant reported that the exercise was a combination of functional and 
full-scale formats, and three participants reported on real incidents.  Participants were asked whether they 
helped to plan the exercise; 43% had helped to plan the exercise (n = 130), and 57% had not (n = 173).  
 Participants reported that an average of 13 agencies participated in their focal exercise, with a 
range from 1 to 140.  Recall that this number includes multiple jurisdictions of the same type of agency 
(e.g., two fire departments from adjacent counties count as “2”).  Participants also selected the types of 
agencies that participated.  They selected an average of 9.6 agency types from the list of 30 provided.  
The agencies most likely to be participating in the exercise were fire (selected by 90% of participants), 
police (78%), ambulance (74%), city or county emergency management agency (71%), and hospitals 
(54%).  The five agencies least likely to be participating in the exercise were WMD teams (“weapons of 
mass destruction”, 8%), county commissioner’s office (9%), EOD or “bomb squads” (9%), medical 
mutual aid (10%), and colleges or universities (12%).  The majority of exercises were largely or wholly 
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civilian exercises.  Sixty-six percent (66%) of the focal exercises had zero military participants; for only 
6%, the proportion of military participants was 20% or greater.   
Conceptual Model Revisited 
 As I began to analyze the data, it became clear to me that the conceptual model (Figure 4, p. 45) 
would be impossible to test in its proposed form.  All of the reasons relate to measurement, and most 
relate specifically to the Phase 2 data set.  As a general principle of structural equation modeling, models 
that include formative latent variables (i.e., those with the arrows pointing from observed variables to 
latent variable) can only be estimated if the formative latent variable includes at least two paths to 
reflective latent variables (i.e., those with arrows pointing from latent variable to observed variables, i.e., 
indicators) (Kline, 2011, pp. 280-296).  As I began to prepare the data, I also found that several of the 
dimensions that I expected to be distinct were, in fact, unidimensional.  The observed variables that I 
proposed would compose collaborative interaction (expertise recognition, informational support, and 
timeliness) turned out to be so highly correlated that I decided to treat them as one scale, rendering 
collaborative interaction an observed variable rather than a latent variable.  In addition, the two outcome 
variables (satisfaction with exercise process and satisfaction with exercise results) were also too highly 
correlated to be considered distinct.  To address a possible halo effect, I tried regressing all the outcome 
items onto one holistic overall satisfaction item (“Exercise participants met all of the overall exercise 
objectives.”) and assessing the standardized residual scores, but the standardized residual scores turned 
out to be even more highly correlated than the original item scores.  Accordingly, I treated these items as 
part of one scale and relabeled the variable exercise satisfaction.  
 Revisions to hypotheses.  These discoveries required me to alter my hypotheses; although I was 
able to retain the conceptual relationships between independent and dependent variables, the collapsing of 
some variables required me to combine “a” and “b” sub-hypotheses.  The revised hypotheses appear 
below. 
 H1: Motivation to achieve coordination will be positively associated with collaborative 
interaction.  
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 H2: Collaborative interaction will mediate the relationship between motivation to achieve 
coordination and exercise satisfaction. 
 H3: Collaborative interaction will be positively associated with exercise satisfaction.  
 H4: Confrontive conflict management style will moderate the relationship between collaborative 
interaction and exercise satisfaction. 
Survey Variables and Measures 
 The following subsections address each scale in turn.  Those labeled “score” (involvement score 
and confrontive style score) are composites formed not by averaging item scores but by conceptually-
specific methods.  Scale reliability, as well as assessments of normality and homoscedasticity, are 
reported. 
 Anticipated impact of exercise.  In the survey instrument, this variable included items related to 
the participant’s perception of how much the exercise would benefit his or her agency’s goals and his or 
her agency’s ability to work effectively with other agencies.  It also included four items about the 
participant’s perception of other agencies’ attitude toward the exercise.  I found that the four items related 
to other agencies were highly correlated among themselves (0.347 – 0.687, p < .01) and not as highly 
correlated to the other items, so I decided to separate the two dimensions.  From this point forward, 
anticipated impact includes only anticipation of benefits for the participant’s own agency.  The new 
dimension, other agencies’ motivation to cooperate, is described and analyzed separately in the following 
section.  
 The items are listed in Table 3.  These ten items demonstrated moderate scale reliability (α = 
0.589), but four items were very weakly correlated with other items and also seemed conceptually 
different.  Consequently, I dropped these items from further consideration to produce the interim model 
shown in Table 4.  Next, I began the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  I used IBM SPSS AMOS 22 to 
calculate parameter estimates for a reflective factor model comprised of the six items in the interim 
model.  As Table 5 demonstrates, this model’s chi square had a probability value of less than 0.05, which 
indicates an unacceptable model.  In structural equation modeling, the chi square test tests the null 
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hypothesis that the proposed model is equal to an unspecified (theory-neutral) model of the same 
parameters (Kline, 2011, pp. 193-195).  Consequently, a p value of less than 0.05 indicates that the null 
hypothesis should be retained; hence, the proposed model does not fit any better than a theory-neutral, 
randomly-specified model.  Additionally, the researcher expects that as the model fit improves, the chi 
square value will decrease, approaching zero (assuming DF > 0) (Kline, 2011, pp. 193-195).  Thus, the 
chi square value associated with the interim model served as a baseline for evaluating whether respecified 
models fit better.   
 Given these results, I re-evaluated the conceptual and empirical evidence.  By removing one item 
at a time based on conceptual incongruence, I determined that the four-item model in Table 6 was 
superior.  I first “built” this model using only half of my data set, comprised of randomly-selected 
responses.  The remaining responses comprised the “test” half of the data set, and I concluded by testing 
the model using the full data set.  The standardized regression weight estimates from this final step are 
shown in Table 6.  I created a composite variable which computed each respondent’s average rating 
across thee final four items.  This variable, “Anticipated Impact,” was somewhat positively skewed 
(skewness: -1.561, s.e.: 0.15; kurtosis: 3.231; s.e.: 0.299), but when regressed onto the dependent 
variable, a plot of predicted values by residuals showed acceptable homoscedasticity.  Means, standard 
deviations, and inter-item correlations for all final variables are shown in Table 16.  
 Other agencies’ motivation to cooperate.  The next scale that I tested included items designed 
to measure the participant’s perception of how much other agencies in the exercise seemed to want to 
work with his or her agency.  The four items are shown in Table 7 in the “Tables and Figures” section.  
This scale already showed a high degree of internal consistency (α = 0.779), so I immediately began 
testing the initial model using the same techniques described in the prior section.  The initial model 
showed an unacceptable probability level for chi square (p < 0.05).  I made a conceptual decision to allow 
the error terms of the two reverse-coded items to be correlated, reasoning that reverse-coded items 
typically do not fully capture the variability in reasons why respondents disagreed.  This minor re-
specification rendered the model fit acceptable (see Table 8).  I named the composite variable that 
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averaged the four items for each response “Others’ Motivation” (see Table 9 for standardized regression 
weights by item).  This variable was normally distributed and, when regressed onto the dependent 
variable, a plot of predicted values by residuals showed acceptable homoscedasticity.   
 Involvement score.  The questionnaire showed participants a list of exercise-related tasks and 
asked them to select as many as applied to what they did in conjunction with the exercise.  The list was 
slightly different for exercise planners (19 items) than for non-planners (16 items).  To address the 
different possible totals, I created a composite “involvement” score by summing the number of tasks 
selected, dividing this sum by the total number possible for planners or non-planners (respectively), and 
multiplying the ratio by 100 to create an integer score.  Regarding interpretation, the mean value of 48.76 
suggests that, on average, participants performed about half of the tasks on the lists.  The lists can be 
found in the full survey instrument in Appendix C.  
 Motivation to achieve coordination.  I proposed that the latent variable, motivation to achieve 
coordination, would consist of scale scores for anticipated impact (now anticipated impact and other 
agencies’ motivation to cooperate), as well as a composite score for involvement and the ordinal agency 
resource investment ‘score.’  Perhaps because agency resource investment was not a true scale score, the 
initial reliability score for these four composite scores was 0.076 – extremely low.  By eliminating agency 
resource investment, it rose only to 0.539.  Similarly, a confirmatory factor analysis of all four observed 
variables with the latent variable failed (ᵡ2 = 8.26, p < 0.05).  With agency resource investment dropped 
from the model, the model was just-identified, so no chi square value could be calculated, but the 
parameter estimates and fit statistics indicated very poor fit.  I decided that, for Hypotheses 1 and 2, it 
would be better to eschew the latent variable, and include the observed variables as stand-alone variables.  
 Collaborative interaction.  Initially, I conceived of the 9 items in the initial model as comprising 
three dimensions: informational support, expertise recognition, and timeliness.  My initial investigation of 
inter-item correlations demonstrated that some items were so highly correlated that this scale should be 
treated as unidimensional.  Thus, I began the confirmatory factor analysis with the initial model shown in 
Table 10.  The “Near-Final Model” described in Table 11 included two additional paths: I allowed the 
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error terms of the first and third items to be correlated, as well as those of the third and fourth items.  
Conceptually, these items related specifically to talking to other people, so it seemed that their errors 
might vary systematically.  As an alternative, I tried allowing the two time-related items’ errors to be 
correlated, but this did not improve model fit.  In the end, when I fitted the model to the full data set, I 
found that the two covariance links were not statistically significant, and model fit improved when I 
removed them.  Thus, the final model included only the items shown in Table 12.  The composite variable 
formed of the average ratings across these items, “Collaborative Interaction,” showed a slight positive 
skew (skewness: -1.288; s.e.: 0.163; kurtosis: 3.046; s.e.: 0.324) but acceptable homoscedasticity.  
 Confrontive style score.  In the proposed model, I labeled this variable confrontive conflict 
management style.  Once I solidified the measurement strategy, I adopted the simpler and more 
descriptive label confrontive style score.  The items the comprised the Confrontive Style Score variable 
came from Kilman and Thomas’ conflict interaction styles instrument (1975).  Instead of the original 
thirty items, I created an abbreviated 15 item version that maintained the same proportions among forced-
choice items reflecting the five conflict styles as the original instrument.  One traditionally scores the 
instrument by using a key that places “A” and “B” response options from each forced choice item into the 
corresponding columns representing each of the five conflict styles.  The user then manually sums each 
column, and the highest value is considered that person’s dominant conflict management style.   
 For the present study, I altered the instructions that accompanied the instrument.  The original 
instructs participants to think of how they typically respond when their wishes differ from those of some 
other party.  Instead, I asked participants to think of how they responded during the exercise when their 
needs or preferences differed from those of a representative or representatives of another agency.  My 
hope was to get participants thinking of particular conflicts that they experienced during the focal 
exercise, as well as how they responded, rather than some general self-conception. 
 As I calculated individuals’ conflict management style scores for each of the five styles, I noticed 
that many participants were closely split between two or even three styles.  Kilman and Thomas 
acknowledge that this is not uncommon; it merely suggests that a person has more than one more 
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dominant or more comfortable style (1975).  When I counted participants’ top two highest scores for all 
scores of four or higher (out of a possible maximum of 6 for each dimension), I found that there were 
sixteen different style groups represented in my data.  Seeking a parsimonious but nuanced alternative, I 
performed a cluster analysis (Ward’s method) on the dimension scores.  I found that a four-cluster 
solution fit the data best.  Based on the cluster centers, these four clusters appeared to represent the 
following groups of tendencies: high scores on compromise and avoidance (“Cluster 1”; n = 52); 
relatively equal and moderately high scores on collaboration, accommodation, and compromise (“Cluster 
2”; n = 72); high scores on compromise and collaboration (“Cluster 3”; n = 34); and high scores on 
competition and collaboration (“Cluster 4”; n = 65).  I then calculated the distance from cluster center and 
identified outliers in each cluster (+/- two standard deviations from the mean).  In so doing, I removed 
eight responses.  I decided to treat the cluster assignments as a pseudo-scale – in truth, ordinal rather than 
scale – of confrontiveness of style.  Avoidance would be the least confrontive, so Cluster 1 entries were 
assigned a score of “1.”  Accommodation would be the next least confrontive style element, so Cluster 2 
entries were assigned a score of “2.”  Compromise or collaboration without competition would be less 
confrontive than collaboration with competition, so Cluster 3 entries were assigned a score of “3” and 
Cluster 4, a score of “4.”  One would not expect this variable to be normally distributed but, because 
cluster memberships were relatively evenly distributed, it does not show a clear ‘skew’-like tendency.  
The variance appears relatively equal across the four levels of the variable.     
 Satisfaction with exercise.  I anticipated having two dependent variables: satisfaction with 
exercise process and satisfaction with exercise outcomes.  For these data, however, the items proposed for 
each dimension were highly correlated with items from the other dimension, and when treated as separate 
scale scores, the dimensions themselves were correlated at 0.723.  I concluded that this variable should be 
treated as unidimensional.  Accordingly, the initial model shown in Table 13 includes all eleven 
“satisfaction with exercise” items from the questionnaire.  Regarding scale, participants were asked to 
give the exercise a grade (selected from a drop-down menu with options A+ to F), and I converted these 
letter grades into numeric scores following a conventional grading scale.  I did decide to score F as 22, 
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two standard deviations below the “C” score of 70, rather than scoring it as 0, which seemed like it might 
act as an outlier.   
 During the model re-specification stage, I decided to allow the error terms of the “met overall 
exercise objectives” and “this group of exercise participants more prepared to face the scenario exercised” 
items because, hypothetically, the overall exercise objectives should have been designed to make exercise 
participants more prepared for the type of scenario exercised (see CFA statistics, Table 14, and final 
model, Table 15).   
 The final composite variable, “Exercise Satisfaction,” was normally distributed.  Its descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table 16. 
Conclusion 
 Following the Phase 1 and Phase 2 methods described above, my analyses produced responses to 
the study’s four research questions and (after revisions due to preliminary measurement analyses) four 
hypotheses.  The results of Phase 1 are described in Chapter 5, the process by which these results 
informed Phase 2 (i.e., the mixing of methods) is described in Chapter 6, and the results of Phase 2 are 
described in Chapter 7.  
Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Response and Completion Rates 
Reason for Non-
Completion 
Percentage Removed 
from Sample 
Percentage Continuing n Continuing 
Did not consent to 
participate 
1% 99% of 388;  
23% of 1650 
384 
Disqualified because had 
not participated in a 
multi-agency disaster 
response exercise in past 
three years 
9% 90% of 388;  
21% of 1650 
349 
Dropped out before first 
substantive question 
(“lurkers”) 
12% 78% of 388;  
18% of 1650 
303 
Dropped out before last 
question (partial 
responses) 
15% 81% of 303; 
63% of 388;  
15% of 1650 
245  
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Table 2 
Percentage of Participations Reporting Affiliation with Agency Types 
Greater than 5% of participants 1 – 5% Less than 1% 
Fire 
Police 
Public Health 
City or County Emergency 
Management 
Hazardous Materials  
9-1-1 or Other Emergency 
Dispatch 
Hospital 
School (College or University) 
Statewide Fire Mutual Aid (e.g., 
“MABAS”) 
Technical Rescue 
Ambulance 
National Guard 
Public Works 
State Emergency Management 
Agency 
State Incident Management 
Team  
Other 
Statewide Law Enforcement 
Mutual Aid (e.g., “ILEAS”) 
City Manager’s Office 
Coroner 
Non-Profit Organization (e.g., 
Red Cross) 
Private Organization (e.g., a 
local manufacturing plant) 
Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) 
Mayor’s Office 
Public Information Office 
School (K-12) 
Statewide Medical Mutual Aid 
(e.g., “IMERT”) 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) 
 
Table 3 
Initial Model (All Proposed Items) for “Anticipated Impact” 
Variable Items (10) 
Anticipated Impact for Own 
Agency (α = 0.589) 
I felt confident that my agency would benefit from being involved in the 
exercise. 
My agency participated in this exercise mainly because it met the 
requirements for some kind of certification or funding for us. 
(reverse-coded) 
I did not expect this exercise to be realistic enough to really help us 
practice how to work together in response to a real incident.  
(reverse-coded) 
This exercise seemed like a valuable learning opportunity for people 
from my agency. 
For me personally, I saw this exercise as an opportunity to meet one of 
my training needs. 
My agency is relatively well prepared, but I expected this exercise to 
help other agencies that are not so well prepared. 
I wanted my agency to improve its responses to disasters by learning 
about how other agencies respond. 
I did not expect participants from my agency to learn anything from 
[Q3] about other agencies’ procedures that we didn’t already know.  
(reverse-coded) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 My agency wanted to use the lessons learned from [Q3] to adapt our 
procedures to better incorporate the knowledge and expertise of 
other agencies. 
From the beginning, I expected the lessons learned from [Q3] to be the 
same ones we talk about every time we exercise with other 
agencies.  (reverse-coded) 
 
Table 4 
Interim Model for “Anticipated Impact” 
Variable Items (6) 
Anticipated Impact for Own 
Agency (α = 0.762) 
I felt confident that my agency would benefit from being involved in the 
exercise. 
I did not expect this exercise to be realistic enough to really help us 
practice how to work together in response to a real incident.  
(reverse-coded) 
This exercise seemed like a valuable learning opportunity for people 
from my agency. 
I wanted my agency to improve its responses to disasters by learning 
about how other agencies respond. 
I did not expect participants from my agency to learn anything from 
[Q3] about other agencies’ procedures that we didn’t already know.  
(reverse-coded) 
My agency wanted to use the lessons learned from [Q3] to adapt our 
procedures to better incorporate the knowledge and expertise of 
other agencies. 
 
Table 5 
CFA Model Statistics for Anticipated Impact  
Model  Data  ᵡ2 df p Change in ᵡ2 
 
Interim Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
24.188 9 .004  
Final Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
3.499 2 .174 20.689 
 “Test” Half of 
Data Set 
.776 2 .679 23.412 
 Full Data Set 1.428 2 .490 22.76 
Note. Change in chi square is change from interim model. 
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Table 6 
Final Model for Anticipated Impact 
Variable Items (4)  Standardized 
Estimated 
Regression Weight 
(Full Data Set) 
Anticipated Impact for Own 
Agency (α = 0.733) 
I felt confident that my agency would benefit 
from being involved in the exercise. 
0.74† 
I did not expect this exercise to be realistic 
enough to really help us practice how to 
work together in response to a real incident.  
(reverse-coded) 
0.57*** 
This exercise seemed like a valuable learning 
opportunity for people from my agency. 
0.84*** 
My agency wanted to use the lessons learned 
from [Q3] to adapt our procedures to better 
incorporate the knowledge and expertise of 
other agencies. 
0.47*** 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, † p value not available because unstandardized regression 
weight constrained to 1.00 for analytical purposes. 
 
Table 7 
Initial Model (All Proposed Items) for Others’ Motivation 
Variable Items (4) 
Other Agencies’ Motivation 
to Cooperate (α = 0.779) 
The other agencies in this exercise were interested in learning about 
how my agency prioritizes tasks during the response to a disaster. 
It seemed like some of the other participants in [Q3] were just in this 
exercise to work on their own training objectives, not to coordinate 
better with other agencies.  (reverse-coded) 
Other agencies seemed to think that integrating knowledge and 
expertise from my agency was important to their ability to respond 
effectively. 
Other agencies seemed to think that these sorts of exercises are not 
particularly useful for coordination in actual emergency situations.  
(reverse-coded) 
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Table 8 
CFA Model Statistics for Others’ Motivation 
Model  Data  ᵡ2 df p Change in ᵡ2 
 
Interim Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
28.807 2 .000  
Final Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
3.331 1 .068 25.476 
 “Test” Half of 
Data Set 
.050 1 .824 28.757 
 Full Data Set 1.936 2 .164 26.871 
 
Table 9 
Final Model for Others’ Motivation 
Variable Items (4)  Standardized 
Estimated 
Regression Weight 
(Full Data Set) 
Other Agencies’ Motivation 
to Cooperate (α = 0.779) 
 
The other agencies in this exercise were 
interested in learning about how my agency 
prioritizes tasks during the response to a 
disaster. 
0.77*** 
It seemed like some of the other participants in 
[Q3] were just in this exercise to work on 
their own training objectives, not to 
coordinate better with other agencies.  
(reverse-coded) 
0.49*** 
Other agencies seemed to think that integrating 
knowledge and expertise from my agency 
was important to their ability to respond 
effectively. 
0.74*** 
Other agencies seemed to think that these sorts 
of exercises are not particularly useful for 
coordination in actual emergency situations.  
(reverse-coded) 
0.52† 
 e2  e4 0.58*** 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, † p value not available because unstandardized regression 
weight constrained to 1.00 for analytical purposes. 
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Table 10 
Initial Model (All Proposed Items) for Collaborative Interaction 
Variable Items (9) 
Other Agencies’ Motivation 
to Cooperate (α = 0.776) 
My agency’s activities seemed completely separate from other agencies’ 
activities.  (reverse-coded) 
When there were points of confusion, I talked to representatives of other 
agencies to get their perspectives. 
We prioritized our tasks so that we could provide timely information or 
updates to other agencies. 
Representatives of other agencies asked representatives of my agency 
for information, assistance, or feedback. 
We got more information and assistance from the controllers and other 
exercise facilitators than from representatives of other agencies.  
(reverse-coded) 
My agency found that we didn’t really need help or feedback from 
representatives of other agencies to do our part of the exercise.  
(reverse-coded) 
We did not have a clear sense of how our tasks aligned with what other 
exercise participants were doing at any given time.  (reverse-
coded) 
No one approached or contacted my agency to talk about how our 
agencies should be working together.  (reverse-coded) 
Most other agencies tried to stay in synch with the exercise timeline. 
 
Table 11  
CFA Model Statistics for Collaborative Interaction 
Model  Data  ᵡ2 df p Change in ᵡ2 
 
Interim Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
55.438 27 .001  
Near-Final 
Model 
“Build” Half of 
Data Set 
2.898 3 .408 52.54 
 “Test” Half of 
Data Set 
5.302 3 .151 50.136 
 Full Data Set 7.614 3 .055 47.824 
Final Model Full Data Set 8.342 5 0.138 47.098 
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Table 12 
Final Model for Collaborative Interaction 
Variable Items (5)  Standardized 
Estimated 
Regression Weight 
(Full Data Set) 
Other Agencies’ Motivation 
to Cooperate (α = 0.779) 
 
When there were points of confusion, I talked to 
representatives of other agencies to get their 
perspectives. 
0.58*** 
We prioritized our tasks so that we could provide 
timely information or updates to other 
agencies. 
0.69*** 
Representatives of other agencies asked 
representatives of my agency for 
information, assistance, or feedback. 
0.66*** 
No one approached or contacted my agency to 
talk about how our agencies should be 
working together.  (reverse-coded) 
0.52*** 
 Most other agencies tried to stay in synch with 
the exercise timeline. 
0.56† 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, † p value not available because unstandardized regression 
weight constrained to 1.00 for analytical purposes. 
 
Table 13 
Initial Model (All Proposed Items) for Exercise Satisfaction 
Variable Items (11) 
Other Agencies’ Motivation 
to Cooperate (α = 0.902) 
The participants included the right people in terms of level and mix of 
disciplines.   
There was a lot of flexibility when decisions were made; people were 
open to discussing different options.  
Exercise participants were able to adapt to changing conditions 
Exercise participants met all of the overall exercise objectives. 
The process of working on [Q3] was actually enjoyable. 
The exercise produced important lessons learned related to inter-agency 
coordination. 
My agency learned more about other agencies' priorities in a disaster 
like the one we simulated. 
Because of this exercise, this group of exercise participants is better 
prepared to respond to real incidents. 
After this exercise, I believe my agency is better prepared to deal 
successfully with the scenario that was exercised. 
This exercise allowed my agency to practice and improve priority 
capabilities 
The exercise was well organized. 
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Table 14 
CFA Model Statistics for Exercise Satisfaction 
Model  Data  ᵡ2 df p Change in ᵡ2 
 
Interim Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
157.300 44 .000  
Final Model “Build” Half of 
Data Set 
.807 1 .369 156.493 
 “Test” Half of 
Data Set 
1.322 1 .250 155.978 
 Full Data Set .154 1 .694 157.146 
 
Table 15 
Final Model for Exercise Satisfaction 
Variable Items (4)  Standardized 
Estimated 
Regression Weight 
(Full Data Set) 
Other Agencies’ Motivation 
to Cooperate (α = 0.840) 
 
Exercise participants met all of the overall 
exercise objectives. 
0.54† 
Because of this exercise, this group of exercise 
participants is better prepared to respond to 
real incidents. 
0.75*** 
After this exercise, I believe my agency is better 
prepared to deal successfully with the 
scenario that was exercised. 
0.86*** 
This exercise allowed my agency to practice and 
improve priority capabilities 
0.82*** 
 e1   e2 0.23** 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, † p value not available because unstandardized regression 
weight constrained to 1.00 for analytical purposes. 
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Table 16 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-item Correlations for Key Variables 
  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
Anticipated Impact 4.32 0.73           
Others' Motivation 3.77 0.85 .540**         
Involvement 48.76 20.48 .252** .193**       
Collaborative 
Interaction 4.07 0.67 .508** .526** .309**     
Confrontive Style 
Score 2.49 1.14 .015 -.001 .018 .044   
Exercise Satisfaction 89.60 8.02 .432** .478** .170** .431** .170* 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Chapter 5: Phase 1 Results 
Introduction 
 Following the methods described in chapter 4, Phase 1 of the study sought to address the 
following research questions: (a) what kinds of conflicts arise in a multi-agency disaster response 
exercise? (RQ1); (b) what communication practices do exercise planners or participants use to navigate 
these conflicts? (RQ2); and (c) how and when do confrontation behaviors emerge? (RQ3). 
 The responses that follow explore the phenomena under study in the context of multi-agency disaster 
response exercises.   
 In the interpretive tradition, the conclusions the researcher draws from qualitative data should be 
grounded in the particular context as well but can also be viewed as potentially transferable to other 
contexts in which the focal concepts or phenomena might also be found.  Accordingly, I chose to present 
my findings in two ways.  First, I present a set of emic themes – related to conflict incidents – organized 
according to their correspondence to an etic framing structure: the seven sources of conflict typically 
found in team and organizational settings that I outlined in my literature review.  These seven sources of 
conflict were power differences, finite resources, role uncertainty, procedural uncertainty, disparities in 
team member effort or involvement (including turnover, absenteeism, and social loafing), mixed motives 
(i.e., shared versus non-shared goals), and task-related interdependency.  This approach helped me 
contextualize my emic themes in an etic framework.  It also helped me acknowledge both what was and 
was not unique about these particular data.  In this section, I present illustrations of particular conflicts for 
each source-of-conflict category, as well as a category-level analysis of responses to the conflicts, 
instances of confrontation (as defined on p. 38 in Chapter 3), and consequences of the response for the 
exercise and for participating agencies.  In this way, each section addresses all three of the 
aforementioned research questions, and the sections cumulatively present a range of different conflicts, 
responses, and confrontations.  
 Second, I present a set of observed sources of conflict that seemed, in my analysis, entirely 
specific to the multi-agency disaster exercise context.  As I analyzed the data, I saw these sources of 
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conflict as substantively different from the kinds of conflicts that I could classify into existing categories.  
They appeared to me to be tensions, perhaps dialectical in nature, that any exercise must navigate – and 
for which there are no simple normative answers.  I present these tensions as “Eight Common Tensions in 
Disaster Exercises” (see Table 17).  Because these conclusions arose from the broader set of source-of-
conflict exemplars, I present them without additional substantiation from primary sources. 
Power Differences 
 In the context of interpersonal communication, power has been defined as follows:  
“Power is the ability to control one's own need satisfaction and often the need satisfaction of 
others.  Whereas high power persons are able to facilitate or prevent the need satisfaction of those 
low in power, low power persons are dependent upon highs for their need satisfaction.”  (Bradley, 
1978, p. 34).   
Sources of power in group and organizational settings include the power to reward or punish, authority to 
make decisions that affect others, and influence due to others’ desire to be affiliated with the target 
individual (Beebe & Masterson, 2009).  Three themes from the case study analysis exemplified power 
differences as a source of conflict: (a) “My boss told me to go”; (b) “Get out your golden pen”; and (c) 
“Whose exercise is it?”  I will explore each one in turn.   
“My boss told me to go.”  In the interviews with exercise planners, the first question I asked 
was, “How did you first become involved with the exercise?”.  Several planners replied that their 
supervisor had directed them to serve as the representatives for their agency.  For example, one firefighter 
and technical rescue technician explained how he was mandated to represent his agency in the CSE 
exercise:  
“Somebody else had been assigned to head that project up, and they had gone to a couple 
meetings, and they're like, ‘Maybe this isn't our cup of tea.’  And so, ‘That's kind of your cup of 
tea,’ so they got a hold of me and asked me to go.  So I didn't get there 'til like the third or fourth 
of the meetings, into the process, but I picked up on it pretty quickly, what they were doing.  And 
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jumped in it that way.  I believe the fire chief or somebody else was tasked with the responsibility 
of going to that meeting, and as I said, it got dumped off onto me.” 
One of the initiators of the CSE exercise also commented that some agency representatives were told not 
to participate by their bosses:  
“You can easily [guess] from experience, and then through the grapevine of the professionals in 
the organizations, you hear that they were actually told by their bosses, ‘Probably I can’t be seen 
working with this group because there’s an election coming up.’  [The real reason they backed 
out of the exercise was], ‘My boss doesn’t like that group’s boss, and so we’ve been told that we 
have to find another exercise.’  And it’s true that it is what it is, and you just say, ‘Okay, well, 
thank you, and we’ll keep you in mind next time.’” 
Even some of the most active members of the planning committee said that it wasn’t their idea to 
participate in the exercise.  Perhaps the most notable example was the person who, by virtue of a sudden 
(and, according to rumors, forced) retirement, became the interim head of the county emergency 
management agency during the planning of the CSE exercise.  While the outgoing head had been very 
supportive of the exercise, the interim head was skeptical:  
“I didn’t know what my role was.  I was so new to it I was trying to fill a void.  No, the only thing 
was I was just trying to make sure that – it was so far along into it, we had to make sure we 
followed through.  Because I would have honestly said if it would have been, let’s say December 
in the transition [i.e., four months ahead of the exercise instead of one month ahead of the 
exercise], I would have said, ‘No we’re not doing the exercise, we’re not ready and the planning’s 
not there.’  But 30 days from it, too many people.  Just too many people were involved.  So yeah, 
that would be my comment, and I told many people that.  I told [the lead facilitators] that, I told 
other people that.  I said, ‘This won’t happen again.’  I was pretty adamant about that.” 
Despite the interim EMA director’s concerns, the county sheriff (his boss) supported the exercise, so the 
exercise went forward.   
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“Get your golden pen.”  One of the most notable power differences that I encountered as I 
observed the case exercises was the distinction between operational disaster responders – such as 
firefighters, law enforcement officials, 9-1-1 dispatchers, and the like – and the upper-level city and 
county administrators – many of whose positions are elected or appointed – who manage the municipal 
resources from perspectives of budget, liability, and other issues of greater abstraction.  As Chapter 2 
discussed, real disasters happen relatively infrequently, whereas municipal administrative positions may 
turnover relatively frequently.  In my observation, operational leaders felt a sense of obligation to partner 
with these administrators in disaster preparedness, but they also felt a sense of wariness or distrust: Do 
these officials even know what my job is?  Will they try to interfere with it?  Will they back me up by 
funding the resources that I believe are needed?  Operational leaders also expressed frustration over their 
lack of ability to persuade policy-level personnel to participate.  In the last planning meeting before the 
CTT exercise, the county emergency manager commented, “If the [city] mayor shows up, great; if not, 
there’s nothing I can do.”  The lead facilitator replied, “Yeah, that’s all you can do; you can’t drag them.”    
One incident stands out in particular.  Among the officials in the emergency operations center 
(EOC) for the CTT exercise were not only city and county officials but also university and college leaders 
from the participating higher educational institutions.  The CTT planners had decided that, during the 
exercise, they would project each new “injects” (exercise prompt) on a screen using PowerPoint, which 
might require exercise participants to take notes so as not to lose track of prior injects.  The conversation 
about the implications of this decision went as follows:  
Planner 1: That’s real world; information will be coming in at different times.  
Planner 2: And if the old discussion continues, that’s an issue, too. 
Planner 1: And if they don’t write it down and I put up the new inject and they say, “Hey, what 
was that?” I’ll say, “You should have written it down.” 
Planner 3: Yeah, the chancellor might have to take notes. 
Planner 4 [joking]: “Get out your golden pen.” 
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[Planner 3 pantomimes the chancellor looking around helplessly for her assistant.  The group 
laughs.] 
As this fantasy chain suggests, the idea of forcing high power participants to take notes made the group 
somewhat uncomfortable.  They imagined the potential conflict and fantasized about how they might 
handle it if power differences were not an issue.  
Whose exercise is it?  The other form of power that seemed to contribute to some conflicts was 
the highly visible role of the lead facilitator.  This person initiated the exercise, was instrumental in 
securing the funding for the exercise, invited the initial group of participating agencies, and facilitated 
planning meetings, orientation meetings, exercise briefings, and exercise hot washes or after-action 
review meetings.  In the three cases I observed, the lead facilitators made very deliberate and consistent 
efforts to seek others’ opinions, make decisions inclusively, and employ a democratic leadership style.  At 
the same time, other exercise planners kept referring to the exercise as the lead facilitator’s exercise.  The 
lead facilitator of the CSE exercise, a National Guardsman, told me how he thought about his role in 
facilitating the exercise:  
“I think we tried to accommodate the needs of everybody as much as we could.  [pause]  I think I 
made it really clear to a lot of people that I didn't have a lot to bring to the table except for, you 
know, my ability to help plan this, coordinate it and put things together.  […]  And it does save 
you a little bit when things go bad.  People are like, ‘Well, yeah, it fell apart,’ and they're not 
looking for a blame or a scapegoat, but they'll sit back and say, ‘Well, this happened for that 
reason,’ so that takes some of that pressure off of you.  If everything is disorganized, 
unprofessional looking, it's easy just to start pushing all the blame or cause of things not going 
right to that one individual or agency.”   
In this comment, he addressed both his desire for the exercise to be conducted with a certain level of 
professionalism (wanting everything to be organized and professional-looking), as well as his desire for 
participating agencies to own the planning of the exercise so that they would reflect on their own choices 
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if they were not happy with the results.  The same individual reinforced this when he described an early 
conversation with a local emergency management contact about the possibility of involving local 
agencies in the exercise:  
“So we approached [him] and said, ‘Hey, want to do this training event?  This is the time frame 
we're looking at.  You got anything in there, anybody that you want to play?’  And his eyes 
basically lit up and he said, ‘Yeah, hey, we need to do an exercise.  How big do you want this to 
be?’  We're like, ‘How big do YOU want it to be?’ [laugh]”  
Here, the lead facilitator demonstrated his attitude that the local portion of the exercise was to be designed 
by the local agency representatives.  One consequence, he admitted later, is that “there are things you 
wish you'd coordinated better that you really just can't coordinate.”  This lead facilitator wanted to see 
local agency representatives take ownership of what he considered ‘their part’ of the exercise.  He neither 
wanted them to over-rely on him or blame him for the exercise’s shortcomings, which he viewed as 
collective rather than individual failings.   
 Similarly, at the planners’ hot wash after the CTT exercise, one planner commented that it 
seemed like the group needed to “hold [local college’s] hand and walk them through it.”  Another asked if 
the local college had the same mandate as the local university to exercise their campus evacuation plan 
every year, and the lead facilitator, who was from the local university, said yes, they did.  Another planner 
reacted, “But they’re riding along on [Lead Facilitator’s] mandate.  That pisses me off.”  In each of these 
instances, despite lead facilitators’ efforts to promote shared ownership of the exercises, participating 
agencies were quick to attribute the exercise to the lead facilitator and his or her agency – as if the other 
agencies did not and should not have as much say in the exercise.  
Responses to power difference conflicts.  Several types of responses emerged from these 
conflicts.  The first type was simply deference to the perceived existing power structure.  Even the interim 
EMA director who thought the exercise should have been cancelled was loath to critique the lead 
facilitator for not seeing things the same way; rather he remarked:  
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“But regardless, and I knew this going in, and I even said something to [the lead facilitators], I 
said, ‘Even if people start pulling out, the exercise will continue because the Guard’s gonna do 
their thing regardless of if the locals say, ‘We’re not gonna do it.’  And they all knew that.  But 
nobody pulled out fully, that I’m aware of, at any time.  They participated.” 
Secondly, operational leaders treated EOC officials with kid gloves in each of the exercises.  In 
conjunction with CSE, the then-interim EMA director planned a four-hour interactive training session for 
the EOC group that was in every way disconnected from the rest of the full-scale exercise.  He explained, 
“Yeah, we planned ahead on that particular – we knew that operations was gonna take place.  They were 
gonna do that.  But this group here was going to be more of a training session.  We knew that going into 
it.”  Regarding the nature of the training session and its objectives, he explained:    
“We were giving them injects that gave us a synopsis of the incident with a little tweaking for 
their needs.  And then we would have them – we were training as they were giving feedback on 
injects.  So what they were doing affected nothing up there.  But they didn’t know that.  And 
because we knew that what we had to get accomplished there we could not stop that up there to 
wait for a decision. […]  [We were focusing] on what we wanted them to know as their roles, like 
a [disaster] declaration.  Things that they may encounter: curfew, interstate closure issues, finance 
issues, resources, things like that.  So those injects were specifically what they’ll deal with, not 
where are we going to put ten deputies for road closures – that’s not their level, that’s operations 
level.  They don’t know that.  Those are the issues they had to deal with.  Martial law issues, 
things like that.”  
As this quotation illustrates, the operational leaders planned a separate exercise, essentially, tailored just 
for the policy group.   
 In the NCD exercise, the controller for one county’s EOC group decided to end their exercise 
early because the group was, in her words, “tapped out on learning.”  As it happened, the group had been 
trying to conduct their portion of the exercise in synch with the field portions of the exercise – in contrast 
to the CSE strategy – and they got frustrated waiting for information from the field.  In addition they had 
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no representative from the sheriff’s office, which prevented them from making some key decisions; this 
individual was out in the field instead of in the EOC.  The controller was mildly disappointed with the 
level of frustration she encountered, but she tried to look at the positive.  She commented, “It’s the first 
time they’ve done any exercise that wasn’t a tabletop, so today was a big step forward.”   
The CTT exercise also had the EOC group working in relative isolation, with periodic briefings 
from a representative of the operational group.  One of the major sources of debate in the planning and 
review of the exercise was how soon, in a situation of possible severe weather, to call the officials to 
come to the EOC.  They considered making it their procedure to call policy-level personnel to the EOC 
before a tornado had been sighted.  They were concerned, however, that if they had one or two incidents 
in which they called in theses personnel, then a tornado never touched down, it would become a ‘boy who 
cried wolf’ situation, and they would stop responding to the messages.  The lead facilitator asked the 
exercise participants in the large group debrief of the exercise how they would want this matter to be 
handled.  Afterwards, with the planners, he summarized, “As far as when to report, I heard them say that 
the policy group is going to come in [to the EOC] second [i.e., after the operational personnel have 
already been called in].”  Another planner remarked, “It does not matter; you cannot dictate it all for 
every incident.”  Another planner agreed.  The lead facilitator said, “I’m glad you said that.  But it’s 
damned if you do, damned if you don’t.”  Clearly one response to power conflicts was to accept one’s 
lack of influence – and perhaps to commiserate with other ‘low-power’ individuals in the process.     
 The lead facilitators’ use of democratic leadership styles and strategies of inclusion constitutes a 
second type of response.  It seems to exemplify the mainstream cultural idea that collaborative, 
participative strategies are preferred for projects like this, in which participation is – for most agencies – 
voluntary and not especially incentivized.  Whether or not that assumption is true is an empirical question.  
The approach certainly stood out from the rest of the military and pseudo-military modes of interaction 
that dominated several of intra-agency experiences with the exercise.  As the CTT hot wash conversations 
described above suggest, the lead facilitators made it their habit to seek opinions and feedback and to 
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promote group problem-solving, and this was apparent in the CSE and, to a lesser extent, the NCD 
exercises as well.  
 The last type of response also exemplified elements of confrontation.  This involved taking the 
attitude of empathy toward those people who might have power but not experience, but also taking an 
active role in correcting their misconceptions in safe training environments.  For example, the present-day 
EMA director (also a lead facilitator for the CSE exercise) showed a sense of acceptance about sometimes 
having to ‘play catch up’ with the policy-level participants; regarding the frequency of turnover in those 
positions, he commented, “You always have to be re-educating, and that’s the nature of their jobs, so that 
falls on you.”  Although the CSE and CTT groups did this successfully, it also seems like they wished 
they could be more forceful – as the “golden pen” anecdote suggests.  Similarly, the then-interim EMA 
director during the CSE exercise characterized his approach to working with the EOC policy group as “a 
personality thing […], not being rude but, ‘You’re going to have sit here all day.’”  The reality, however, 
was those participants did not have to ‘sit there all day’ for the CSE exercise; they got a half-day exercise 
tailored to their needs and interests – and completely disconnected from the operational portions of the 
exercise. 
Finite Resources 
 The finite nature of resources like time, money, and space required exercise participants to decide 
how to divide up or share resources, as well as how to coordinate their activities accordingly.  On the one 
hand, the initial establishment of some resource provisions was a major factor in motivating agencies to 
participate in the exercise.  Some key resources were already in place: the date/s, the venue/s, the basic 
structure of the exercise (e.g., tabletop, functional, or full-scale, as well as some overall exercise 
objectives), and a dedicated lead facilitator – a de facto organizer of the exercise – all of these were 
already confirmed by the time agencies were invited to participate.  This is sort of like being invited to 
attend the party instead of hosting it, which can be a prohibitive amount of work.  
Time as a resource constraint.  After the point at which the established resources motivated 
agencies to participate, resource limitations defined their decisions and activities from that point forward.  
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The CSE exercise faced two major sources of conflict related to resources.  The first was related to 
participant time; participants in each phase of the exercise had different constraints on how long they 
could be at the exercise per the conditions of their employment.  The local response participants were on 
an 8-hour work day schedule, so their activities had to occur simultaneously during the 8-to-5 work day.  
Some elected to make it a half-day of training, rather than a full day, and they wanted to hold their 
exercise in the morning, 8-to-noon.  In a real incident, the first responding agency would likely be 
dispatched from a 9-1-1 call; it might be police, fire, ambulance, or some combination thereof.  Then 
additional (and more specialized resources) would be called in as the first responding agencies saw the 
need.  By exercising all of the local agencies simultaneously, the exercise planners exponentially 
complicated the task of writing an exercise scenario and accompanying injects that would give probable 
cause for each agency’s involvement; it was like having to pick up the narrative thread in multiple places, 
with multiple contingencies, just to provide some sense of coherence regarding what kind of incident 
might have all of these agencies working together, at least nominally.   
The NCD exercise faced similar time constraints; their one-day exercise included six venues.   In 
their case, however, they were not as interested in inter-agency dependencies.  The master narrative was 
about a tornado, but each venue had an incident that was not necessarily specific to tornado damage, such 
as injured students on a school bus, a collapse pile, a chemical fire on a freight train, an overturned rail 
car, and a person trapped in a corn crib.   The CSE exercise had the added complication that the second 
day was a state resource day, including urban search and rescue teams specializing in heavy materials 
collapse (e.g., cement building structures).  In this state, the urban search and rescue team is comprised of 
firefighters and other response professionals from across the state, but their training and deployment is 
funded by a non-governmental fire mutual aid organization – sort of like a state-level traveling sports 
team.  Thus, their sponsoring organization could fund them – via backfill and overtime pay to their home 
departments – for overnight travel to the venue and a training day on a Saturday.  Lastly, the National 
Guard participants were fulfilling one of their monthly weekend sessions (“one weekend a month, two 
weeks a year”), so their portion had to begin with travel to the venue on Saturday and an operational 
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period from Saturday afternoon to Sunday afternoon.  By the time the Guard arrived, all of the local 
participants and many of the state-level participants were already gone.  Although everyone accepted the 
constraints of these employment conditions, several planners commented that they had looked forward to 
interacting with the Guard in this exercise, and that never really happened.  For example, one local fire 
department representative commented:   
“Our perception was that it was going to be localized teams, and it was going to be their National 
Guard team, or I guess, the State… Guard team coming in, working together.  And so right up 
front, it was our understanding that it was going to be this joint, side-by-side partnership of 
special operations guys working together, to mitigate a single problem.  And then, as the process 
went on, the scope changed maybe a little bit, and it got a little bit bigger than what we 
anticipated.  But that's okay, I mean, we got through it.”  
While this individual did not specifically attribute this disappointment to the issue of time as a resource, 
an agency representative for the state weapons of mass destruction team did:  
“When it’s [a 24-hour operational period format] things are better understood, timelines are better 
understood, instead of saying, ‘Okay, now it’s this.’  Some people cannot grasp when you're 
running parallel scenarios or picking up a scenario from the next day and saying, ‘Okay, it’s 6:00 
at night’ when actually, you're there at 8:00 in the morning.  Some people just can’t grasp that.  
When you run – and we’ve done this before where – because our guys are on ten-hour shifts – we 
run 20-hour scenarios.  We’ll work a double shift back to back.  It allows for the event to unfold 
more naturally and it actually works a lot smoother.  The downside of it is you have union issues, 
you have staffing issues, you have logistics issues, so there are some negatives to it.  But overall, 
running something 24 hours through is going to be way better than doing the three separate days.”   
There may not have been a viable alternative, but the scarcity of time as a resources did lead to confusion 
and conflicts.  
 Space as a resource constraint.  The second major resource conflict that came up at CSE and 
CTT was space.  At CSE, the exercise site consisted of four abandoned apartment buildings all located 
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next to one another in an apartment complex.  There was one street running between the buildings, and 
the exercise was only able to close off one end of the street, because parts of the complex were still 
occupied.  On the first day of the exercise, there were eight local agencies working in the four buildings 
simultaneously, and each agency had at least one really big truck.  Some trucks had equipment that the 
participants needed to perform their duties; other trucks were part of the response – for example, the state 
SWAT team wanted to practice using a special vehicle to make a second floor entry.  As participants 
arrived at the venues, they each parked their big trucks on the side of the narrow residential street until 
both sides were completely parked up, and it was hard to get anyone in or out.  One agency planner 
described it as follows:  
“The site was very compact.  There was only one road in.  The other thing was that they chose to 
put the command bus right in the middle of the hazard zone, so right in the middle of where there 
were active shooters, bombings, buildings blown up -- and that's -- tactically, you never want to 
put the people in charge of making strategic decisions, you don't want to put them right in the 
heat of the battle.  Because once you take out the communication or the leadership segment of 
that, then the whole operation falls apart.  They put that bus right smack-dab in that parking lot, 
and we had a hard enough time getting our trailers and everything else in there.  It was one more 
thing to work around, but -- you know, if they would have put the operations bus on that park that 
was to the south of there, and away from it all, you still communicate via radio.” 
The lead facilitator also remarked on this issue, only he talked about it as a regret – something he wished 
that he would have managed differently during the exercise:  
“[I wish I could have gotten] those venues straightened out.  If only I would have had somebody 
down there that would have stepped up and said, ‘No, stop.  You're doing this, you're doing this.  
You're going here.’  And it might have been nice to have somebody saying, ‘Alright, you don't 
need that truck and that truck in here.  Go park it over there and walk back over here.’  That 
would have been nice.” 
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As both comments suggest, neither of the speakers expressed these concerns directly during the exercise 
itself.  At one point during the CSE exercise, I was standing next to the lead controller as he was getting 
radio calls about this problem, and his comment was, “Who gets to park where – that’s real world.”  His 
reaction was to let the participants work it out for themselves.    
 At the CTT exercise, the planners had initially intended for all the operations participants to be 
gathered around one big table.  Unfortunately, there were about twenty seats at the table and more than 
thirty participants in this room alone.  The incident commander began the exercise by organizing the 
participants into functional groups based on Incident Command System areas of responsibility: logistics, 
planning, operations, safety, etc.  It was clear that there weren’t enough places for these small groups to 
gather, so he suggested that the operations group, the largest, go into an adjoining small conference room.  
As a result, however, the operations group became isolated; they did not make an effort to find out what 
the other groups were deciding, nor did the other groups approach them.  In the hot wash with just the 
planners after the exercise, the following conversation ensued: 
Lead Facilitator: The incident commander did a really good job taking ten minutes to set the 
room.  We pushed back the [timeline of the] injects for that.  It was all good until operations went 
into that side room.  Then I was like, “We’re screwed!”  
[laughter] 
Planner 1: I didn’t understand that.  Isn’t operations supposed to be communicating directly to the 
incident commander – or is it the role of logistics chief and the incident commander to go in there 
[to the operations area] and listen? 
Lead Facilitator: There’s one operations section chief to handle that, but [name of operations 
section chief] never got out of that chair.  Of course, they were all pressed for time, but section 
chiefs need to check in with one another.  
This issue came up again in conversation a few minutes later, related to an oversight in the exercise, 
which one planner attributed to the fact that logistics could not do their job “because those four guys did 
nothing but go to operations to ask them questions about operations.  Nobody from operations came out 
 86 
 
 
 
here; they didn’t give a shit what was happening out here.”  No one seemed to disagree with this 
assessment, but everyone seemed to agree that the lack of space, which necessitated the use of the side 
room, exacerbated the situation.  
Responses to finite resource conflicts.  Despite the CSE lead controller’s comment about the 
parking problem being “real world,” I observed that most planners and participants were comfortable 
dismissing these resource challenges as an artifact of the exercise.  In a real incident, they argued, we 
wouldn’t all be at the same scene at once.  In interviews about a previous exercise, a pilot for the 
dissertation study, one interviewee explained to me that these space and time issues aren’t realistic 
because, in a real incident, responders just seize whatever space they need around the incident site so that 
they can do their jobs.  He explained, “In real life, I would just say, ‘We're using this parking lot,’ and 
they'd say, ‘Ok.’  They'd pray it was a hazmat or reimbursable event so they could charge us, but if it was 
just a local event, they know they're just eating it.”  Arrangements for exercises, however, are different; 
while the public accommodates disruptions caused by the response to a real incident, it does not regard 
exercises in the same way.   
The ‘just do it’ argument may apply to the use of space in a real incident, but the same may not be 
true regarding time and its implications for responder pay.  During the CTT exercise, the EOC officials 
declared that they were (notionally) writing a blank check for the response to the hypothetical tornado.  In 
the hot wash with planners, the state emergency management agency representative cautioned that 
someone in the exercise should be fulfilling the finance management function because there are 
benchmarks for what state or federal disaster aid will reimburse.  The conversation went like this:    
Planner 1: They came down and told us one time that it was an “open checkbook” for the 
response. 
Planner 2 [surprised]:  I never heard that. 
Planner 1: The [operational briefing liaison] said that.  I was trying to get a discussion started to 
get federal housing and all that. 
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Planner 2 [frustrated]:  It’s that artificiality thing.  Is it taken care of?  “Yeah.”  Is it really taken 
care of? No. 
Planner 1: Yeah, how are you going to do that? 
[…] 
State EMA Rep: They don’t get what incident command has to do: Who’s got the checkbook, and 
who’s in charge of the expense?  They never made that decision, and if not, it is an open 
checkbook.  
Planner 2: One thing they did well was the declaration.  There was no hemming and hawing on 
that. 
Planner 1: But to expect them to jump on that in the dark is not a reality.  When [location] got hit 
at 8 p.m., that group didn’t do the declaration until 1 or 2 in the morning.  We’re doing it to keep 
them busy. [Facilitator] handed them something generic: “We have damage.”  It doesn’t happen 
that way.  It isn’t first thing.  
State EMA Rep: Look at what the declaration says.  It actually came at 9:00 something – as soon 
as they started calling for mutual aid.  You’ve used everything you’ve got, that’s when you call.  
If you’re looking for public assistance, the threshold is big dollar numbers; that’s a function 
where I have to provide [state capitol] with valid information.  It just makes it easier for everyone 
concerned if you track that.  Some of my counties have a disaster cost code, so when it’s time to 
make the tally sheet, it’s easy to do.  Another reason why you need a controller or finance person 
from the county is to know how that’s done.  If you don’t get to $600,000, I’ll tell you, you aren’t 
getting public assistance.  Once you’re over 17 million, okay, that will be fine.  Every day we 
have to tell the government how much damage and how much it’s costing the state.  Over 16.5 
million, okay, then we have to tell the [U.S.] President.  
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 Unfortunately, disappointments like the parking traffic jam or the inability to work with Guard 
participants may have left some local agencies feeling less positive about the exercise —particularly as a 
template for interagency coordination.  Overall, I saw the finite resource issues as matters of common 
concern for all participating agencies, but the agencies did not seem to treat them as such.  They either 
saw the conflicts as particular to one agency or a small set of agencies (e.g., I want to park, and this guy is 
in my way) or as inevitable side effects of ‘exercise world’ – problems that would not occur in a real 
disaster context and therefore did not deserve to be treated as fodder for cooperative problem solving.  It 
seems likely, however, that not all conflicts over finite resources would truly be eliminated in a real world 
disaster.    
Role Uncertainty 
 The state of role uncertainty is one in which the individual feels that he or she does not have 
enough information about the task or relational consequences of his or her actions to make decisions 
(Galbraith, 1973).  Despite each agency’s ability to define, in advance of the exercise, target capabilities 
that it wanted to exercise, there seemed to be a fair amount of role uncertainty in two respects: (a) some 
areas of responsibility seemed to be completely overlooked; no one saw them as falling under their 
purview; and (b) participants only seemed to find points of intersection between their responsibilities or 
roles and another agency’s by violating some unforeseen boundary.  
 No one’s role: radio communications and unified command.  In the full-scale exercises (CSE 
and NCD), one area that no one seemed to really own was radio communications.  One agency provided 
exercise radios and an exercise channel.  These were for exercise purposes only and included multiple 
agencies on the same channel that would not, even in a real incident be on the same channel.  Radio 
traffic was mostly communication between the lead controller or facilitator and site controllers regarding 
exercise business.  Hence, much of the radio communication – in form and content – was for exercise 
purposes only.  For the functional exercise (CTT), the challenge of using different radio channels was 
only mentioned in passing and not addressed in the exercise itself.  This issue came up in the after-action 
review for the CSE exercise, but agency representatives differed in their view about how radio difficulties 
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should be handled for the future.  An ambulance representative mentioned some problems getting radio 
reception in certain geographical areas, and the dispatch representative responded, “We didn’t know 
about that.  We heard they moved radio traffic to [a different channel], but we didn’t know why.”  They 
shared some additional information about the nature of the problem.  The state emergency management 
agency representative tried to instruct the group about how he thought the radio communications problem 
should have been handled:  
“If we’d had a true unified command, then that would have been an issue for them to deal with, 
and with a [state communications equipment] truck, they could have set the actual unit up out 
there.  If that whole ‘We’ve got a problem’ doesn’t get back to somebody who can fix the 
problem [it will never get fixed] – and we can fix the problem.  But [the way things went] it 
didn’t allow us to exercise something that we would have done in real incident; we would have 
said we need the [state communications equipment truck] now, not two days from now.  We can 
fix the problem, we [as a state agency] spend thousands of dollars to do that.” 
In contrast, the ambulance representative replied that, from his perspective, “The communications 
challenges were an added benefit.”  He explained, “I knew that [radio communications would be limited 
due to technical difficulties] going in, and I let it play out just to see where it would go.  I told the 
supervisor working for me, as soon as you see it’s not working, move to another channel.  I saw this as a 
positive: Next time everyone will be thinking on their feet.”  The state EMA representative saw it as the 
role of the local agency representatives to escalate the radio communications problem because state-level 
resources might be able to address it.  The ambulance representative saw the problem as not belonging to 
anyone in particular and perhaps not even being fix-able.  He wanted to train his people to work around 
the problem because he didn’t expect it to be fixed.   
 Another notable void related even more closely to interagency coordination.  In my observations, 
Unified Command, the multi-agency oversight committee that is supposed to form in response to a large 
incident, was neither unified nor in command.  In CSE, they essentially failed to convene.  When I 
interviewed one of the lead evaluators, she explained,  
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“I think that's an educational thing for [some of the exercise participants], because the 
commanders don't understand that they are – they don't really understand the concept of incident 
management.  When we were talking with them about unified command, they were like, ‘Oh, that 
would have been our chief; our chief would have been in the unified command.’  And it's like, 
‘No… Your chief would have been in the policy group, of the group of people that make the 
policies and assist you, but you are the operational unified command.  So whether you like it or 
not, you are the unified command.’  And they don't have that thought process that says, ‘No, 
that's not where I should be.’  Instead, it’s, ‘I need to be closer, and I need to know where my 
guys are, and I need to make those on-the-fly command decisions.’" 
As one controller commented in the CSE after-action review, “Nobody wanted to come in E-1 [the 
mobile command post where unified command is supposed to meet]; they were on radios walking around 
E-1.”  Another agency representative joked, “I think they were afraid they wouldn’t get out.”  The 
controller laughed and elaborated, “Or maybe they were afraid of being heard?”  There was some 
discussion about the resulting confusion that ensued with the SWAT and state weapons of mass 
destruction participants.  One of the lead controllers, a firefighter, commented, “I knew it would be tough 
to get police to command post.”  The first controller, a policeman, replied, “I will give you guys credit on 
that, fire does command post better; law enforcement, they just withdraw.”  The firefighter responded, “It 
happens every time, and we write it down [in the after-action report] every time.”  The first controller 
said, “It’s interesting to see it from an EMA [emergency management agency] perspective; I’ve had my 
eyes opened.  I’m drinking the Kool-Aid!”   
 Similarly, in NCD, the Unified Command group failed to convene.  As a consequence, one 
agency was directing participants to come in on a particular street after police participants had decided to 
set up a roadblock there.  In the hot wash discussion, the lead facilitator commented that what they needed 
was more “interagency coordination.”  One of the lead evaluators also commented that setting up a 
unified command post for this venue would have addressed this problem.  In CTT, a Unified Command 
group was never explicitly identified, even though they would, in a real situation, be making some of the 
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operational decisions that the operations group was making.  In each case, participants seemed to assume 
that, because it was ‘just an exercise’, erecting Unified Command was unnecessary.  It seemed to me that 
it was exactly the thing they were there to practice.  Somehow, they didn’t see it as part of their roles.  
 Roles clarified through boundary violations.  Some of the most interesting lessons learned in 
the exercise came from points of violating the boundary of someone else’s “RAE” (an acronym for 
responsibility, authority and expertise).  In some cases, they found this out through direct interaction. At 
the CTT exercise, a casual conversation led the Red Cross representative to realize that Public Health had 
a mandate to inspect any shelter that Red Cross might establish.  Representatives of both agencies were 
literally and figuratively on the sidelines of the operational portion of the exercise.  About two and a half 
hours into the exercise, the Red Cross representative turned to the three Public Health representatives and, 
just making casual conversation, said, “So what kind of things would you all be doing in an incident like 
this?”  They mentioned a few things: getting supplies ready for possible vaccinations, monitoring the 
water supply situation in case they might have to react to water-borne illnesses, inspecting temporary 
shelters—and here the Red Cross representative stopped them.  The conversation continued:  
Red Cross Rep: I have never had Public Health come out and inspect a shelter.  Public Health 
would be looking for what?  
Public Health Rep: Just a general assessment for it to be a shelter. 
Red Cross Rep: I’ve been doing this for ten years, and this is the first I’ve ever heard of this.  
Public Health Rep:  We’re also supposed to do food service assessments, like kitchen inspections.  
Red Cross Rep: That part I understand, but at first all we do is purchase food and bring it in.  
Public Health Rep: We might also want to do vaccinations at the shelter.  Or case management 
for displaced people with special needs.  
Red Cross Rep: Wow, this is the first I’ve heard about all of this.  
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Public Health Rep: We would just need a call made to us, saying what the shelter will be, then it’s 
our responsibility to make the assessment.  
Red Cross Rep: So, you’re written into our [emergency] plan?  
Public Health Rep: I don’t know. 
Red Cross Rep: If it’s legally mandated, you should be written into our plan.  There should be an 
MOU [memorandum of understanding].  
Public Health Rep: I’ll have to check with our emergency plan person [who was circulating the 
room in her role as an evaluator for the exercise].  
At this point, one of the Public Health participants pulled out the checklist that they use to evaluate a 
shelter, and they talked through each of the items on the list.  The Red Cross representative asked some 
questions for clarification.  Still surprised, she commented, “Well, we have our own guidelines, because 
it’s a Red Cross shelter, but I’ve never seen that before.”  When the evaluator/emergency plan Public 
Health person came by a few minutes later, she confirmed that inspecting mass care shelters was written 
into the Public Health emergency plan, and it included things like square footage per person requirements 
from FEMA and interventions for people who need special care.  The group decided that they should 
schedule a follow-up meeting to compare and refine their two plans.  The Red Cross representative 
commented that clarifying all of this in the emergency plan would help her train her volunteers: “My 
problem is that I have a lot of volunteers, but many of them are not specialized.”  Having Public Health 
representatives come out to shelters would also help her ensure that her volunteers were maintaining 
health and safety standards; this was a resource that she didn’t even know she had.  Even though both 
agencies were a bit surprised by this encounter, stumbling onto the overlap in responsibilities helped them 
work together to plan for the future.  The whole conversation took place in just under fifteen minutes, but 
it might never have taken place if they hadn’t both been waiting around at the exercise.   
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 In other cases, the points of intersection were not addressed directly during the exercise, but a 
controller pointed them out in the hot wash or an agency lead pointed them out at the AAR.  For example, 
the technical rescue team that participated in day one of the CSE exercise held a hot wash discussion 
immediately following the end of their shift.  This included ten technical rescue technicians, their two 
controllers, and one evaluator.  After discussing a number of technical issues (e.g., regulation and non-
regulation shoring structures), one of the controllers raised an interagency issue.  He said,  
“The scenario was that the house exploded while the police were following up on a search 
warrant.  Did you ever think about evidence?  Realistically, if this happened, might we have 
backed out and called EOD?  Before we went in, we had a conversation about what we might see 
when we got there.  If we see a secondary device, that takes precedent: call EOD.  They [the EOD 
players] did their own thing out there [today], but in real life, we wouldn’t be doing anything.  
We’d be pulled out and staged until they cleared it.  We wanted to put something in there for you 
to discover, but we didn’t get to that today.  We wanted to see how well we communicate with 
other players, especially on the cop side.  If we had to test those boundaries, that would have been 
a good avenue to do that.”   
In a follow-up interview, this same individual explained further:  
“One of the things that we had in [the exercise plan] was that our guys were going to encounter a 
pipe bomb, and we've never addressed, ‘If you come across a piece of evidence, as a rescue team, 
what are you supposed to do?  Do you back out and not touch it?  What do we do?’  So we 
wanted to create a policy on what we do.  And we were going to challenge our people to find out 
what they would do so that we could build on that.  And our goal was for them to encounter an 
explosive device and then basically back out, call EOD in, those guys would come over – who 
we've never worked with before – they would go disarm the thing, or deem it safe, and we would 
go back to work.  That was our goal.  We never got to that goal, and we didn't get to that goal 
because we were out of script, on the time.”  
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It was certainly productive for the technical rescue team to discuss this, but this discussion happened 
solely within their group, not with the local EOD representatives.  
 In a similar vein, a dispatch representative brought up an issue relevant to several local agencies 
during the CSE after-action review meeting.  She said she was surprised, as local agencies started 
assessing the venues and calling for assistance, “that no one ever called a ‘mass casualty incident’; for 
locals, that’s what really gets you a lot of resources.”  Another agency representative asked for 
clarification on that term: “Is there a trigger for that?”  Another answered, “Ten or more injured persons.”  
An EMA employee added, “That’s in the EOC [emergency operations center] plan.”  The dispatch 
representative further explained,  
“Because we [the dispatchers] are located in the EOC, we’re not allowed to call that.  It has to be 
someone on site to do that, like fire, police, or the state EMA.  When that’s called, we have a 
whole checklist, including calling emergency rooms to notify them.  At one point [during the 
exercise], [a controller] asked me, “Has anybody called the hospitals yet?” and I had to say, 
“They haven’t called mass casualty yet.”  He went ahead and had someone call the hospitals to 
set off their exercise.  They had a more realistic scenario in terms of having the timing 
compressed; [our venue] was not how it would work from an operations standpoint, police and 
fire.  So that’s something that we could have improved upon.”   
Unfortunately, not every agency sent a representative to attend the after-action review meeting, so not 
every agency who needed to hear this information was able to hear it.   
 Responses to role uncertainty conflicts.  As these examples suggest, a case of direct 
confrontation between the agencies involved was rare in cases of role clarification.  In cases of 
responsibility void, it was unclear who was in a position to fix this or when it should happen.  Although 
these voids were mentioned in after-action review meetings, these discussions did not seem to determine 
who should do what differently in the future.  For CSE, several parties agreed that Unified Command 
personnel should convene in the mobile command unit, but none of the individuals who served in those 
roles were in the room to participate in that discussion.  Accordingly, there was no clarification about 
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when such a gathering should take place, what it should accomplish, or what affected parties could do to 
intervene to make such a thing happen.  In the NCD hot wash, the lead facilitator and lead evaluator 
pointed to the need for Unified Command but did not provide guidance about who should have comprised 
it or what they should have done differently to make this a reality.  In both cases, as with many of the 
other voids, exercise facilitators and controllers recognized the oversight when it was happening, but they 
seemed to think that it was not their place to intervene.  This attitude seems to reflect a training 
philosophy that exercise participants learn best from being left alone to make their own mistakes, but the 
lack of detailed review after the exercise makes me question the effectiveness of this philosophy for role 
uncertainty issues.   
 In contrast, the Red Cross – Public Health discovery of complementary responsibilities presents 
an example of a productive confrontation.  The agency representatives had the opportunity to talk through 
the overlapping portions of their disaster plans; they preliminarily decided when and how they would 
work together in such a situation, and they agreed to meet again to flesh out the details and document 
them for their colleagues.  Interestingly, this discovery happened more by chance than by design.  It was 
prompted more by proximity and opportunity (a mix, perhaps, of boredom and general friendliness) than 
by any part of the exercise design.   
Procedural Uncertainty 
 The term procedural uncertainty refers to uncertainty about the ‘rules of engagement’ or which 
procedures qualify as “rational” in a particular situation or environment (Dosi & Egidi, 1991; Simon, 
1957).  I observed procedural uncertainty as a source of conflict in two forms.  In the planning stage of 
the CSE exercise, it seemed that the lead facilitator had a system for designing the exercise, and he 
seemed to think that others understood it better than perhaps they did. In the second form, I observed that 
the NIMS a.k.a. ICS, the incident command system, was used only selectively and then almost 
academically.  It is supposed to bring order to the chaos of a complex, extended response, but things still 
seemed chaotic even when it was in full use.  
 96 
 
 
 
 HSEEP as a source procedural un/certainty.  The planning of the CSE exercise followed very 
clear guidelines provided by HSEEP.  It also reflected the lead facilitator’s experience facilitating the 
design of other large multiagency exercises and his expertise as a training and development professional.  
He often sought feedback form the group, asking if there were questions, concerns, or opinions.  When I 
asked him what advice he would give to someone else facilitating the planning of an exercise like CSE, 
he said:  
“If I had to give a piece of advice, I would introduce them to some people that are smart and say, 
‘Work with them.’  [laugh]  I'm sure you know that there is a wide range of factors.  [State 
evaluator] comes in here all the time and sits down, and he and I don't see eye to eye on anything.  
But, you know what?  I can sit here and have an intelligent conversation.  And we can agree to 
disagree on a couple of things, and one of us is going to yield on something.  Or I'll yield and say, 
‘We'll try that.’  But normally when you have that level of respect and ability to work together, 
you sit there and say, ‘I just don't like that.  And this is why.’  You have that conversation and 
meet some type of… what's the word?  Not concession, not compromise, but a collaborative 
decision.  Because compromise is not the same as collaboration.”  
The CTT lead facilitator seemed to share that attitude and employed similar strategies in his meetings; 
one of his favorite phrases was, “Anybody have any heartburn over that?”  While it sounds coy, he 
seemed genuinely interested in the answer, and he was willing to talk through any concern that was 
raised.   
 It seemed strange to me, then, that at some of the large group CSE planning meetings, the CSE 
lead facilitator got very little feedback from the group.  At times, he seemed a bit exacerbated that no one 
seemed to have anything to say.  Others noticed it, too; the then-interim EMA director commented in his 
interview:  
“I think the large meetings where we had the majority of the representatives, if they were paying 
attention, could get a feel for how the flow of the exercises was supposed to go.  And if 
something caught their attention that wouldn’t jive with what their agency would do, there was 
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some communication there saying, ‘Hey, we wouldn’t do it this way, or this group’s gonna come 
in or our plan is to…’  So that was good.  I think there was a lot of note taking during those 
meetings, which ultimately led to the master inject outline.  […]  I think those smaller [sub-
committee meetings], if they were with their discipline, such as the hospital and ambulance 
services, they knew exactly what they needed to work on, and afterwards they knew exactly what 
their shortfalls were.  I’m just saying them, but the smaller groups, to me, people will open up 
even more.  Big groups sometimes people don’t ask questions or don’t want to say as much 
because they’re in a big group.  It’s the group-think syndrome I think, you know what I mean?  
So I think the smaller ones people seem to be a little more open.” 
While there was some productive discussion in the large group meetings, there seemed to be more, to 
borrow this participant’s description, “getting a feel” for things and taking notes to inform their agency-
specific planning.  
 When I interviewed the CSE lead facilitator, he explained that he expected some initial 
skepticism from the group, since most of the representatives didn’t know him personally, but he didn’t 
expect the lack of familiarity with exercise design that he encountered.  Some agencies were well versed, 
and others were not: “The hospitals, they had that all [figured out]: ‘We need this, this, this and this, and 
here's how we're going to do it.’  We said, ‘We need your injects’ and [immediately] here's the injects. 
They had it together.  And then there were some other people just sitting back saying, ‘Lead me to the 
water, and maybe I'll drink.’”  This discrepancy became especially apparent in the writing of injects.  The 
lead facilitator asked each agency representative on the planning committee to write the injects for their 
agency’s portion of the exercise.  As it turned out, some were so inappropriate, by his standards, that he 
had to completely rewrite them.  After it was all over, he commented that he wished that he had provided 
some training on how to do this up front.  The conversation went like this:  
Lead Facilitator: Probably a lot of it was just assumption on my part that people knew what a 
good inject would be, what they needed to provided.  Some people just gave me a timeline: 
saying "at this time, this; at this time, this."  So there was a lot of tweaking, a lot of massaging.  I 
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think a lot of people don't like writing MSELs; they like planning exercises.  And they're hoping 
that the MSEL injects come together.  Some people had too much detail for a full scale exercise.  
Again, a little bit of a learning point of mine.  If this was a functional exercise, and we didn't have 
EOCs going, we didn't actually have firemen and stuff pushing reports, your injects would have a 
lot more detail, a lot more vivid… So, in some cases it was a little too much, some cases it wasn't 
enough.   
 
Interviewer: So, did you go back to those representatives and say, "Here's how I'd like you to redo 
this?" 
 
Lead Facilitator: Yup. And some people did, and some people didn't.  And you get to a point 
where you've just got to go with what you have.  And try to make it work.  To fix that, remediate 
that problem, next time I would like to start a few months earlier and then get into the MSELs a 
lot sooner.  And possibly do some OJT [on the job training] for that training team.  Because these 
people know a little bit about HSEEP, they've done exercises, but they're not professionals at it.  
And they don't do this every day for a living.  And very few agencies have the privilege of having 
somebody whose job is to just coordinate and design exercises. 
 
Even though it would seem that HSEEP standards would have provided procedural certainty, for this 
group, they did not.  It became clear, instead, that writing the exercise plan was a technical skill that not 
many exercise participants had had a chance to develop – or perhaps even wanted to.    
 ICS as a source of procedural un/certainty.  During the exercise, the use of ICS was somewhat 
selective.  In CSE, a state level incident management team set up a command post on the evening of the 
first day of the exercise and spent the second day developing ICS plans for the third and last day of the 
exercise.  This team’s sole purpose was to apply ICS to the ‘letter of the law.’  They filled out every form 
on a large wipe-off template, then entered the data into electronic versions of the forms on the computers 
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they brought.  Unfortunately, none of the local participants and almost none of the state-level participants 
saw any of this.  In the AAR, someone suggested getting the state IMT involved more in the planning and 
have them present for the whole exercise. The lead facilitator agreed, and someone reminded them that 
one person had volunteered to set this up but never followed thorough.  
 The IMT did use its materials to brief the incoming National Guard participants on the incident.  
This raised an important issue of contention.  Part of the ICS process is to plan the next operational 
period: the resources needed, how assets will be organized into task forces, etc.  The way that the IMT 
planned for the National Guard participants to work in task forces was different from the way the 
National Guard groups had decided to organize themselves, and the commanding officer was upset.  She 
initially thought that the IMT was telling her how to do her job, without the expertise about how she had 
been trained to do it.  Later, one exercise planner from the Guard explained,  
“The incident management team giving that briefing to the [Guard’s explosive specialists], I think 
that was really good, because they had to make some assumptions about what that group did that 
weren’t necessarily correct, how they were going to task-organize some things.  And the 
commander actually had to have a conversation with them about, ‘Hey, this way, that way’… so 
there was a little bit of learning there, too.  And she [the commander] walked away saying, 
‘Alright, I understand that I would bring in this, this and this, and these guys may try to chop me 
apart, and I've got to decide, am I going to let them chop me apart, based on the need, or do I 
need to kind of keep a little bit more group integrity?’  So that was good, good learning point 
there, how all of that worked.”  
The IMT representatives treated it as a misunderstanding, diffused the situation, and helped to make it a 
learning opportunity for the future. 
 The National Guard group also used ICS to manage their incident from a mobile command post 
during day three of the CSE exercise.  While this seemed like it would minimize confusion and 
frustration, it did not seem to have that effect.  When I arrived at about 8:00 a.m., the participants were 
finishing an elaborate set up of decontamination and medical tents.  In the command tent, the incident 
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commander was shouting orders, frenetically, at a series of people in the tent and on the radio as well.  
Despite the elaborate ICS insignia all around – forms posted and filled in with the latest information – it 
was chaos.  I later learned that they were about an hour behind schedule because setting up the equipment 
and inspecting the structural integrity of the collapse pile took longer than expected.  At one point, in the 
command tent, the incident commander turned to me and barked, “Do they shout like this at your 
university?”  “At the sports games, they do,” I replied.  His demeanor reminded me of the kind of sideline 
screaming one sees from the coaching staff at football and basketball games.   
 At points in the exercises, people talked about using ICS forms to record or share information, but 
then decided not to.  For example, the small group the comprised the logistics section of the CTT exercise 
at one point asked the incident commander if they should record what they were deciding on a particular 
ICS form, and the incident commander told them not to bother.  In the previously mentioned technical 
rescue team hot wash for the CSE exercise, the controllers talked with the group about the sketch they 
made of the incident site (including where they found victims); they asked how they would pass on this 
information to the next operational period if there were one.  They said they could pass on the sketch 
itself, and the controllers said that would be a good idea – and it would also be a good idea to fill out an 
ICS 201 form.  “We didn’t do that here,” the controllers explained, “because we’re so short-staffed.  We 
were ten people doing what forty people would normally be doing in a real incident.”  While I was 
chatting with the simcell exercise participants over the lunch break at the NCD exercise, I asked why 
people don’t use ICS to plan and run the exercise itself.  The controller explained, “ICS doesn’t really 
kick in until an incident happens.  It is really for an event that is already in progress – to help you plan for 
the next operational period, and the next one.”  Participants seemed to see the application of ICS as fairly 
limited, even in the exercise context.  
 Responses to procedural uncertainty conflicts.  A consequence of these challenges was that the 
lead facilitators were overwhelmed with last-minute questions and sometimes did extra work to 
compensate for others.  The Guard incident commander described above seemed to respond by shouting – 
maybe that was just his style, but no one else seemed to be quite so anxious.  I asked the lead facilitator of 
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the CSE exercise if there are really any common procedural languages – if HSEEP or ICS really worked 
that way in his experience.  He replied that what makes anything a common language is really repetition: 
“You talk about the common language, that's the Incident Command System, or they call it NIMS, 
and really all they say is, ‘Talk plain English so that everybody understands what you're talking 
about.’  Because a ‘TRT’ to the fire department is not a ‘TRT’ to the police department.  One's a 
tactical response team, one's a technical rescue team.  I don't know of any other methods or 
guidelines out there for designing exercises.  I haven't heard of, you know, the ‘Joe Snuffy Method’ 
[laughs].  I have experienced, with the military, that they go through the regular military planning 
cycle and they get into the little militant way of how we do things and pushing them and using the 
HSEEP planning process works out really well because you can translate it over.  You can say, 
‘We're going to have a planning conference’ [repeats twice]; I don't care what I call it, the right 
people have to come and these are the things we're going to talk about in this meeting.  It works out.  
As far as a common language for planning, HSEEP says just follow the incident command 
structure, plan the exercise the way you would normally respond to an event. And as you start 
making them bigger -- there's no guidelines for saying a 'small full-scale exercise' vs. a 'giant full-
scale exercise.'  It just says here are the different milestones, the things you need to accomplish in 
the different meetings.  And it's flexible.”   
If repetition is indeed the key, it did not seem like exercise participants were practicing with the shared 
procedures enough to reinforce them.   
 In general, the structures that some participants treated as the collective’s designated ‘common 
language’ did not seem to be commonly used nor commonly understood.  Such structures clearly had the 
potential to general productive confrontations about coordination – as in the case of the IMT group and 
the Guard commander – particularly when the parties involved adopted an attitude of learning, rather than 
dictating, how best to use existing structures to coordinate among agencies.  More often, I observed that 
these existing structures prompted more questions than answers: whether they should be used, who should 
use them, when they should be used, to what extent they should be used.  As such, they seemed to have 
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more potential to generate conflict than to resolve conflict.  
Disparities in Team Member Effort  
 Another source of conflict came from varying degrees of team member involvement; some 
agency representatives expended much more effort for the exercise than others.  It was also the case that 
planning teams experienced turnover – some agencies joined in later in the planning process, some 
dropped out, and others sent different representatives at different times.  Some agencies agreed to 
participate, but their representatives rarely attended planning meetings.  In the team literature, these 
disparity of effort kinds of conflicts sometimes fall under the heading of social loafing, but in this 
interorganizational setting, the motives and conditions of differential involvement seem more complex.  
In this section, I will talk about three areas of conflict related to three areas of team member involvement: 
members missing in action, members not providing requested information, and under-attendance at after 
action review meetings.   
 Missing in action.  Some agency representatives joined the planning process late through no fault 
of their own, such as the previously mentioned fire department representative whose bosses sent him to 
the planning meetings.  Others were simply not among the first wave of people invited to participate, and 
they, too, felt like the exercise was not really for them. For example, the agency representative for one of 
the hospitals commented, “Well, I will say that I think a major part of this exercise was more driven 
toward police, fire, and special teams.  The hospitals were, kind of, an end result, or an add-on actually.”  
Other agency representatives did not make it a priority to attend planning meetings.  One of the lead 
evaluators explained her frustration with metro and county SWAT representatives not attending planning 
meetings:  
“That's one of the failures.  The actual commanders, during the planning stages, did not attend 
most of the planning meetings, and that would have been something that, if they had been in on 
the planning phases, they could have side-barred with each other and worked a lot of things out, 
but they did not.  They knew that they were training in the same location, but they thought they 
were completely training separately and there would be no cross-communications or anything like 
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that.  County ended up having their own tactical operations with their SWAT commander, and 
then metro had their own, and it should have been a unified command structure, but the each had 
their own.”   
This also frustrated the state weapons of mass destruction representative, who wanted to plan his portion 
of the exercise to dovetail with the metro and county SWAT teams, but from his account, not only were 
they not at the meetings, but they didn’t return his phone calls.  
 The previous examples relate to the planning process, but several exercise situations reflected the 
missing-in-action phenomenon as well.  In CSE, the local agency participants were all invited to come 
back and see the National Guard portion of the exercise, but almost none of them did.  Only the local 
coroner came by to meet the National Guard exercise participants and talk with them about how they 
might work together in a real incident.  In contrast, the NCD exercise was not able to get the coroner to 
come and participate, a point that they mentioned with disappointment in the hot wash at the end of day.  
The NCD exercise also ran into a snag when a county sheriff decided to spend the morning in the field 
portion of the exercise, rather than in the EOC, where he would be stationed in a real incident.  The EOC 
group wanted to consult him to make a decision as part of their exercise, but he couldn’t be reached, and 
the neighboring county sheriff was not willing to speak for him.  The lead facilitator of the NCD exercise 
explained, “The EOC had a key department missing, the [County B] Sheriff’s Office.  They needed to 
make a decision, but there was no one there to make it.  It turns out the sheriff was out in the field.   So I 
would recommend putting an alternate in the EOC to represent the [County B] Sheriff’s Office.”  
Perhaps others’ expectations were not adequately conveyed, but some people failed to meet those 
expectations regarding their involvement.  
 Failing to provide timely information.  The lead facilitators often relied on agency 
representatives to supply them with information specific to their agencies, such as target capabilities or 
exercise objectives, a roster of participants, and, in the case of CSE, the injects for the agency-specific 
portions of the exercise scenario, and lessons learned for the AAR report.  I previously mentioned that 
some of the injects provided demonstrated a lack of understanding of the format.  In addition, the lead 
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facilitator had a very difficult time getting any injects from some of the participating agencies.  One of the 
controllers explained:  
“Now I think [CSE lead facilitator], if you’ve talked to him, would say, ‘I had to pull information 
from people,’ because they weren’t getting it to him on time.  And so with him not getting the 
information on time, he couldn’t put it into his formatted form.  And so he was having to skip 
around until he got injects from people, and then I think toward the end we were down to crunch 
time and he was finally getting all the information he needed.” 
 Some participating agencies also disregarded instructions to check in at a central location 
before going to the exercise venue, which contributed to confusion for their agencies and for other 
agencies at the venue.  For example, the fire department – technical rescue agency representative told this 
story from the CSE exercise:  
“They had told us through the planning process that they wanted us out there at a certain time.  
And our involvement was based on the script of, after the hazmat team arrived, and basically, 
they arrested this guy and he chose to blow up whatever he did.  Once the building got blown up, 
the hazmat team was going to request the need for the TRT team.  Well, the adjustment came 
when the hazmat team never reported to the aircraft hangar for check-in, and the planners had no 
idea that the hazmat team was even there.  So we started on time, like we were supposed to, and 
we started going through the scripts.  They were dispatching people out there, according to the 
schedule, but the hazmat team wasn't even on the premises.  They were on that field to the south, 
because they never went to the aircraft hangar to check in. And so nobody had any idea that they 
were there.  And how it played into us is, they told us to go ahead and go out there [to the venue].  
When we pulled up, the cops thought we were the hazmat team, because we pulled into the 
parking lot, because they were going off the script.  We're like, ‘No, no, no, we're the special ops 
team,’ and then the hazmat guys were behind the eight ball because they weren't even in position 
to get in to the facility.  They had to come in after we did.  And we each have two big sets of 
trailers and big trucks to pull them.  And so we had to make an adjustment of how we were going 
 105 
 
 
 
to position them in there, and basically we had to ad lib our script as far as, ‘Okay, the buildings 
have already been detonated and we've got people trapped, and we're going to begin the process,’ 
even though we weren't scripted into the process, and adlibbed later on.  So a lot of those 
challenges, through the planning process: ‘There's the script, that's what we're trying to all go for’ 
-- because we all understood what were to do and that one thing being out of order or not 
following the check-in process kind of threw everybody for a loop because we didn't get to come 
into the event with certain things already having happened.”  
These oversights were understandably frustrating to exercise planners and confusing to participants.  As 
the SWMD representative commented, it was particularly disheartening because he didn’t feel like he was 
asking very much of the other agencies: “And you know what’s funny – and then I’ll get off my soapbox 
– but it’s not that difficult.  We’re talking a five-minute conversation as to what needs to be done for us to 
be brought in and then where we need to go to pass this off beyond; you know what I mean?”  I can’t help 
but agree; it doesn’t seem that difficult when you put it that way.  
 Absenteeism at after-action review meetings.   Hot wash debriefs that immediately followed 
the exercise were generally well attended, since participants were already on site.  After-action review 
meetings that occurred on a different date – as they were for NCD and CSE – engendered less 
engagement.  In the case of NCD, the AAR meeting was simply cancelled.  The lead facilitator prepared a 
report and shared it with individual agency representatives, but no “problem-solving” meeting was held to 
debrief the contents of the report.  Even the hot wash at the end of the day at NCD was missing a few 
agency representatives, and the nature of the discussion was a series of venue-specific report-outs – no 
collective idea generation or decision-making regarding matters of shared concern.  The CSE did not have 
the luxury of having a hot wash with all participants, given its three-day, piecemeal format.  The AAR 
meeting held several days after the exercise brought only about half of the agency representatives.  The 
discussion that ensued did raise issues of common concern, such as improving radio channel signal power 
and training together for future exercises, but no one volunteered to follow up on these issues.  When I 
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asked the lead facilitator about his impressions of that meeting, he said, “A lot less people showed up.”  I 
agreed, and he continued,  
“Yeah, well, and I knew it was gonna be that way because I’d already talked to some outside that 
said it’s over with, done, not gonna do it again.  And I even told [lead controller], and I think I 
even said something to [lead facilitator].  I said, ‘Hey, you realize a lot of these people aren’t 
going to be here.’  That’s just the way it is. The exercise is over.  Once the box is checked, that’s 
it.” 
The CSE lead facilitator also expressed that he was “Very disappointed in the amount of participation” in 
the AAR.  I asked if he was surprised, and he replied:  
“Very surprised.  We always, from the very beginning, were going to do it right away after the 
exercise, soon.  And a little bit out of the norm of people being done with the exercise and the 'not 
give a shit' factor goes up.  This one was very high.  Very disappointed with who wasn't there.  
Not as much so disappointed in some of the quality of what the evaluators had provided to [the 
lead evaluator] for the report.  It is what it is.  So I try not to take that personally.”  
To me, like to the CSE lead facilitator, this seemed like a missed opportunity.  The lack of attendance 
seemed to suggest a lack of interest in interagency or community-level learning.   
 Responses to discrepancy in member effort conflicts.  Regarding the planning latecomers, the 
lead facilitator made the effort to talk with each one initially, get them up to speed and make sure they felt 
comfortable.  At the same time, it seems that they still walked away with the impression that it was 
somebody else’s exercise, and they should just try to fit their piece in where they could.  They did not see 
themselves as equal partners in the exercise.  This seemed strange to me, because I observed that the two 
aforementioned groups were among the most active and appreciative of all of the involved agencies.  
Perhaps the missed opportunity was more about other agencies not seeing them in action and not knowing 
more about how to interact with them.  Regarding others missing in action, exercise facilitators and 
planners seemed to feel helpless to prevent that.  Like with unified command, leaders would like to tell 
people that this is their job, but they also can’t promise that the people will follow through. The team 
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members who did not provide information prompted the individual who needed the information – e.g., the 
lead facilitator or lead evaluator – to pester them individually; this is a frustration for those individuals, 
but never reached the level of a group concern.   Regarding under-attendance at follow-up meetings, 
again, leaders seem to accept that this was a matter of personal choice, and the best they could do was 
‘live with the living.’ 
 In contrast, there was exceptionally strong group problem solving in the planners’ hot wash for 
the CTT meeting.  It was all operational leaders – no EOC personnel – and the only major party missing 
was the smaller local college.  The group had robust discussions of several issues, such as when to issue 
alerts to operational and policy personnel and which group had the authority to make certain kinds of 
decisions.  They also talked about how to help the local college representatives get up to speed, and they 
confirmed their commitment to doing so.  Unfortunately, since no representative of the local college 
stayed for the hot wash, this could not be an instance of confrontation, nor could the local college 
representatives ensure that their concerns or questions were addressed.  Still, this instance provides a 
contrasting example, in which a small group engaging in confrontive problem-solving discussion 
examined issues and reached decisions for the future.  
Mixed Motives 
 The term mixed motives refers to the combination of group motives and individual motives – in 
this case, the shared goals of the entire exercise group and the goals of the particular agency that a 
member represented.   
 Collective goals: preparedness and safety.  There were three very strong shared goals that 
seemed to unite exercise planners and participants across agency lines.  The first was the general desire 
for preparedness.  Many of the comments on the exercise evaluation and in the individual interviews 
reflected the attitude that, “We don’t do this enough,” and “We need to be ready for anything.”  Second, 
the exercise brought together individuals that were not accustomed to working together, both within 
agencies and between agencies.  This was widely regarded as one of the greatest benefits of the exercise.  
Lastly, a cause that united participants was safety during the exercise – in other words, avoiding real-
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world injury or illness for exercise participants.  This included the physical safety of participants, as well 
as reputational protection through the management of media coverage of the exercise. These three areas 
of common concern prompted productive discussion in planning meetings and served as points of unity 
for the agency representatives.  
 Agency-specific goals.  At the same time, each agency brought its own very specific goals for the 
capabilities that it wanted its people to exercise.  Interacting with other agencies was sometimes among 
these, but not first among these.  Despite everyone’s best intentions, it was my impression that the work 
felt ‘silo-ed’ during the exercise.  Even in the microcosm of the CTT exercise, in which the operational 
participants divided into logistics, operations, and safety sections – as soon as these distinctions were 
established, they focused on their sub-teams and stopped checking in with the rest of the group.  In every 
case, it was often unclear who was managing the incident, even when there was an explicitly-appointed 
incident manager.  When confusion or deviations from the exercise plan arose, agency participants 
focused on what they could do within their agency group to make it a useful training day.  The “let’s 
make the best of this” attitude, while admirable, turned them inward, rather than outward.  Rather than 
trying to salvage the inter-agency learning opportunity, they worked from the perspective, “How can we 
salvage this training day for our people?”  The SWMD representative described his perspective on 
making the best of a day with some interagency snafus:  
“The takeaway was that our team actually got some very good training out of it.  The command 
post issues were, kind of – I blame it on planners and on some of the evaluators that some of the 
things that would’ve driven us to even be there, to show up, and/or to go in and make entry, those 
driving forces weren’t there.  And I know [my agency’s training specialist] had to step in on some 
issues where she wasn’t supposed to.  It wasn’t her job to do that, but she had to call a timeout 
and say, ‘This needs to be straightened out and this needs to be straightened out.’   
So that was that and because of that it was described as being a cluster for a while.  It just didn’t – 
our aspect didn’t go as smooth as possible.  I told you two of the major things.  One is that the 
local department that would normally call us in didn’t give us a reason why we would get called 
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in.  They didn’t give a shit either.  That was one of the words that they said – and I’m sorry for 
my language – but one of the things they told our team is that, ‘Hey, we’re done.  We’re going to 
another building to train.  You can do what you want to do.’  So that wasn’t a great attitude. And 
then the second was that the other thing we planned on with the local HAZMAT team and going 
through DECON [decontamination] – that didn’t happen either, so two major training objectives 
of interacting with the other teams didn’t exactly work out that well.” 
Despite all of these challenges, his team was able to focus on their intra-agency objectives and make it 
meaningful training day in other respects.  
 In some cases, this kind of defaulting to a focus on one’s own agency happened even in the 
planning process, such as when the hospitals participating in the CSE exercise decided that it would be 
best for them to have their own exercise on the second day of the exercise, not on the first day when the 
other local responders were exercising.  Consequently, there was very little interaction between these 
groups.  The hospitals had a productive exercise day among themselves, and that went beyond the single-
hospital exercises that they would typically run, but they did not get to educate other agencies about their 
processes, or vice versa.  One could say the same of the National Guard group in the CSE exercise – 
although they initiated the other portions of the exercise, their specific scheduling and training needs 
precluded actually training with others.  One of the Guard planners that I interviewed kept using the 
metaphor that planning a multi-agency exercise is like hosting party.  Near the end of the interview I 
asked him, “So if we revisit the party metaphor, who had the best time at this party?  Who got the most 
out of the exercise?”  He thought about it for a second, and he answered, “Well, I guess we did.”  
Similarly, a number of the agency representatives whom I interviewed were extremely pleased with what 
their agency was able to do during the exercise, even if they were displeased with or simply oblivious to 
the interagency elements.  
 Sometimes, even when group goals were discussed, individual agencies decided to do their own 
thing anyway.  For example, in the third planning team meeting, the lead facilitator raised a question 
about which agency or agencies would provide “simunitions.”  Simunitions are realistic-looking, fake 
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weapons with non-lethal ammunition that are commonly used for military and law enforcement training.  
Representatives of the state SWAT team conferred privately at their table, and they offered to bring 
simunitions for their portion of the exercise.  Then, one SWAT representative asked whether there would 
be any “real security” on the scene.  He explained that, with so many unarmed police and SWAT officers 
participating in the exercise, they might be an easy target for a real “bad guy.”  The state emergency 
management agency representative rejoined that, due to the grant specifications, no live weapons were 
allowed on the exercise site.  He warned that they would lose their grant money if they got caught with 
any live weapons.  One state SWAT representative offered that they could post a SWAT squad with live 
weapons on the perimeter of the exercise site, just to be safe.  The facilitator appeared a bit reluctant.  He 
looked to the state emergency management representative, who posed no objection, and he said that 
would be okay.  When I talked to the facilitator afterwards, he expressed frustration with the SWAT 
representatives, because, in his opinion, they were acting paranoid; they seemed overly worried about not 
being armed for two hours.  During the SWAT period of the exercise, I was chatting with a National 
Guardsman who was assigned to direct traffic on the street running through the exercise site.  A SWAT 
truck drove by, transporting a group of exercise participants in full gear, and the Guardsman looked 
surprised.  He turned to me and said, ominously, “Those aren’t simunitions.”  
 Responses to mixed motives conflicts.  In the instances described in this section, we see more of 
the individual motives being prioritized over the group motives.  Sometimes this was explicitly addressed 
– at least decided ahead, if not seeking the group’s input as part of the decision; other times covertly.  I 
did not observe any confrontation in this area; rather, agencies seemed to think that it was not appropriate 
for them to ask others to adapt with them – instead, they should stay out of each other’s way.  In the 
positive evaluations of the experience, I sometimes detected a note of defeatism, as in this comment from 
the fire department – technical rescue representative:   
“We wanted to [get involved with the CSE exercise] as soon as we heard about it.  We thought it 
would be a great opportunity to do – like I was telling you before, we thought we were going to 
be more hands on with the National Guard than what we were, but regardless of how it all ended 
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up, it was an awesome experience for our team.  We got really good feedback, we identified some 
weaknesses, some little things that-- there's no way you can plan for them without something like 
that.  I'm very thankful for that opportunity.”   
The gratitude expressed here is certainly genuine, but perhaps so is the note of powerlessness.  
  These examples demonstrate a general lack of communication across agency lines about the 
negotiation of individual and collective goals.  The establishment of collective and agency-specific 
exercise objectives was completely mediated by the primary exercise planner, such that this person served 
as a liaison between agency representatives – even, it seemed, in planning meetings with all of the agency 
representatives.  These examples also seem to suggest that a proportion, perhaps the majority, of exercise 
participants prioritize their agency objectives over the overall exercise objectives.  This calls into question 
the extent to which exercise planners and participants from different agencies agree on the priorities of the 
exercise – or even the primary purpose of multi-agency exercises in general.  
Task-related Interdependency 
 Lastly, task-related interdependencies produced some conflict.  Sometimes these were built into 
the master scenario exercise list (MSEL), and sometimes they occurred organically during the exercise.  
In the best cases, interdependency issues that came up through the injects were discussed in the agency-
specific hot wash, even if they weren’t carried out during the exercise.  This was the case for the TRT 
group discussed earlier, as well as the group in NCD exercise that asked the mock victims to get up and 
walk off the bus rather than packaging them for medical triage as if their injuries were real.  When they 
occurred organically during the exercise, sometimes one party was willing to correct the others’ mistakes, 
and sometimes not.  A good example of a confrontation was the previously described instance in which 
the National Guard commander explained to the IMT that the way that they had organized the task forces 
would not work for her.  Although this started as a somewhat heated moment, the IMT representatives 
were amenable to learning and thanked her for saying something.  A less effective example occurred 
between 9-1-1 dispatch group and several of the local agencies in the CSE exercise.  Two pairs of 
dispatchers were responding to the exercise radio traffic, making records and passing on information as 
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they would in their real dispatch work.  As she described in the after action review meeting, “We need 
everyone to be giving us location information when they call in.  Initially, they didn’t do that, and we 
didn’t ask because we were trying not to impede the progress of the drill.  We normally would have had 
to ask for that information, and we didn’t do it.”  In my observation notes from my time with two of the 
dispatchers I noted that they seemed to be struggling to figure out what to say, because they knew that 
things were going wrong, but they seemed to think that they would be contaminating the exercise by 
correcting people – or even by asking questions that would prompt them.  As I mentioned with respect to 
the “mass casualty” comment, when the dispatch representative did bring up this issue in the AAR 
meeting, unfortunately, many of the people who would have benefitted form the information weren’t 
there to hear it.  The lead evaluator asked her to write it down and email it to him so that he could be sure 
to include it in the report, but there is no guarantee that the report would be read, shared, or used as a 
training tool (although that was certainly its intention).   
 All that said, there were some points of interagency interdependency that participants counted 
among the successes of their exercises.  Some interactions between just two agencies yielded discoveries 
of interdependencies and a learning moment for both parties, such as the previously described interaction 
between Red Cross and Public Health at CTT.  Other participants were just glad to have the exposure to 
faces and names of people from other agencies, even if it was sparse or informal.  The CSE lead 
facilitator described this a point of pride for him, too: “As an organization, we want to go out there and 
support, we want to build relationships with people that we could be working with in the future.” 
Eight Common Tensions in Disaster Response Exercises  
 Looking more specifically at the uniquely context-specific conflicts in these data, I generated a 
set of eight tensions that seemed to be present in each of the exercises that I observed.  I speculated that 
they might perhaps be common to all such disaster response exercises.  I have alluded to the majority of 
them in the preceding analysis, so I merely list and describe them here.  They are also summarized in 
Table 17 at the end of this chapter. 
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 Planning versus improvising.  In some aspects of an exercise, participants were expected to 
follow the script or the exercise plan without deviation.  To violate it was treated as disrespectful to 
planners and a form of ‘breaking the rules’ of the exercise.  In other aspects of an exercise, participants 
were expected to choose their own actions and improvise as needed – sometimes even ignoring part of the 
exercise plan if it was no longer relevant.  Sometimes participants were praised for adapting and 
adlibbing; other times, they were chastised for not following the exercise plan. 
 Following versus violating standard operating procedure for notional exercise elements.  
Exercise planners expected participants to dismiss some aspects of an exercise as notional – as in, "We all 
know that we wouldn't really do it that way, but we're doing it that way for today's exercise."  At the same 
time, exercise planners generally expected participants to apply their knowledge of standard operating 
procedures to demonstrate their competency during the exercise.  Similar to the planning versus 
improvising tension, it was not always clear when participants were expected or encouraged to violate 
standard operating procedure, as opposed to when they were supposed to treat standard operating 
procedure as sacrosanct.     
 Ignoring missing elements versus addressing missing elements.  There were some exercise 
artificialities that planners intended for participants to ignore (e.g., "we just don't have that information") 
and others which planners intended for participants to improvise to address (e.g., "pretend that we have 
that information -- just make something up to keep the exercise moving").  Distinguishing between the 
two intentions appeared to be confusing to all parties.  
 Intervening immediately versus giving constructive feedback in the debrief meeting.  As a 
training philosophy, some people – albeit a minority – seemed to think that it was better to intervene 
immediately when they saw participants making a mistake.  Others preferred to let participants play out 
the whole exercise, believing they would learn best by analyzing the failure and its consequences at the 
end of the exercise.  More broadly, this philosophy was captured in the idea that some people saw 
exercises more as interactive lessons, to be elaborated on while in process, while others saw exercises 
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more as tests, in which participants should be given a chance to prove what they know without disruption 
and should then be evaluated holistically after finishing the exercise.  
 Arriving simultaneously versus arriving gradually.  In a real incident, personnel would arrive 
at the scene or the Emergency Operations Center incrementally -- not all at once -- and would 
commandeer as much space as needed to manage the incident.  In an exercise, participants all arrived at a 
pre-determined start time.  Consequently, space for parking, equipment, and meetings was sometimes 
limited.   
 Operating on a 24-hour operational period versus operating on an 8-hour work day 
schedule.  A real incident would have a 24-hour operational period; in other words, the response would 
be continuous, and personnel would be rotated in and out to support a continuous response.  In exercises, 
it was more cost-effective to condense the exercise scenario into a 4- or 8-hour work period (i.e., part or 
all of a normal work day).  As the “finite resource” section of the prior analysis illustrated, translating a 
continuous response into a set of simultaneous 4- or 8-hour segments created a heavy administrative 
burden for exercise planners and often confused exercise participants.  At the same time, it seemed that 
far fewer agencies could afford to participate if the exercise were conducted on a 24-hour operational 
schedule.  This, too, would create additional administrative challenges.    
 Pacing the release of information.  In a real incident, responders and government officials 
would not be able to control the pace at which new information about the incident became available.  In 
an exercise, however, exercise planners strove to manage the pace of information in order to keep 
participants occupied throughout the training period.  This sometimes made it difficult to practice how 
information should flow in a real incident.  Exercise participants seemed to resent having to wait on 
information, even though they understood that, in a real incident, the arrival of new information would be 
entirely unpredictable.    
 Enacting special authorities.  Certain positions (e.g., city and county leaders, members of 
Unified Command, etc.) are designed to take on special authorities during a crisis.  Because these 
authorities are rarely activated, the individuals occupying the positions may be unfamiliar with them.  
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Although exercises typically emphasized practice, some parties did not seem to have enough information 
about their roles to effectively practice them.  Differences in status sometimes prevented both higher and 
lower status individuals from speaking candidly about what they did and did not know about special 
authorities and their domains.     
 As I considered these tensions, I began to wonder whether differing positions on some or all of 
the tensions might contribute to the dismissiveness that I sometimes observed among exercise planners 
and participants.  At times, in response to tensions, participants were quick to shrug off 
misunderstandings or frustrations as “exercise world” – but this did not seem to me to be a complete or 
satisfactory answer to any of the tensions.  
Conclusions 
 Although my analysis focused on conflicts, conflict responses, and confrontation, I found many 
aspects of the exercises to be very impressive and – as a citizen who might one day experience a disaster 
– very reassuring.  Each exercise had a high degree of complexity, and each showcased successes as well 
as challenges.  As a communication scholar, however, I was surprised by the overall lack of cooperative 
problem-solving between agencies, whether one-to-one or as a group of agency representatives.   
 Research question one asked about the kinds of conflicts that arise in a multi-agency disaster 
response exercise.  Many of these conflicts, in my view, all under the auspices of established sources of 
conflict in group and organizational settings: power differences, finite resources, role uncertainty, 
procedural uncertainty, disparities in team member effort, mixed motives, and task-related 
interdependency.  Some of the conflicts – or, as I came to see them, tensions – seemed unique to the 
context of disaster response exercises.   
 Research question two asked about how exercise planners and participants navigated conflicts, 
and research question three asked, more specifically, how and when confrontation behaviors emerged.  I 
came to see the question of ‘when’ as increasingly important.  Logically, there really only three options 
for when a party can respond to an instance of competing goals (i.e., a conflict): before it happens, as 
soon as it happens, or sometime after it happens.  My assumption had been that it would be best to 
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anticipate potential conflicts in the planning stages of the exercise and address them before they might 
happen.  Upon reflection, I think that that approach may put unreasonable demands on the exercise 
planners and, worse yet, may prohibit the exercise participants from learning more about other agencies’ 
preferences and needs first-hand.  From the analysis presented here, it also seemed that waiting for a 
designated feedback period was not the most effective time to address a conflict, either.  Although it 
would not have to be this way, in practice it seemed that key individuals did not attend hot wash or after-
action review meetings, and such meetings produced more superficial than robust discussions of 
unresolved issues.  Particularly in the larger exercises, an attitude of “write it down for next time” seemed 
to prevail over an attitude of “let’s sort this out right now while it’s fresh in our minds.”   
 The issue of addressing a conflict as soon as it happened met with mixed results, which is where 
the topic of conflict management style could perhaps make a contribution.  Regarding the question of how 
parties responded to conflict, the responses did not defy extant thinking about broad categories of conflict 
management styles, but they did suggest that more nuanced analysis of intentions, behaviors, and conflict 
cycles would be warranted.  The decision to address a conflict later (if ever) matches the concept of 
conflict avoidance, but conflict avoidance can be manifested in multiple ways and may not, in every 
instance, be pathological.  The decision to let others do what they will seems like accommodation, but I 
saw several different shades of this phenomenon in these data: let others do what they will so that they 
can see the consequences for themselves, let others do what they will because you have no formal power 
to influence them, or let others do what they will because it simply doesn’t affect you and your priorities.  
Compromise only seemed to be mentioned when someone had accepted less than what he or she really 
wanted, not as a bargaining tool to get another party to acquiesce.   
 Cooperative or win-win solutions – i.e., the emphasis of the traditional collaborative conflict 
management style – required a relatively high level of investment from participants.  As has been well 
established in group communication scholarship, reaching consensus takes substantially more time and 
energy than other forms of decision-making.  Accordingly, smaller groups, or even pairs of agencies, 
seemed the most likely to invest in cooperative problem-solving to reach consensus.  To do so, 
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confrontation was required, and often one party had to initiate it.  In agency-to-agency contact, sometimes 
the party that did not initiate the confrontation rejected the other party’s authority to do so.  In such cases, 
ego conflict or avoidance ensued.  In other cases, the party that did not initiate the confrontation 
welcomed the confrontation as a learning opportunity – in other words, an opportunity complementary to 
their goals and to their purpose for participating in the exercise.  This learning frame seemed to me to be a 
powerful resource – after all, all participants acknowledge that disaster exercises are training exercises.  
The tension that encapsulates the lesson-versus-test metaphor may, however, prevent this frame from 
being widely adopted.  Similarly, tensions related to following procedures rather than adapting may 
dissuade exercise participants from engaging with one another in these learning moments. 
 Phase 1 of the study shed light on the types of conflicts that emerge in disaster response exercise, 
how participants navigate conflicts, and how and when confrontation behaviors may occur.  It did little, 
however, to help me tease out the distinction between collaboration and confrontation – nor how they 
may relate to one another and to exercise outcomes.  Phase 2 of the study (described in the next chapter) 
uses the vocabulary and key concepts that I drew from Phase 1 to further examine the relationships 
among motivations, exercise involvement and investment, collaborative interaction behaviors, conflict 
styles, and participants’ evaluations of the success of the exercise.    
Table 
Table 17 
Eight Common Tensions in Disaster Response Exercises 
Plan vs. Improvise In some aspects of the exercise, participants should follow the script or 
exercise plan without deviation.  In other aspects, participants are expected to 
choose their own actions and improvise as needed. 
Notional Elements and 
SOPs 
Exercise planners expect participants to dismiss some aspects of the exercise as 
notional -- in other words, "We all know that we wouldn't really do it that way, 
but we're doing it that way for today's exercise."  At the same time, exercise 
planners expect participants to apply their knowledge of standard operating 
procedures to demonstrate their competency during the exercise. 
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Table 17 (continued)  
Ignore vs. Address There are some exercise artificialities that planners intend for participants to 
ignore (e.g., "we just don't have that information") and others which planners 
intend for participants to improvise to address (e.g., "pretend that we have that 
information -- just make something up to keep the exercise moving"). 
Intervene vs. Debrief As a training philosophy, some people think it is better to intervene 
immediately when you see participants making a mistake. Others prefer to let 
participants play out the whole exercise and then learn by analyzing the failure 
and its consequences at the end of the exercise. 
Simultaneous vs. 
Gradual Arrival 
In a real incident, personnel would arrive at the scene or the Emergency 
Operations Center incrementally -- not all at once -- and would commandeer as 
much space as needed to manage the incident. In an exercise, participants all 
arrive at a pre-determined start time, and space for parking, equipment, and 
meetings may be limited. 
24-hour Operation vs. 
8-hour  
A real incident would have a 24-hour operational period. In an exercise, it is 
more cost-effective to condense the exercise scenario into a 4- or 8-hour work 
period (i.e., part or all of a normal work day). 
Pace of Information In a real incident, responders and government officials cannot control the pace 
at which new information about the incident becomes available. In an exercise, 
exercise planners strive to manage the pace of information in order to keep 
participants occupied throughout the training period. This sometimes makes it 
difficult to practice how information should flow in a real incident. 
Special Authorities Certain positions (e.g., city and county leaders, members of Unified Command, 
etc.) take on special authorities during a crisis. Because these authorities are 
rarely activated, the individuals occupying the positions may be unfamiliar 
with them. Although exercises typically emphasize practice, some parties may 
not have enough information about their roles to effectively practice them. 
Differences in status may prevent both higher and lower status individuals 
from speaking candidly about what they do and don't know. 
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Chapter 6: Phase 2 Design Using Phase 1 Results 
 Although instrument development is a relatively common purpose for mixing methods, the 
process that a scholar employs to get from the analysis of qualitative data to the design of a survey 
instrument is rarely transparent.  The goal of this chapter is to describe how the analysis of qualitative 
data from Phase 1 – in concert with reviews of extant literature – informed the development of the online 
questionnaire employed in Phase 2 of the study.  I entered the qualitative analysis having already 
identified some key variables in extant literature, such as collaborators’ perceptions of the anticipated 
impact of the cooperative effort and collaborators’ level of participation.   The results of the qualitative 
analysis did not persuade me to include any different or additional variables, but they did strongly inform 
how I measured the variables in the particular context of multi-agency disaster response exercises.  The 
majority of the questionnaire consisted of original items and scales, and it would not have been possible 
to create context-sensitive items without the knowledge I gained from Phase 1 of the research.  This 
chapter addresses how I used the results of Phase 1 in three aspects of questionnaire design: vocabulary, 
items, and scales.    
Vocabulary 
 The validity of a survey instrument relies in part on the degree to which its language and 
terminology make sense to research participants.  Survey instruments rely on closed-ended items; this 
means that both the questions and the answer options must seem relevant and comprehensive to 
participants.  My Phase 1 research provided me with the vocabulary to write closed-ended items in 
language that was familiar to participants and allowed them to proceed through the questions with relative 
ease.  This was particular helpful for the variables described below.  
 Exercise characteristics.  My exposure to the context in Phase 1 also allowed me to write 
concise, closed-ended items about the characteristics of the focal exercise – that is, the exercise in recent 
experience about which the participant chose to answer the questions provided.  I asked about the type of 
exercise, the types of agencies included, and the type of agency that the participant was representing in 
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the exercise.  Although these variables do not appear in the Phase 2 results, they may prove fruitful for 
future analyses.  
 Satisfaction with exercise process and results.  For these variables, I adapted a number of items 
from the HSEEP exercise evaluation question bank, which provided the language used in exercise 
planners’ development of target objectives, as well as in the after action review meeting.  These items 
included, “The participants included the right mix of people in terms of level and mix of disciplines,” 
“After this exercise, I believe that my agency is better prepared to deal successfully with the scenario that 
was exercised,” “Exercise participants met all of the exercise objectives,” “The exercise was well 
organized,” and “This exercise allowed my agency to practice and improve priority capabilities.”  
Encountering these kinds of phrases in multiple exercises reassured me that the HSEEP items were true to 
participants’ way of assessing the success of an exercise.   
Items 
 Similarly, my observations and interviews helped me write items appropriate to the proposed 
variables.  For example, the involvement variable consisted of a checklist of exercise-related tasks or 
activities; the question prompted participants to select all that described something they did as part of the 
exercise in question.  The list for planners included nineteen items (e.g., “I created exercise prompts or 
‘injects’ for my agency’s portion of the exercise,” “I provided feedback on a draft version of the exercise 
plan, or ‘MSEL’, in advance of the exercise,” etc.), and the list for non-planners included sixteen items 
(e.g., “I attended an orientation meeting before the start of the exercise,” “I participated in a ‘hot wash’ 
discussion immediately after the exercise,” etc.).  I would not have been able to generate these lists of 
items without observing several exercises directly and noticing which tasks or behaviors seem to 
distinguish the more involved participants from the less involved participants.  It was also apparent to me 
that, regarding the resource commitments of participating agencies, that participants would best be able 
assess their agency’s investment on a relative basis: more than all of the other participating agencies, 
more than most other participating agencies, about the same as other agencies, not as much as most other 
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agencies.  Accordingly, I created an item to correspond to the agency resource investment variable using 
these relative terms.  I later converted it into an ordinal ‘score.’ 
Scales 
 Lastly, the Phase 1 study helped me develop several series of items to comprise original scales for 
the variables anticipated impact, expertise recognition, informational support, and timeliness.  Phase 1 
also produced the list of eight common tensions in disaster simulation exercise design, which I then 
included in the questionnaire to find out whether participants observed any of these tensions in their focal 
exercises – and, if so, with what degree of severity.   
 Anticipated impact.  Although Keyton, Ford, and Smith (2008) proposed impact as describing 
the organization’s perception of the value proposition of the collaborative endeavor for their organization 
alone, my Phase 1 analysis pointed me to the possibility that perceptions of other agencies’ motivations to 
participate in the collaborative effort might also comprise part of that value proposition.  Accordingly, I 
created items that described positive and (reverse coded) neutral or negative expectations of the exercise 
for the participant’s own agency, and I created items that described positive and (reverse coded) neutral or 
negative expectations of other agencies’ attitude toward the exercise.  (See Appendix C for examples.)  
 Expertise recognition, informational support, and timeliness.  These variables actually 
emerged in a more emic fashion.  First, I wrote a series of items that described the kinds of interagency 
interactions that seemed to illustrate collaborative behaviors (e.g., “We prioritized our tasks so that we 
could provide timely information or updates to other agencies.”), and then I grouped the items by content 
similarity and applied dimension labels that resonated with organizational concepts (e.g., timeliness).  
Some of these items reflected behaviors that I did not see, as well as those that I saw, e.g., “No one 
approached or contacted my agency to talk about how our agencies should be working together.”  These 
scales strongly reflect the kinds of interactions that seemed influential in my Phase 1 data collection and 
analysis.   
 Common tensions in disaster simulation exercise design.  As described in Chapter 5, the list of 
eight common tensions emerged from a purely context-specific induction of tension-related themes.  
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Naturally, I wanted to find out whether these so-called tensions would resonate with practitioners’ views 
of their experiences.  Accordingly, I included the eight tensions in the questionnaire, with the following 
instructions: “If you observed the tension, please select a rating from 0 to 10, with 0 being ‘no tension at 
all,’ 5 being ‘moderate tension,’ and 10 being ‘very strong tension.’  If you did not observe the tension, 
please select ‘Don’t know / Not applicable.’”  Although the tensions themselves do not comprise part of 
the conceptual model, I decided to explore their relationship to outcome variables in conjunction with 
Research Question 4.     
 As the previous paragraphs suggest, the Phase 1 analysis did not overrule my expectations about 
relevant variables the emerged from the literature review.  It did, however, strongly influence the way that 
I operationalized and measured each variable.  
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Chapter 7: Phase 2 Results 
 Following the method described in Chapter 4, this chapter will summarize the results of Phase 2 
of the study, which used survey methodology to collect quantitative data pertinent to the study 
phenomena.  The survey asked each participant to think of a one particular multi-agency disaster response 
exercise in which he or she had participated in the last three years.  Questions about that exercise included 
anticipated impact of the exercise for the participant’s agency, the participant’s level of involvement in 
the exercise, the degree to which agencies engaged in collaborative interaction behaviors with one another 
during the exercise, the conflict management style the participant employed in interagency interactions 
during the exercise, and the presence and severity of eight common tensions found in disaster response 
exercises (independent variables), as well as the participant’s satisfaction with the exercise process and 
the exercise outcomes (dependent variables).  In addition, the questionnaire asked for background 
information about the focal exercise (exercise type, number and types of agencies involved, etc.) and 
demographic information about the research participant (sex, birth year, number of years in field, agency 
affiliation type, etc.).  The sections that follow describe the results of the analyses specific to the revised 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 (pp. 57-58) and Research Question 4 (p. 43).  
Results 
 Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 1 stated that, “Motivation to achieve coordination will be positively 
associated with collaborative interaction.”  Given the incoherence of motivation to achieve coordination 
as a latent variable, I investigated this hypothesis by testing a linear regression model with anticipated 
impact, other agencies’ motivation to cooperate, involvement, and agency resource investment as 
predictors and collaborative interaction as the dependent variable.  I found that agency resource 
investment was not supported as predictor; in other words, it did not appear to have a linear, positive 
association with collaborative interaction.  Agency resource investment was, in fact, a nominal variable 
with four levels.  Although the mean values of collaborative interaction ranged from 3.85 (s.d. = 0.87) at 
the lowest level of resource investment to 4.24 (s.d. = 0.50) at the highest level of resource investment, an 
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analysis of variance did not support rejecting the hypothesis that group means in the population were 
equal (p = 0.135).  The other three variables did demonstrate a linear, positive association with 
collaborative interaction, with standardized linear regression coefficients of 0.242 for anticipated impact, 
0.347 for other agencies’ motivation to cooperate, and 0.188 for involvement (p < .01 for all).  This 
model, shown as Model 2 in Table 18, explained approximately 35% of the variance in collaborative 
interaction.   
Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 2 stated that, “Collaborative interaction will mediate the relationship 
between motivation to achieve coordination and exercise satisfaction.”  The “build” half of the data set 
did not support a full mediation model.  Table 19 shows the first four iterations of respecification, none of 
which supported a full mediation model for any of the input variables.  With further respecification, the 
“build” data seemed to support a partial mediation model.  The model that depicted both anticipated 
impact and other agencies’ motivation to exercise satisfaction as partially mediated by collaborative 
interaction could not be subjected to a chi square test because it was just-identified, but the parameter 
estimates showed that the link between anticipated impact and exercise satisfaction was not statistically 
significant and therefore not supported (p = .188).  Removing this link produced the preliminary model 
(with standardized regression coefficient estimates) shown in Figure 5 and described in Table 20.  This 
model was not supported, however, in the “test” half of the data set, nor in the full data set.  I began an 
iterative process of respecification on the “test” half of the data set.  In these iterations, I returned 
involvement to the model, treated involvement as a partial mediator for the relationship between 
anticipated impact and collaborative interaction, and, for empirical reasons, removed the link between 
collaborative interaction and exercise satisfaction.  This model was supported in the test data, but it was 
not supported in the full data set.  I next returned the link from collaborative interaction to exercise 
satisfaction, and the model was supported by the full data set.  I also found that including the involvement 
variable dramatically improved the model fit.  This final model is depicted in Figure 6 and described in 
Table 21.   In the end, the full data set supported a model in which: (a) collaborative interaction partially 
mediated the relationship between anticipated impact and exercise satisfaction; (b) collaborative 
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interaction partially mediated the relationship between other agencies’ motivation to cooperate and 
exercise satisfaction; (c) involvement partially mediated the relationship between anticipated impact and 
collaborative interaction; and (d) the error terms of anticipated impact and other agencies’ motivation to 
cooperate were strongly correlated.  
 Hypothesis 3.  Hypothesis 3 stated, “Collaborative interaction will be positively associated with 
exercise satisfaction.”  Two tests support this hypothesis.  A simple Pearson bivariate correlation test 
shows that collaborative interaction and exercise satisfaction are significantly and positively correlated at 
0.431 (p < .01, n = 211).  A simple linear regression model with collaborative interaction as the only 
predictor and exercise satisfaction as the outcome variable shows that collaborative interaction predicts 
approximately 18% of the variance in exercise satisfaction (F = 47.695, p < .000), and the estimated 
regression coefficient for collaborative interaction is 5.221 (s.e. = 0.756, t = 6.906, p < .000).  Recall that 
exercise satisfaction was scaled like a traditional grading scale; this means that every increase of one unit 
in the average of ratings on the collaborative interaction items predicts an increase of 5 points in the 
overall ‘grade’ of the exercise – in other words, half a grade level.   
 Hypothesis 4.  Hypothesis four stated, “Confrontive conflict management style will moderate the 
relationship between collaborative interaction and exercise satisfaction.”  In path analysis, moderation is 
modeled by creating a product variable and assessing its contribution to the regression equation estimated 
by the model (Kline, 2011, p. 332).  Such models are just-identified, so the chi square test does not apply.  
Instead, the researcher examines the slopes of regression equations at particular values to assess the 
possibility of an interaction effect (Kline, pp. 328-332).  I estimated the regression coefficients for each 
path using the maximum likelihood technique, then I examined the unstandardized slopes of the resulting 
regression equations by inserting tiered values of W, the confrontive style score variable – specifically, 
from one standard deviation below the mean value of W to one standard deviation above the mean.  
(Values of +/- two standard deviations from the mean were not possible, given the way that these data 
were measured.)  To identify interaction effects, one would expect to see the equation at one standard 
deviation above the mean render a slope direction opposite that of the equation at one standard deviation 
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below the mean.  In the “build,” “test,” and full data sets, all slopes were positive.  These results do not 
support the hypothesis that confrontive conflict management style moderates the relationship between 
collaborative interaction and exercise satisfaction.   
 Research question 4.  RQ4 asked, “What is the relationship between the proposed eight common 
exercise tensions and participants’ overall satisfaction with the exercise?”  Recall that participants were 
asked to rate the severity of the tension from 0 (“no tension at all”) to 10 (“very strong tension”), with the 
mid-point, 5, representing “moderate tension.”  The mean values of the tension ratings ranged from 4.23 
to 5.25, with the “special authorities” tension showing the highest mean rating (see Table 22).  It read, 
“Certain positions (e.g., city and county leaders, members of Unified Command, etc.) take on 
special authorities during a crisis. Because these authorities are rarely activated, the individuals 
occupying the positions may be unfamiliar with them. Although exercises typically emphasize 
practice, some parties may not have enough information about their roles to effectively practice 
them. Differences in status may prevent both higher and lower status individuals from speaking 
candidly about what they do and don't know.”   
A test of bivariate correlations showed that all of the tensions were significantly positively correlated with 
one another, suggesting either that a focal exercise that experienced one tension more strongly was also 
likely to experience other tensions more strongly – or, alternatively, suggesting that individuals varied in 
their perceptions of the general severity of tensions in an exercise.  The ratings for each tension showed 
small but consistently negative correlations with the exercise satisfaction outcome variable. Only three of 
these Pearson correlations with exercise satisfaction were statistically significant (p < 0.05): the 
plan/improvise tension (-0.169), the simultaneous versus gradual arrival tension (-0.160), and the twenty-
four hour operational period versus eight-hour operational period tension (-0.201).   
 Conclusions.  In conclusion, the first hypothesis was largely supported: anticipated impact, other 
agencies’ motivation to cooperate, and involvement were linearly and positively associated with 
collaborative interaction.  Higher levels on each of these variables were associated with higher levels of 
collaborative interaction.  Agency resource investment was not meaningfully associated with 
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collaborative interaction, which suggests that even agencies that invest few resources in the exercise may 
engage in a high degree of collaborative interaction.   
 The second hypothesis was partially supported.  In the final model, only the relationship between 
involvement and exercise satisfaction was fully mediated by collaborative interaction.  This suggest that 
being highly involved is not, in itself predictive of satisfaction with exercise, but being more involved and 
more collaborative predicts higher levels of satisfaction.  For anticipated impact and other agencies’ 
motivation to cooperate, these variables alone helped predict exercise satisfaction, but they predicted 
much higher levels of exercise satisfaction when mediated by collaborative interaction.  Lastly, the final 
model suggested that anticipated impact helps to predict involvement, and collaborative interaction levels 
are predicted to be higher when both anticipated impact and involvement are higher.   
 The third hypothesis was not supported; a more confrontive conflict management style did not 
appear to moderate the relationship between collaborative interaction and exercise satisfaction.  This issue 
merits further analysis.  The fact that confrontive conflict style was, effectively, an ordinal variable 
seemed to limit the effectiveness of path analysis.  Other tests may be more effective for investigating this 
hypothesis, and other ways of composing the confrontive conflict management style variable are certainly 
possible.   
 Lastly, of the eight tensions that I proposed might be common to disaster exercises, I found that 
three of them were significantly (and negatively) correlated with exercise satisfaction: the plan/improvise 
tension, the simultaneous versus gradual arrival tension, and the twenty-four hour operational period 
versus eight-hour operational period tension.  These tensions in particular could be further investigated in 
future research.  While this chapter addressed the results of Phase 2, the quantitative study, in isolation, 
the chapter that follows will draw conclusions and implications from the entire project.         
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Tables and Figures 
Table 18  
Linear Regression Models Addressing Hypothesis 1 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
B Std. Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Anticipated 
Impact 
0.236 .067 .256** 0.229 .065 .242** 
Others' 
Motivation 
0.257 .054 .339*** 0.266 .052 .347*** 
Involvement .005 .002 .157* 
.006 .002 .188** 
Agency 
Contribution 
.008 .042 .012 
   
R2    0.353     0.360   
Adjusted R2 
  0.338    0.350   
F-statistic   24.65***     36.04***   
 
 
Figure 5. Preliminary Path Analysis Model for Hypothesis 2 (Build Data Only.. 
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Table 19 
Model Respecification for Hypothesis 2 
Model  Data  ᵡ2 df p Change 
in ᵡ2 
 
Full Mediation Model (Anticipated Impact, Other 
Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate, Involvement, 
Agency Resource Investment) 
“Build” Half 
of Data Set 
102.978 10 .000 n/a 
Full Mediation Model (Anticipated Impact, Other 
Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate, Involvement) 
“Build” Half 
of Data Set 
86.424 6 .000 16.554 
Full Mediation Model (Anticipated Impact, Other 
Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate) 
“Build” Half 
of Data Set 
75.146 3 .000 27.832 
Full Mediation Model with Correlated Error Terms 
(Anticipated Impact, Other Agencies’ Motivation to 
Cooperate, e1   e2) 
“Build” Half 
of Data Set 
11.532 2 .003 91.446 
Preliminary Model: Partial Mediation (Anticipated 
Impact, Other Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate) 
“Build” Half 
of Data Set 
1.797 1 .180 101.181 
Preliminary Model: Partial Mediation (see above) “Test” Half 
of Data Set 
6.928 1 .008 96.05 
Preliminary Model: Partial Mediation (see above) Full Data Set 6.372 1 .012 96.606 
Final Model: Partial Mediation (Anticipated Impact, 
Other Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate, 
Involvement, e1   e2) 
Full Data Set 1.884 2 .390 101.094 
Note. Change in ᵡ2 is change from interim model. 
 
Table 20 
Preliminary Partial Mediation Model for Anticipated Impact, Other Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate, 
Collaborative Interaction, and Exercise Satisfaction 
 
Variable  Standardized Estimated 
Regression Weight 
(Build Half of Data Set) 
Anticipated Impact  Collaborative Interaction 0.26* 
Others’ Motivation  Collaborative Interaction 0.35*** 
Collaborative Interaction  Exercise Satisfaction 0.29** 
Others’ Motivation  Exercise Satisfaction 0.31*** 
e1   e2 0.64*** 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 21 
Final Partial Mediation Model for Anticipated Impact, Other Agencies’ Motivation to Cooperate, 
Involvement, Collaborative Interaction, and Exercise Satisfaction (Hypothesis 2) 
 
Variable  Standardized Estimated 
Regression Weight 
(Build Half of Data Set) 
Anticipated Impact  Involvement 0.23*** 
Involvement  Collaborative Interaction 0.17** 
Anticipated Impact  Collaborative Interaction 0.27*** 
Others’ Motivation  Collaborative Interaction  0.36*** 
Collaborative Interaction  Exercise Satisfaction 0.20** 
Anticipated Impact  Exercise Satisfaction 0.19** 
Others’ Motivation  Exercise Satisfaction  0.25** 
e1   e2 0.55*** 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Figure 6. Final Path Analysis Model for Hypothesis 2.  
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Table 22 
Mean Ratings for the Eight Common Exercise Tensions 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Plan_Improvise 4.23 1.800 200 
Notional_SOP 4.58 2.104 197 
Ignore_Address 4.41 1.997 196 
Intervene_Debrief 4.26 2.145 207 
Simultaneous_GradualArrival 4.33 2.412 184 
24HrOp_8Hr 4.42 2.429 175 
PaceofInformation 4.61 2.224 224 
SpecialAuthorities 5.25 2.372 215 
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Chapter 8: Implications and Future Directions 
Summary of the Study 
 The dissertation project originated from a desire to better understand how agents engaging in 
interorganizational coordination operate in the absence of a hierarchical authority that could mandate 
coordinating structures.  In such situations, collaborative approaches are often invoked as normative, but 
our limited understanding of collaborative interaction as a phenomenon of organizational communication 
makes it difficult to distinguish between more and less effective ways to apply collaborative approaches 
in such situations.  In particular, collaboration research has often overlooked the important role of conflict 
management in collaborative work arrangements.  Consequently, I built upon Poole’s (2013) idea that 
good collaborations include an element of confrontation; I defined this construct as a sub-set or style of 
collaborative interaction in which agents (a) initiate contact with collaborators to seek or share feedback, 
preferences, perspectives, opinions, task information or status information; and, in situations of conflict, 
(b) asserting their preferences or opinions rather than withholding them; (c) ask the other party/ies to 
assert their preferences or opinions; and (d) first encourage differentiation, or the expression of 
differences, and only after that encourage integration, or the pursuit of common interests. 
 In Phase 1 of the study, I used observational and interview methods to collect qualitative data.  
The data comprised three cases – each of a different disaster exercise – for which I observed planning 
meetings and the exercise itself.  In each case, I informally interviewed a convenience sample of 
participants, and for the most complex case, I conducted more formal semi-structured individual 
interviews with members of the exercise planning committee.  (The interview guide appears in Appendix 
A.)  The research questions that guided this phase of the study were:  
RQ1: What kinds of conflicts arise in a multi-agency disaster response exercise? 
RQ2: What communication practices do exercise planners or participants use to navigate these 
conflicts?   
RQ3: How and when do confrontation behaviors emerge?  
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 With respect to RQ1, I found that the types of conflicts that arose conform to scholarly 
expectation in that they aligned with categories in extant literature, specifically: power differences, role 
uncertainty, procedural uncertainty, finite resources, mixed motives, differences in member effort, and 
task interdependency.  At the same time, however, the anecdotes of expressed struggle, response, and 
counter-response provided insight into the world of disaster response training exercises.  I distilled the 
challenges that seemed to be unique to the exercise context into eight common tensions in disaster 
response exercises, and I subsequently included these tensions in the Phase 2 questionnaire.   
 Regarding RQ2, I learned that indirect or avoidant responses to conflict were surprisingly 
common; these responses seemed to reflect a perception that, because agencies are to regard one another 
as equals, it would be inappropriate for one agency to make demands of or correct another.  The 
exercises’ lead facilitators often became default liaisons between agencies; the larger the group, the less 
likely the facilitator was to be able to create conditions for productive dialogue and cooperative decision-
making.   
 The third research question, RQ3, asked how and when confrontation behaviors emerged.  I 
found that some exercise participants took an ‘interventionist’ approach and engaged in confrontation as 
soon a conflict arose, while others waited for a sanctioned time to raise their concern, primarily in debrief 
discussions such as a “hot wash” with a sub-set of exercise participants or the formal after-action review 
meeting.  Those who took the latter approach seemed less likely to be heard by those who could do 
something meaningful about the conflict, while those who took the former approach had mixed results.  
Sometimes, the other party was receptive, and together they reached a preliminary solution.  Sometimes, 
however, the other party was dismissive, and no further action seemed possible. All of these data point to 
larger questions about the true purpose of training exercises: Learning or evaluation of prior learning?  
Building rapport through informal interactions or working separately to maximize each agency’s ability to 
reach its instrumental goals?  A version of these questions is likely to apply to many voluntary 
associations among organizations that prompt a need for coordination – and especially to those that 
initiate as attempts to collaborate.  
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 In keeping with the mixed-method design of the study, the qualitative results of Phase 1 strongly 
informed the development of items and scales for the survey instrument used in Phase 2.  (The full 
instrument can be found in Appendix C.)  The hypotheses and research question that guided Phase 2 of 
the study were as follows:  
H1: Motivation to achieve coordination will be positively associated with collaborative 
interaction.  
 H2: Collaborative interaction will mediate the relationship between motivation to achieve 
coordination and exercise satisfaction. 
 H3: Collaborative interaction will be positively associated with exercise satisfaction.  
 H4: Confrontive conflict management style will moderate the relationship between collaborative 
interaction and exercise satisfaction. 
RQ4: What is the relationship between the proposed eight common exercise tensions and 
participants’ overall satisfaction with the exercise?   
I developed the instrument to be distributed as an online questionnaire, and I recruited participants by 
email from a randomly-selected sample of response professionals who had completed any of six incident 
management courses at a local fire service institute in the last seven years.  The only inclusion criterion 
for participants was that they had to have participated in a multi-agency disaster response exercise in the 
past three years.  The questionnaire asked them to think of one such exercise and report on their 
perceptions and behaviors related to this focal exercise.  Two-hundred forty-five individuals completed 
the questionnaire.  The largest proportions of participants were firefighters, police, public health officials, 
or emergency management professionals, but the remaining participants were affiliated with a wide 
variety of other types of response agencies.   
My analysis evaluated a series of original scales and addressed four hypotheses and one research 
question related to the relationships between key variables.  The first hypothesis was largely supported: 
anticipated impact, other agencies’ motivation to cooperate, and involvement were linearly and positively 
associated with collaborative interaction.  Higher levels on each of these variables were associated with 
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higher levels of collaborative interaction.  Agency resource investment was not meaningfully associated 
with collaborative interaction, which suggests that even agencies that invest few resources in the exercise 
may engage in a high degree of collaborative interaction.   
The second hypothesis was partially supported.  In the final model, only the relationship between 
involvement and exercise satisfaction was fully mediated by collaborative interaction.  This suggest that 
being highly involved is not, in itself predictive of satisfaction with exercise, but being more involved and 
more collaborative predicts higher levels of satisfaction.  For anticipated impact and other agencies’ 
motivation to cooperate, these variables alone helped predict exercise satisfaction, but they predicted 
much higher levels of exercise satisfaction when mediated by collaborative interaction.  Lastly, the final 
model suggested that anticipated impact helps to predict involvement, and collaborative interaction levels 
are predicted to be higher when both anticipated impact and involvement are higher.   
The third hypothesis was not supported; a more confrontive conflict management style did not 
appear to moderate the relationship between collaborative interaction and exercise satisfaction.  This issue 
merits further analysis.  The fact that confrontive conflict style was, effectively, an ordinal variable 
seemed to limit the effectiveness of path analysis.  Other tests may be more effective for investigating this 
hypothesis, and other ways of composing the confrontive conflict management style variable are certainly 
possible.   
With respect to the fourth research question, of the eight tensions that I proposed might be 
common to disaster exercises, I found that three of them were significantly (and negatively) correlated 
with exercise satisfaction: the plan/improvise tension, the simultaneous versus gradual arrival tension, and 
the twenty-four hour operational period versus eight-hour operational period tension.  These tensions in 
particular could be further investigated in future research.  While this chapter addressed the results of 
Phase 2, the quantitative study, in isolation, the chapter that follows will draw conclusions and 
implications from the entire project.       
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Limitations  
 A Chinese proverb says that the best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago; the second best time 
is now.  There are several limitations of this study that merit mention, and I may be able to remedy some 
in future work.   
 Learning-oriented participants.  I gained entry to the field and got access to my survey sample 
through the local fire service institute.  Because many of my key informants and all of my survey 
participants had affiliations with this fire service institute, my samples may have been biased in their 
enthusiasm for training and learning in general.  It is possible that the people who declined to participate 
in exercises, declined my requests for interviews, or declined to participate in the survey might be less 
motivated about training, preparedness, or professional development.   
 Independent thematic analysis.  I got informal confirmation of my themes from a research 
colleague who had attended the planning meetings for the CSE exercise, but I did ask anyone to formally 
review or independently analyze my qualitative data or analysis.  The matching of themes to conflict 
categories is a coding exercise for which I could, in the future, recruit additional coders and assess inter-
rater reliability.  Other coding schemes related to confrontation episodes or conflict responses would also 
be possible.  
 Post-exercise “halo effect.”  My interviews and survey responses were entirely comprised of 
retrospective data.  Perhaps, after an exercise, participants are inclined to focus on what was positive and 
disinclined to think about what frustrated them or what didn’t work.   
 Missing data and survey sample size.  In quantitative research, missing data is an unpleasant 
reality.  Even among the responses that I counted as complete, participants often skipped one or two items 
somewhere in the questionnaire.  These skips were not consistent enough for me to decide to exclude a 
particular item, although more thorough survey testing would help me better identify confusing or 
irrelevant items.  I have not yet explored sophisticated interventions for missing data, such as imputation 
of missing data, but these might be worthy of consideration.  In the end, the sample size was barely 
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adequate for splitting the data to separate model building from model testing.  My more complex models 
may have struggled due to inadequate sample size for the number of parameters being estimated.   
Implications 
 Interorganizational coordination is difficult.  The master concept under investigation in this study 
was interorganizational coordination, and the simplest thing one can say about these data is that 
interorganizational coordination is difficult to achieve.  In the context of disaster response, responders 
train to use non-agency-specific standard operating procedures, such as HSEEP exercise planning 
structures or ICS for incident management, but these structures are unfamiliar enough to most responders 
that they may not truly provide a common language.  This hearkens back to Faraj & Xiao’s (2006) 
conclusion that, when nothing goes wrong, procedures for routinized coordination can work well, but 
when circumstances are less than perfect, routines break down and conflict ensues.  More broadly, the 
communication and coordination skills that responders need in unusual, high-risk situations seem to be 
skills that they rarely practice in their day-to-day activities.   
 The study also confirmed that the kinds of lateral relationships often described in 
interorganizational collaboration literature are exactly those that strain interorganizational coordination 
due to the lack of overarching authority.  There is no one to demarcate organizations’ ‘territory’ in order 
to provide role certainty, no one with enough influence to mandate procedures, and no one who sees it as 
his or her agency’s responsibility to make everyone work together for the common good.  Who is 
responsible for collective goal attainment?  Everyone and no one at the same time.  These challenges echo 
Taylor’s (2005) depiction of post-bureaucratic (i.e., postmodern) organizing.  Organizations seem to feel 
increasing pressure to operate in a more agile, resilient way – to be high-reliability organizations (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007) – but to partner with other organizations may be more challenging than they first 
imagine.   
 Collaborative approaches certainly seem to have the potential to foster cooperative decision-
making and attendant coordination of activity among laterally-related organizational partners.  Variations 
in the degree to which organizations and their representatives invest in collaborative arrangements raise, 
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once again, questions related to group membership (i.e., the bona fide groups concept of Putnam & Stohl, 
1990) and group inter-subjectivity (Poole, 1998).  My own work in this study, in retrospect, focused 
heavily on instrumental behaviors and goals, although the qualitative data certainly suggested that the 
development of trust and collective consciousness as exercise outcomes might be at least as important as 
satisfaction with the training exercise as a technical learning opportunity.  Contestants on reality 
television shows seem to have an in situ value concept called “being here for the right reasons”;  how 
could disaster response professionals and other interorganizational collaborators demonstrate to one 
another that they are ‘there for the right reasons’?  
 One success of the present study was the development of a collaborative interaction scale.  This 
begins to address Lewis’s (2006) call for communication scholars to identify what is basic to the 
phenomenon of collaborative interaction.  Like any approach that emphasis behaviors, what it misses is 
motivations, perceptions, and nuances in the socially-embedded interpretations of those particular 
behaviors.  It seems very possible that one party’s efforts to give and seek feedback, provide status 
updates, and adhere to a shared timeline might be perceived as incompetent, controlling, or interfering by 
another party.  Under what conditions would these collaborative behaviors be perceived as pro-social or 
appropriate, rather than anti-social or inappropriate?  Another related topic that merits further exploration 
is that of balancing among mixed motives in interorganizational coordination and collaboration; in the 
very instrumental terminology of the multi-team system literature, Marks and co-authors call this goal 
prioritization (2004).  My study suggested that agents may be likely to fall back on their home 
organizations’ goals when they encounter impediments to the interorganizational collective goals.  What, 
if anything, could reverse this reversion and refocus members on the collective goals?        
 Another success of the present study was the finding that collaborative interaction and conflict 
management, as concepts, appear to be intimately related but conceptually distinct.  I found some 
evidence to suggest that the study of conflict management styles need not end with the five styles of the 
Kilman Thomas instrument nor with Putnam and Wilson’s finding that people may not even be able to 
distinguish between collaboration and compromise (1984).  I need to do quite a bit more analysis of the 
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quantitative data from this study to speak more confidently about this topic.  At present, it appears that the 
collaboration-competition cluster style is linearly associated with greater exercise satisfaction and not 
strongly correlated with collaborative interaction.  I need to do more testing of the relationship between 
the two – for example, mediation and moderation within regression models – and I would still like to run 
some analyses using the broader spectrum of conflict ‘styles’ based on the dispersion of conflict style 
dimension scores.  Since counting each participant’s two highest styles created sixteen groups, I would 
like to try some hierarchical linear modeling with this conflict style variable as a grouping variable. 
 Even though I attempted to operationalize confrontation, I recognize that this operationalization 
needs refinement and further testing.  One might argue that the questionnaire never really measured it at 
all.  As I continue to work with this concept, it will be important to demonstrate its discriminant validity, 
particularly with respect to established conflict management styles – unless, of course, I begin to find that 
it is not truly distinct.  The term confrontation itself may need some revision, as it connotes antagonism.  
 Regarding disaster preparation, the reality is that The Big One – be it a devastating tornado, a 
massive earthquake, or an act of biological terrorism – will probably never happen here.  I become more 
and more convinced, however, that hundreds of Smallish Ones will, and for the victims, they will feel big 
enough indeed.  Some agencies will need to work together, and these exercises seem to help more than 
hurt, even if it seems like the “lessons learned” are the same every time (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006).  Also, 
given the overall unlikelihood of a major local catastrophe, I’ve begun to operate from the assumption 
that the exercise isn’t practice for the collaboration; the exercise is the collaboration.  The only known 
quantity is that everyone will get together and practice some more, next year, or the next year.  I’ve 
learned that “exercise world” is a world onto itself, and whether the exercises are ‘lessons’ or ‘tests’ 
seems to be a matter of some controversy.  Some participants seem to get very frustrated by the 
artificiality of exercise conditions, scenarios, or procedures.  I can understand this.  They want the highest 
possible degree of verisimilitude between the ‘dress rehearsal’ and the performance.  At the same time, 
I’m also starting to see it another way: The pace of the exercise – the lack of adrenaline – makes it 
possible for responders to engage in the luxury of informal conversation.  I observed many brief but 
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relaxed coffee-clutch conversations between people who didn’t work together on an everyday basis – or 
perhaps were meeting for the first time – and, to me, these small conversations seem to build the response 
community.   
One Last Reflection 
 I have to admit, I expected emergency response culture to be authoritarian, militaristic, and 
frankly rather unfriendly.  Some of those elements have their place, but I also found most responders to be 
good-humored, humble, and service-oriented.  The work of practicing to respond to disaster is important 
work, and I followed my participants’ lead in taking their objectives and efforts very seriously.  At the 
same time, I think that some aspects of the exercise experience related to identity and culture could be 
powerful tools in achieving effective interorganizational coordination through collaborative interaction.  
Confrontation is complementary, not contradictory, to this perspective.  Group scholarship has long 
known that more cohesive groups are more receptive to acknowledging and addressing conflict than are 
less cohesive groups.  
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Introduction and Consent:  
 
Thank you for taking the time to talk with me today.  As you may know, I am a Ph.D. student in the 
Department of Communication at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and I am conducting 
this research for my dissertation project.   
 
The goal of the project is to better understand how professionals from different agencies collaborate 
during the planning and performance of disaster response exercises. I believe that these findings will not 
only be useful to professionals in fields related to emergency management but also to people in many 
other sectors.  The idea of collaboration is very popular, but in practice, it can be challenging to 
communicate effectively and to reach agreements that benefit everyone.      
 
I would like to ask you some questions about your impressions of [exercise], from the planning meetings 
to the after-action review.  I am interested in your experiences and your opinions; there are no wrong 
answers.  Everything you tell me is confidential; for all my notes, analysis, and reporting, I will replace 
your name, the name of your agency, and the names of any geographical locations with pseudonyms.  I 
plan to interview at least thirty people, from three different exercises, and write papers based on the 
aggregate of all of their comments.   
 
I asked for 30 minutes of your time, but you are of course welcome to end the interview at any time.  
Also, if I ask a question that you would prefer not to answer, just let me know, and I will move on to 
another topic.   
 
With your permission, I would like to audio-record this interview so that I can focus on listening rather 
than taking notes.  I am the only person who will have access to the audio-recording; I will use it to take 
notes after we talk, and I’ll refer to the notes – which include no real names – from that point forward.  
Are you comfortable with having me audio-record?    
 
To comply with university research policies, I will need your signature on two consent documents: one 
saying that you are willing to participate in the research interview and one saying that it is okay for me to 
record the interview.  I have an extra copy of each form for you to keep.  [sign consent forms] 
 
Do you have any questions for me before we get started?  [if yes, address.]  Transition: Let’s get started.  
 
[Researcher Notes -- Key Concepts:  
 perceptions of incompatible goals/interests/values;  
 perceptions of interference;  
 consequences of interdependence;  
 changes to degree or type of interdependence;  
 attributions of intention;  
 dis/incentives to cooperate or compete (incl. rules, requirements, public or market pressure, 
stakeholder influence, etc.) 
Probe about specific interactions, communication behaviors or strategies.] 
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Outline of Topic Areas and Key Questions (Chronological Approach):  
 
[Transitional comment: First, I’d like to ask some general questions about you and your agency’s 
participation in disaster response exercises.] 
 
1. Orienting information:  
a. [Confirm which agency the participant represented in the exercise] 
b. What was your role during the exercise itself?  
c. What was your role during the planning of the exercise? [Get a sense of whether/to what 
extent participant attended planning meetings.] 
d. How typical was this exercise compared to others in which you’ve participated? [Get a 
sense of how many, what kind of exercises agency members participate in  in a typical 
year.] 
e. For exercises like this, where do your agency’s exercise objectives come from? 
f. Did your agency have any concerns about participating in this exercise?    
g. From your agency’s perspective, what might make an exercise like this one NOT a good 
use of participants’ time?   
h. About how many people from your agency participated in the exercise?  In what 
capacity?  
i. Did anyone else from your agency help plan the exercise?  In what capacity?  
j. Did you personally recruit controllers and evaluators?  On what basis were these 
individuals recruited?  
 
[Transitional comment: Now, I’d like to walk back through the process of planning, participating in, and 
debriefing the exercise, starting with the time when you first became involved with the exercise.] 
 
2. Initial involvement / planning phase: 
a. How did you personally became involved in the planning of the exercise? 
b. How clear were your agency’s goals for the exercise from the outset?   
c. Did you have any individual goals – anything that you personally wanted to get out of the 
exercise?  If yes, did you need anyone else’s help to meet this/these goal/s? 
d. Think about the first meeting that you attended.  As you looked around the room, what 
proportion of the agencies represented were ones that you work with frequently?  
Occasionally?  Never before?  
e. [Follow up on specific agencies given for each category: How might you expect to work 
with [other agency] during the exercise?  Is it the same for a real event?  For the 
‘frequent’ group, what kinds of challenges might you expect to arise?  For the ‘never’ 
group, what kinds of challenges might you expect to arise?] 
f. During the meeting, did anything that you observed from representatives of other 
agencies surprise you?   
 
 
3. Sub-committee meeting/s:  
a. Did you go to any sub-committee meetings? 
b. Who was included / represented in the meeting/s?  How familiar were you with the other 
people around the table?  In what context would you normally interact with each of them 
(outside of planning an exercise)? 
c. From your perspective, was the meeting useful?  Why or why not?  
d. Do you remember whether the discussion raised any considerations or information that 
was new to you? 
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e. Do you remember making any adjustments in the plans for your agency as a result of the 
discussion?  
f. Do you remember any adjustments that others made? 
g. Knowing what you know now about how the exercise went, was there anything that the 
group SHOULD have been talking about or resolving?  
 
4. Final stages of planning phase / MSEL review:  
a. How did your agency develop injects for the MSEL [“master scenario events list”]?  
When, in the planning process, did this happen?   
b. Did you make any revisions to these injects before the exercise?  If so, why?  
c. What was your approach to reviewing the full MSEL?  Did you look it over? If yes, were 
you looking for anything specific?  Did you provide any feedback about it?  Ask for any 
changes? 
d. Were you involved with getting participants, controllers, or evaluators from your agency 
to commit to attending the exercise?  If so, how easy was it to persuade them?  [Note: 
This may already have been covered in the orientation section.] 
e. What questions or concerns did participants from your agency have related to the 
exercise?  
f. What questions or concerns did controllers and evaluators from your agency have related 
to the exercise?  
g. Before the exercise, what were your predictions about the challenges that participants 
from your agency would face on the day of exercise?  In other words, what did you think 
might be difficult?  Might go wrong?  
h. Did you have any unresolved questions about the role or involvement of other agencies or 
representatives?   
i. In the weeks leading up to the exercise, did anyone from the planning committee ask you 
or your agency to go ‘above and beyond’ what you had expected to do?  If yes, how so? 
 
5. Exercise itself:  
a. From your perspective, how did the exercise go?   
b. What surprised ______?  (you, participants, controllers, evaluators, each in turn if 
different) 
c. What frustrated ______? (you, participants, controllers, evaluators, each in turn if 
different) 
d. Do you recall any incidents of being ‘stuck’ or waiting on someone or something? 
e. What did others seem to expect from your agency? Were these expectations reasonable?  
Where do you think these expectations came from?  (for example, is there any precedent 
for that?) 
f. Do you recall any misunderstandings that occurred?  
g. Do you recall any challenges related to missing information or a lack of input from some 
party?  
h. If this had been a real incident, rather than an exercise, do you think the response would 
have been any different?  How so?  
i. Were you a part of a “hot wash” conversation at the exercise itself?  If yes, were the 
things we’ve talked about discussed there?  [If yes, probe for specific 
opinions/perspectives.] 
 
6. After-action review and follow up: 
a. Did you participate in or contribute to the after-action review?  How so?  
b. From your perspective, what were one or two key take-aways from the exercise for your 
agency?  
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c. Did you learn anything about other agencies’ procedures or approaches?  
d. Did you learn anything about how other agencies perceive of your agency, rightly or 
wrongly?  
e. Was your leadership satisfied with the exercise?   
f. If you had it to do over again, is there anything that you would change in order to 
improve the value of the exercise for members of your agency?  For you personally?  
g. Do you have any reservations about getting involved in another exercise of this scope in 
the future?  Why/not?  
h. Has anything changed about the relationships between planning committee members as a 
result of this exercise?   
i. If you were going to send a brand new employee to serve on the planning committee of 
the next exercise like this, what advice would you give that person about how to work 
effectively with a group like this?  
 
 
[Transitional comment: Ask participant if there is anything else that s/he thinks that I should know about 
interagency collaboration in the emergency management community.  Ask participant if s/he has any 
questions for me.  Thank participant for time, offer to send summary of findings within a year.] 
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Appendix B: Complete List of Survey Variables 
 Independent variables:  
o Anticipated impact of exercise for agency (“Anticipated Impact”) 
o Agency representative’s level of involvement in exercise planning or participation 
(“Involvement”) 
o Agency’s relative resource investment compared to other agencies in exercise 
(“Involvement”) 
o Perceived mutual interest of participating agencies in understanding and drawing upon 
one another’s expertise (“Expertise Recognition”) 
o Degree to which agencies sought information from one another or shared information 
with one another during exercise process (“Informational Support”) 
o Degree to which agencies conformed to timelines and deadlines meaningful to the 
collective exercise experience (“Timeliness”) 
o Latent variable: “Confrontation”  
o Conflict management style employed by agency representative during exercise process 
(“Conflict Management Style Employed”) 
o Presence/severity of eight common tensions in disaster response exercises 
o Open-ended descriptions of tension/s experienced during exercise 
o Breadth/depth/number/types of agencies involved in exercise 
o Type of exercise (full-scale, functional, table-top, other) 
o Whether or not the individual helped to plan the exercise 
 Demographic information:  
o Years of field experience 
o Age 
o Amount of past exercise experience 
o Amount of additional training 
o Home agency 
o Military experience 
o FEMA credential status 
o Sex  
o If/how the individual has applied Incident Command System knowledge acquired in the 
IFSI course that they completed 1 to 8 years ago [as courtesy feedback for fire service 
institute] 
 Dependent variables:  
o Satisfaction with exercise process (“Satisfaction with Process”) 
o Satisfaction with exercise outcome (“Satisfaction with Result”) 
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Appendix C: Survey Instrument 
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